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ABSTRACT

To what degree do the methods of management for territorial and maritime disputes relate to
voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly? In particular, do actions taken by the
disputants in managing their disputes exert influence on their fellow disputant’s foreign policy
preferences in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) reflective of the nature of these
attempts? As territory has been found to be one of the most important driving factors in the
conflict between states, understanding the impacts of different settlement methods in the active
conveyance of information to other state actors in attempts to settle can provide insight into the
general contentment of states with international law and their place in the international system.
This potential impact in understanding the degree settlement attempts are reflected in UNGA
voting is important, not only to the disputants but also to the wellbeing of the international
system as a whole. In this dissertation, I seek to assess the relationship between settlement
attempts on territorial and maritime disputes with resulting voting patterns in the UNGA. To do
this, I conduct a large-N quantitative analysis to assess general support for my theory’s
hypotheses, followed by the examination of five case studies involving China to determine
additional support. I conclude with an overall discussion of my findings and with the next steps
in research.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review
Introduction
In order for a state to exist it must possess territory over which it is sovereign. This forms
a core component of the bedrock on which the modern international system rests. It comes as no
surprise, then, that when territorial control is disputed between states, the disputants take their
quarrel seriously. Sometimes these disputes are resolved through peaceful settlement while other
times conflict is pursued, though in both cases the territorial dispute itself may languish for
decades or more before it is finally settled. China and India have several disputed areas along
their borders, which have seen both violence and peaceful attempts at settlement since their
origination in the 1800s when territorial control of India shifted multiple times along the
boundaries with China, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. The greatest incidence of violence between
these two states was the eruption of the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Many border clashes and
violations have been instigated by both sides with the result that the disputed areas have often
been tense and attracted a lot of attention from both governments and the international
community. In more recent years, China and India have signed agreements in 1993, 1996, 2005,
2012 and 2013 in the hope that peace might be maintained along the disputed areas. The disputes
themselves continue to shape and mold the interactions between China and India to this day.
Similarly, long enduring disputes have grown increasingly contentious between the states
bordering the South China Sea, most notably between China and several other claimants,
especially Vietnam and the Philippines. Though to a large degree similar disputes, interactions
between China and Vietnam have been different from those between China and Philippines. In
the case of China and Vietnam, their shared border was the site of a brief war in 1979, a conflict
that ended in a stalemate that contributed to frequent border clashes well into the 1980s. Only
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since 2000 have these disputes begun to be put to rest, though tensions remain in the South China
Sea itself. The Philippines has had similar clashes with China, over the Spratly Islands in
particular, but has not engaged in outright war. Being the weaker economic and military power,
the Philippines has acted carefully to ensure its security and claims in the South China Sea, most
recently in the court case they brought against China which asserted in 2016 that their claims
were illegal.
These disputes shared by China, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines have consumed
many resources, much wealth, and considerable political effort to manage over the duration of
their existence. So much so that the disputes have been referenced in other interactions the states
have engaged in. That being said, it might be expected that states take interactions over their
disputed territories into account in other political areas beyond the dispute itself such as in
international organizations in which they are members. To what degree do types of settlement
attempts for territorial and maritime disputes relate to voting patterns in the United Nations
General Assembly? In particular, do peaceful/violent actions taken by the disputants contribute
to a convergence/divergence in voting similarity between the disputants in the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA)? As territory has been found to be one of the most important driving
factors in conflict between states, it stands to reason interactions over territorial disputes will
exert effects on other interactions between states. Understanding the impacts of different
settlement methods between disputants can provide insight into voting in the UNGA, which
serves as a proxy for the general respect of states with regards to the place of international law
rule-based order in the international system. After all, violent attempts to settle territorial
disputes explicitly violate international law regarding territory, sovereignty, and the norms of
what is permissible in the international order, things which have been increasingly reinforced

2

since the end of World War II. This potential impact in understanding the degree settlement
attempts are reflected in UNGA voting is important, not only to the disputants, but also to the
wellbeing of the international system as a whole. To so explicitly and overtly act violently
counter to what has been enshrined in the structure of the UN reveals states that do so as not
willing to respect the rules on which the modern international system is based, and thus the more
states that behave this way, the more the functioning international order is at risk to degenerating
into what it was prior to the World Wars wherein conflict and upheaval was more common and
cooperation less so. Depending, then, on the strength of the relationship between these two
phenomenon, states and the leaders of the international community have greater incentive to pay
attention to territorial disputes and act to reinforce the likelihood of successful peaceful
settlement of disputes, that the general place of international law is strengthened in the
international system, especially as regards to efforts to expand and codify it via resolutions in the
UNGA.
Although some researchers examining the international relations between states see
interactions in the UNGA as being primarily symbolic, the fact remains that it is the main forum
in which all states are able to come together, and vote on issues, on a regular basis (Voeten
2000), and as such has served as part of the bedrock in which modern international efforts have
been made in attempts to mitigate illegal violence between states. In the worst-case scenario,
even if the UNGA is “merely a passive arena for the political interaction of member states
(Dixon 1981, p. 47),” the point remains that studying these interactions over time and across
issues will reveal insights into the interactions between states in the international community. As
Voeten (2000) presents it, even though the analysis of UNGA voting behavior can have its
issues, it remains one of the best means with which to examine the structure of the international
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system following the end of the Cold War. This is primarily due to how the interactions in this
forum serve as a representation of the opinions, alignments, and even changes in the international
system as a whole. With this in mind, and given the importance of territory to states, it stands to
reason that different types of settlement attempts will have different impacts on disputant
relations with each other, which might be expected to be reflected in behavior outside of the
direct dispute interactions, such as voting in the UNGA.
In order to establish the importance of the theory presented and tested in this project, I
begin with a presentation of the importance of territory to states, how it is linked to conflict in
the international system, and what research has been done regarding territorial disputes. This is
necessary to fully understand the grounding in which this theory is based, particularly to the
degree it helps contribute to the understanding of the analyses conducted in the following
chapters. From there I present what is still missing from this research and how my research
project contributes to it. I conclude with a general outline of the rest of this project.

Territory and Conflict Between States
While states can go to war over many things, when we examine the data, territory tends
to be an issue that comes up often as a cause of war (Heldt 1999; Hensel 2000; Kocs 1995;
Mitchell and Thyne 2010; Mitchell and Thies 2011; Vasquez 2001, 2004). In point of fact, in the
period of 1816 to 1945, territory was a contributing cause to 65% of wars, a percentage that
increases to 72% for conflicts following the end of World War II (Vasquez and Henehan 2011).
This might well be due to unresolved territorial claims potentially increasing the likelihood of
conflict by forty times as compared to other issues (Kocs 1995).
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Territorial borders themselves can be particularly salient to when a war might break out
according to decades of research into these kinds of disputes (Atzili 2005; Bennett and Stam
2004; Gibler 2007; Hensel et al. 2008; Kratochwil 1986; Mandel 1980; Silberfein and Conteh
2006; Siverson and Starr 1990; Starr 2002; Starr and Most 1976, 1978; Starr and Thomas 2005).
It has been established that it often serves as one of the most important predicators of war or
conflict escalation (Hensel 2000; Vasquez 2001; Vasquez and Henehan 2011), which holds true
regardless of how escalation is measured (Braithwaite and Lemke 2011). Of these areas under
dispute, borders that diverge from previously existing administrative frontiers, whether internal
or external, are particularly likely to lead to territorial disputes (Carter and Goemans 2011),
especially when said borders lack standing in international law (Kocs 1995; Owsiak 2012).
There are relationships between regime types and conflict over territorial disputes as
well. First of these findings deals with the general lack of conflict between democracies when
these shared stable borders (Gibler 2007; Miller and Gibler 2011). What this ends up
contributing to is points of contention between these bordering democracies that tend to have less
salience to the survival of the states themselves, thereby leaving the door open to a greater room
to maneuver in finding a settlement that falls short of conflict (Miller and Gibler 2011).
Interestingly, there have been some findings that suggest that stable borders between states is
what contributed to states attaining democratic status (Gibler 2007), which has found support in
a range of other studies (Kacowicz 1995; Mitchell and Prins 1999; Miller and Gibler 2011;
Owsiak 2012). Indeed, when it comes to conflict, it appears that territorial disputes, and the
variables that relate to them, matter more than regime type variables when it comes to whether or
not disputes might spiral into conflict (James, Park and Choi 2006).
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Territorial disputes themselves might also have impacts that can be felt outside of the
dispute itself. According to Senese (2005) and Rider (2013), territorial disputes between states
are often more likely to lead to arms races. They may also spur on the formation of new
alliances (Gibler 1996, 1997; Sprecher 2004; Senese 2005). These things in turn can contribute
to a higher probability of conflict, which is supported by Vasquez (2004) in his findings that
outside allies, enduring rivalries, and arms races are all more likely to contribute to war as
compared to non-territorial disputes between states. That being said, where territorial disputes
co-occur alongside other disputed issues, they can become increasingly contentious (Dreyer
2010). When states have rivalries with other states, disputed territory between them can
contribute to tensions (Lektzian, Prins and Souva 2010), even leading to normal rivalries
becoming enduring ones (Dreyer 2012; Fuhrmann and Tir 2009; Goertz and Diehl 1992, 1993).
In point of fact, when rivalries are based around territory they tend to be more enduring than
those that are based in ideological or regime-based differences (Dreyer 2012; Miller and Gibler
2011).
Given the costs associated with conflicts surrounding territory, both in the short and long
terms, it becomes rational for states to attempt to settle these issues. Unfortunately, this becomes
increasingly difficult to do over time as a territorial dispute becomes more entrenched, leading
for the disputed area to acquire additional symbolic value (Hassner 2006), especially when
political agents construct narratives to affect the nature of the conflict (Goddard 2006; Goddard,
Pressman and Hassner 2008). That being said, a large percentage of research in the literature on
territorial disputes tend to focus on the armed conflict between the disputants more so than the
management, or peaceful settlement, of these disputes (Frazier 2006; Hensel 2001; Powell and
Wiegand 2010; Wiegand 2011a). More has been done in recent years, and this project hopes to
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make an equally valuable contribution in terms of how these settlement interactions impacts
voting patterns in the UNGA.

Settlement Attempts
Since territorial disputes can be so costly for the states engaged in them, especially in
regards to economic and military costs (Simmons 2002, 2005), it behooves these countries to
attempt to settle them in a manner that will reduce the costs over time. The expectation here is
that, following peaceful transfers of territory, peace between the disputing state will occur
(Goertz and Diehl 1992), especially in cases where the transfers are themselves mutually
acceptable to both parties (Vasquez 1993). This is even more effective when the settlement itself
is legally based (Huth 1996; Kocs 1995). Contrary to the peaceful approaches, which tend to
constrain leaders from being able to use violent attempts in the future, when territory is
transferred as a result of violence future armed conflict is more likely to occur (Gibler and Tir
2010; Tir 2003, 2006). That being said, research by Hensel, Allison, and Khanani (2009) asserts
that there is no systematic effect from violent or peaceful territorial treaties on the likelihood of
future territorial change. Regardless, research has shown that specific types of dispute
settlements have resulted in different results and levels of effectiveness.
There are a range of settlement methods disputant states might utilize in an attempt to
settle their disputes. The default approach, maintaining the status quo, is where the state would
be motivated to make no change in attempting to settle the dispute, be it a militarized or peaceful
attempt. This being the case, the dispute itself is maintained, and the situation takes on the
characteristics of a negative peace between the opponents (Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2008).
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If states decide to settle their disputes, however, there are a range of approaches they
might pursue. The first of these is bilateral negotiations, under which the disputants themselves
directly engage with their counterparts in attempt to settle the shared dispute, and as such require
no outside facilitation (Shaw 2003). This first attempt tends to be particularly likely to be used
by states when territory is under dispute (Hensel 2001; Hensel et al 2008; Mitchell and Thies
2011). The next deals with non-binding dispute resolution methods, specifically mediation,
conciliation, or the use of good offices by a third party. For these first two types, if there is a
history of failed settlement attempts on a specific dispute, it becomes more likely in the future
for subsequent third-party assistance, while if there is a history of success bilateral attempts are
more likely (Hensel 1999).
Beyond this are the binding dispute methods of arbitration and adjudication that bring in
a third party to rule on the merits of the case, which leads to a decision on how the dispute
should be settled (Bercovitch and Rubin 1992; Cassese 2005; Merrills 2011; Powell and
Wiegand 2010; Shaw 2003). Arbitration can be particularly appealing to leaders of democratic
states, as this method provides a way to protects themselves from domestic criticism (Huth,
Croco and Appel 2011). In fact, the likelihood of legal dispute resolution increases by three
times if the states involved have democratic political institutions (Allee and Huth 2006).
Ultimately the odds of peaceful resolution increases when the legal principles involved justify
resolution in favor of one state over another (Huth, Croco and Appel 2011, 2012). Perhaps this is
due to making the decision process that much simpler by not having to come up with a ruling
that equitably satisfies both parties. It has even been found that another factor of influence in
choosing a dispute settlement method it the win-loss record of the challenger state (Wiegand and
Powell 2011).
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These last two methods share three general characteristics. Firstly, a third party, not the
disputants themselves, determine terms of settlement. Secondly, unlike mediation, states agree
to honor the ruling before the decision is handed down. Lastly, principles of international law are
incorporated in the process of the settlement attempt, which are consistent across different
disputes as the law is itself consistent. The tensions inherent in these types of settlements have
meant that arbitration and adjudication have seen less usage than other peaceful settlement
attempt methods. That being said, these latter two methods boost the overall credibility of the
disputants for wanting to settle the dispute in peaceful manner since, by participating, they do so
with the full knowledge of the potential costs that might ensue should they not stand by them. To
bring both parties onboard for an attempt at arbitration or adjudication then seems to indicate that
much more commitment to settle the dispute.
Just because states start to commit to settling their shared territorial disputes does not
always mean that they will successfully be able to do so. In the case of a disputed territory
having strategic value, even if it is divisible states might still resort to violence over it due to
facing a commitment problem (Carter 2010). Emotional and symbolic value can also hamstring
an attempt before it even begins. In examining the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, Kaufman (2009)
shows that emotional narratives regarding the disputed area prevent any compromises from being
reached, thereby escalating the conflict, all because anything less than complete victory is seen
as losing. This being the case, there sometimes can be other motivations for states to attempt to
settle their territorial disputes beyond simply seeking to put them to rest to avoid the economic,
political, and military costs associated with their continuance.
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United Nations General Assembly and General Voting Patterns
The UNGA, one of the six primary organs of the United Nations (UN) and the only one
of which each member is represented and allowed to vote, was first convened in January of 1946.
Since that first year the initial membership of fifty-one countries has expanded to include one
hundred and ninety-three by present day. In terms of its role, the UNGA is in charge of
exercising the deliberative, supervisory, financial and elective functions relating to the matters
covered by the UN Charter. That being said, its primary role, and the one of which has received
the most scrutiny by the academic community, is in its’ serving as a forum in which to discuss
issues affecting the international community and the recommendations they arrive at, as the body
itself has no real power to enforce these resolutions or to compel any state to act. Most decisions
generally require a simple majority vote, though for matters related to the admission of new
members, budgets, or issues of peace or security, a two-thirds majority vote is required. Given
the status of the UNGA as the only forum in which the vast majority of states in the international
system convenes and votes regularly on issues, that is to say express their preferences in an
observable manner, a number of theoretical attempts at understanding voting patterns within this
body have resulted. In particular, many researchers have sought to use UNGA voting in order to
determine dimensions of interactions in international relations, including such things as voting
blocs and political alignments, especially during the Cold War period (Alker 1964; Alker and
Russett 1965; Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2017; Gartzke 1998; Holloway 1990; Holloway and
Tomlinson 1995; Kim and Russett 1996; Lijphart 1963; Voeten 2000, 2004, 2013).
In terms of understanding the general structure of the international system during the
Cold War, the world community might best be thought of as composing a bipolar continuum
dividing it into a Western bloc, an opposing Eastern bloc, and a range of non-aligned countries

10

across the center between both groups. This period in time was characterized by intense
competition between the wealthy and democratic Western bloc, led by the United States, and
their communism aligned Eastern bloc, headed by the Soviet Union. The remainder of the states
in the international system were generally unaligned with either faction fully, though they also
varied with the degree of their involvement in the Cold War conflict, as well as the
characteristics of their states. It is in this period that we see the first, classic study of UNGA
voting by Alker and Russett (1965), in which they assess voting as generally following an EastWest dichotomy, with a North-South as another frequently underlying pattern of voting behavior.
This second division was found to be based in large part on differences in levels of economic
development, with both patterns being supported to some degree in subsequent studies (Alker
1964; Alker and Russett 1965; Holloway 1990; Lijphart 1963; Newcombe, Ross, and Newcombe
1970; Van Staden and Stokman 1970). Once the Cold War ended, however, this initial bipolar
system that had dominated world politics and UNGA voting for the initial decades of the UN’s
existence went away.
With this being the case, Voeten (2000) set out to assess how voting patterns had varied
following the end of the Cold War, ultimately arrival at two different examinations of potential
changes in UNGA voting, with underlying theoretical perspectives as to why they might have
varied this way. The first of these is what Voeten (2000) terms Dealignment, in which states
pursue voting informed by their preferences on each specific issue, rather than relying on
consistent geopolitical affiliations to inform their votes. Under this first approach, even when
there is bloc voting on specific issues, this is due to association with more ad hoc coalitions
rather than groups that inform voting on other issues. To illustrate this, Voeten (2000) cites how
most European countries tend to vote in favor of the US stance on defense issues, though they
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tend to vary a bit more on human rights or trade issues to which they might have different
preferences. What this approach signifies for patterns in UNGA voting is the overall
dimensionality, that is to say the potential spread of voting outcomes, has increased, with the
specific issues on the UNGA’s agenda having more influence on voting outcomes. This stands
contrary to the alternative that Voeten (2000) presents, that of realignment. Under the
realignment thesis, voting in the UNGA is not necessarily less structured as it was during the
Cold War, only that other alignments might have replaced the East-West division of the
opposing sides that existed during this period in the history of the UNGA. Overall, Voeten
(2000) suggests that these new alignments might be theoretically derived from both realist and
liberalist perspectives of international relations. What follows are the hypotheses he suggests.

Realist Hypotheses of Alignment in UNGA Voting
From the realist perspective, it is possible to present the ending of the Cold War as
fundamental shift in the distribution of power. The scale of this shift might be labeled as
systemic as it completely altered the overall distribution of power and the global hierarchy
(Gilpin 1981). According to realists, then, states will respond to this change by adjusting their
behaviors to take into out the new distribution of power, though their overall goals and how they
interact will not change meaningfully (Ikenberry and Doyle 1997). Following this line of
reasoning, Voeten (2000) presents three hypotheses based on realist theories: a stability
hypothesis; a structuralist hypothesis; and a counterhegemonic hypothesis.
Regarding the stability hypothesis, the perspective that Voeten (2000) summarizes states
that the ending of the Cold War will not change the basic factors underlying state behavior in the
international system, namely that each state pursues their security with the perspective that the
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greater international community exists in a state of war in which every other state is a potential
opponent. Thus, other than former Communist states emerging into new alignment with the
West, and European countries achieving somewhat more distance from the US, the overall
voting behavior within the UNGA will still share similar patterns with what occurred during the
Cold War itself.
A second realist hypothesis that Voeten (2000) sets out to examine is the structural one,
wherein weak states are expected to share common interests in preventing the adoption of policy
positions favored by stronger states on the basis that this would lead to an increase in their
insecurity (Iida 1988). In the case of the current structure of the UN, developing states in the
Global South would have vested interests in a strong UN, as it would act to protect them against
the predations of the stronger states in the Global North, whereas these more developed states
would be determined to keep the UN weaker so as to maximize the utility of their power. Work
by Kim and Russett (1996) found that, by the 1990s, the cleavage between the North and South
actually took prime position over the previously reigning Cold War alignments in terms of
UNGA voting. In addition, Voeten (2004) also finds that a preference gap between the United
states and the rest of the world has opened up since the Cold War ended, a gap that has widened
at a constant rate over time from the period 1991 to 2001.
The last of the realist based hypotheses is based around the idea of a counterhegemonic
bloc. Generally speaking, Voeten (2000) suggests that challengers to US hegemony would be
either rising powers with disproportional growth rates (like China) or states that would seek
opportunities to expand contrary to the guiding principles of the international system (one
example being Iraq under Saddam Hussein). Thus, this hypothesis would suggest that states
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seeking to challenge the US and the principles of the international system would come together
to form a counterhegemonic bloc.

Liberalist Hypotheses of Alignment in UNGA Voting
Standing distinct from the realist perception of patterns of voting in UNGA are the
liberalist perspectives, which see shifts in international politics as generally stemming from
changes in the domestic principles or structures of states. Under the approach, then, any shifts in
voting alignments in the UNGA might not only be determined by the structural variables of the
international system but might also be influenced by domestic political regimes (Voeten 2001).
The first hypothesis of this perspective that Voeten (2001) suggests is centered around
regime type and how it tied into the end of the Cold War. Given that the Cold War ended with
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Voeten (2001) suggests that the ending of this ideological
conflict would lead to a tightening of the alliance between liberal democratic states against those
states that had yet to make the transition from other regime types. With states expected to vote in
line with their interests, Voeten (2001) would suggest that the new voting blocs would be
composed of these democracies on one side and non-democracies on the other. This hypothesis
might have some merit as Voeten (2000) himself finds that a greater degree of democracy is
related to more “Western” voting behavior, and Potrafke (2009) finds that government ideology
itself has had a strong influence on whether a state votes in line with the US.

Other Factors Influencing Patterns in UNGA Voting
Several additional factors have been examined in terms of determining influences on
UNGA voting, with some of the earliest work in this regard seeking to examine the role that
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geography and shared history might play. Rai (1972) found that historical and military ties were
an important factor in the voting of countries in Latin America. Several decades later
Montenegro and Mesquita (2017) would tackle a similar project in seeking to determine the
relationship between the BRICS countries and the voting affinity in their respective regions.
Overall, they found that there was a high degree of cohesion regionally for Brazil, China, and
South Africa (Montenegro and Mesquita 2017). More generally, there has even been found a
considerable level of cohesion between Brazil and African states in the UNGA, partly as a result
of a rising public profile in the international system (Seabra and Sanches 2019). That being said,
this general cohesion does not mean they in line all the time (Seabra and Sanches 2019). Specific
characteristics of a state, such as human rights issues, have also been found to have a relationship
with voting in the UNGA (Hug and Lukács 2014; Primiano and Xiang 2016).
The leaders of a country have also been shown to exert some influence on voting patterns
in the UNGA. The new leaders of states have been found to vote in line with the United States
more consistently than leaders that had held their position longer (Dreher and Jensen 2013).
Thus, some researchers have called for more attention to be directed to the dynamics of domestic
political competition and leadership selection in order to more fully predict foreign policy
changes by states (Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll 2015). Moreover, leader change in nondemocratic
states has been found to lead to voting more neutrally in relation to the voting of the United
States (Smith 2016). Conversely, leader change in democratic states appears to have no
systematic impacts on voting alignments (Smith 2016), though the ascendance of individual
leaders has contributed to shifts in voting patterns, an example being the election of President
Trump which saw UNGA voting agreement with Western countries reduced by 7.2 percentage

15

points on average as compared to previous presidents, a change that was especially pronounced
in NATO member countries and on topics related to the Middle East (Mosler and Potrafke 2020).
More generally, democracy has itself been examined in terms of its influence on voting in the
UNGA (Hug and Lukács 2014). Dreher and Sturm (2012) find that the more democratic a state
is, the more they tend to vote in line with the G7 countries. In addition, there is greater voting
alignment between states that have similar political leanings, and as they become more
democratic (Dreher and Sturm 2012). That being said, some research has also found that part of
the reason democracies might support US positions in the UNGA might be due to the linkage of
US aid to voting (Carter and Stone 2015). Democracies in the developing world tend to be
critical of voting positions by the US in the UNGA as compared to autocracies, which might be
due to the sensitivity of their governments to public opinion (Carter and Stone 2014). Despite
this, these same democracies tend to comply with US voting positions more so than autocracies
due to the US being more likely to carry out threats and uphold promises to manipulate aid if the
state is a democracy (Carter and Stone 2014).
Development and trade have also been assessed for its link to voting behavior in the
UNGA. For states that have a stronger national capability, and thus less dependence on foreign
relationships, there is less of a likelihood of voting in line with the G7 (Dreher and Sturm 2012).
In terms of those states that are larger or richer, they tend to vote relatively consistently, whereas
states that are poor and the target of aid tend to shift their voting patterns more often, which may
be indicative of vote-buying by other states (Brazys and Panke 2017). Worryingly, Brazys and
Panke (2017) conclude that one of the ramifications of this is that the international norm
environment might not be set in stone and instead be more susceptible to changes by revisionist
actors than has been previously assumed. Corruption has also been assessed to find that voting
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alignment with the US rises as corruption decreases (Dreher and Jensen 2013), while more
corrupt states tend to vote in line with one another (Dreher and Sturm 2012). Lower GDP per
capita also carries a higher likelihood of voting similarly to the US, though GDP growth has no
significant effect on voting (Dreher and Jensen 2013). Lastly, there is some support for a link
between rising exports and imports with a state to voting similarity (Dreher and Sturm 2012).
Lastly, the provision of aid has itself been extensively examined for a relationship with
vote similarity in the UNGA. Initially during the height of the Cold War, US economic aid was
found to have very little relationship to voting patterns in the UNGA, whereas the aid provided
by the USSR had a greater impact on voting (Rai 1972). Over time this changed. Since 1985, US
law has given the State Department the responsibility of identifying important votes in the
UNGA, that aid disbursements might occur to reflect voting decisions (Carter and Stone 2015),
with the result that US aid has a direct impact on ensuring voting compliance (Carter and Stone
2010; Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008). While many poorer countries in the UNGA place
importance on their voting independence (Carter and Stone 2010), the US systematically
provides more bilateral foreign aid to countries that are moving away from its’ position or hold
unfavorable opinions in the UNGA following the end of the Cold War (Woo and Chung 2017).
Program aid, grants, and untied aid are particularly likely to influence voting behavior in the
UNGA (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008), and even the projects, programs, and loans of
the World Bank and IMF have been found to increase voting similarity with the G7 countries.
Only the poorest of democracies have voting preferences that stand out as more in opposition to
US positions that autocracies do, perhaps indicating that they are more willing to take symbolic
stands on issues voted upon in the UNGA, even if it means they lose access to foreign aid (Carter
and Stone 2015). The relationship between aid and voting even touches on the elected members
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of UNSC, such that these states vote similarly to the US and the other permanent members as the
number of loans they have increases (Hwang, Sanford, and Lee 2015). Overall, the dependence
on aid appears to increase voting similarity between the provider and the receiver in the UNGA
(Dreher and Sturm 2012).
What these findings indicate is that, contrary to some paradigmatic arguments as to
international organizations not mattering, states often do behave in a manner that shows they
care about influencing voting in the UNGA. Even when they do not directly attempt to influence
voting, factors like corruption and trade (Dreher and Sturm 2012) seem to exert influences on
voting alignment anyway. Thus, each of these examined relationships provides support
theoretically to the notion that external interactions to the UNGA, such as interactions over
territorial disputes, might in turn impact voting in the international organization. Territorial
dispute interactions are unique of those above in the sense that the management of them can be
starkly positive (peaceful attempts) or negative (violent attempts) in terms of the methods
themselves. This being the case, and sidestepping whether or not international organizations
matter to the overall international system, this project proceeds along an issue-based approach to
studying interactions between states within IOs, wherein states cooperate (or struggle) over a
range of issues (see work by: Diehl 1992; Hensel 2001; Keohane and Nye 1977; Mansbach and
Vasquez 1981).

Gaps in the Literature
To this point, research has examined the factors that influence the likelihood of dispute
settlement, factors that have influenced the selection of settlement methods, and the overall
results of successful settlement on relations between the former disputants. This dissertation
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project moves to examine one scenario that has been under-examined, which is the extent that
action taken in regards to territorial and maritime disputes can impact interactions with states
outside the direct dispute itself. This new theory draws in part on the logic of work by Atzili and
Pearlman (2012). They break down how states have incentives to use threats or punishments
against other states in order to coerce the targeted states to exert influence on non-state actors to
cease conducting attacks of the coercers’ territory. Essentially, the logic of their theory is that the
state hosting a non-state group is forced to play two games simultaneously (Atzili and Pearlman
2012). On the one level, the state must deal with the actions and threats of the state it is disputing
with, while on the other hand also manage its policies with the non-state actor it is hosting.
For this project the logic is similar, but instead of using coercion to send a message to a non-state
actor, is it possible that the message is instead being sent not just to the fellow disputant but to
the international community as a whole? Could states utilize territorial dispute settlement
attempts to signal something to the international community? The answer might be found in
examining how these interactions over territorial and maritime disputes might be reflective of
international norms themselves, specifically those outlined previously in the scope of the United
Nations Charter.
Several research projects up until now have made the case that, since territory is often
subject to emotion and normative elements, territorial disputes themselves might also be
explained to some degree by adopting social and psychological perspectives and, more
importantly for this project, by drawing on subjective conceptions of justice and international
norms (Barzilai and Peleg, 1994; Forsberg 1996). In presenting the underlying motivations of the
UN in terms of codes of behavior acceptable in the international system, and the fact that the vast
majority of states in said international system account themselves members of the international
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organization, it stands to reason that the guidelines of state behavior enshrined in the UN Charter
are the guidelines in which the member states are throwing their support behind in terms of how
the international system itself should function. That is to say that, by being member states, they
will act in concert against threats to international peace and security, particularly in the sense of
acting “…to bring about by peaceful means, in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might
lead to a breach of the peace (United Nations 1945a),” all with the UN itself existing as a
“…center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends (United
Nations 1945a).” Thus, the expectation is here that being a member state of the UN, yet acting in
a violent manner in pursuit of territorial or maritime settlement that is illegal under the Charter,
said states are in spirit protesting the international laws and norms surrounding the UN as they
are preventing these states from acting in the manner they wish regarding their disputes. This can
be indirectly supported by the literature supporting how a consensus over international norms
can increase the likelihood of peaceful territorial change, despite diplomatic interventions or past
experiences not having this influence (Kacowicz 1994). It stands to reason that states who differ
on their perspectives of international norms might conceivably see greater conflict between
themselves over these disputes due to these differences. This might especially hold true in
situations where states might wish to signal other states outside the disputing dyad, such as
Wiegand (2011a) finds when states demonstrate their resolve to an opposing state to credibly
signal said resolve to other states as well. In sum, should this be the case, we can expect that
attempts to settle territorial and maritime disputes that violate these subjective conceptions of
justice and international norms are made in protest of the international system from which they
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come. This being the case, we can expect the impact of these dyadic settlement interactions to
exert influences on other political arenas, such as voting in the UNGA.

The Rest of the Project
In the turbulent international system of the present, it is now more important than ever to
understand the relationship between interactions over disputed territory, interactions in terms of
voting in the UNGA, and how it links to stances on the structure of the US-led international
system. My dissertation extends scholarship on territorial disputes and conflict management by
examining how interactions over these, often contentious, phenomena can impact interactions
beyond just the dispute itself, in this case in terms of voting patterns in the UNGA. By
understanding how these international political arenas interact, it will become more possible to
determine when political dissension and conflict in the international system might spread from a
localized dispute between a dyad of states to become multilateral in nature. Further, this work
will contribute to an elaboration on the relevance of territory to understanding interstate
interactions in the international system beyond those directly related to the dispute itself. In the
next chapter, I outline the theory being presented to test the interrelationships between territorial
dispute settlement attempts and voting in the UNGA. Chapter 3 will outline the methodologies
being utilized in this project, starting with the quantitative dataset construction and analysis. This
chapter will conclude with the first of the quantitative analyses, seeking to assess all the
hypotheses as applied to all territorial and maritime disputes from the advent of the first UNGA
session in 1946 up through 2015. Chapter 4 then progresses to the presentation of the qualitative
case design, why the case studies were selected to illustrate the theoretical logic of the project,
and the examination of these specific qualitative case studies to best demonstrate the logic of the
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theory as applied at the state level. The final chapter presents my conclusion and reiterates an
overview of the findings of this project, the contributions it makes to the literature and policy
arenas, and how future research based of this theoretical approach will progress.
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Chapter 2: Theory
Introduction
The study of the importance of international organizations has been ongoing for some
time now. That being said, the general influence of international organizations on interactions
between states is still somewhat heavily debated (Mitchell and Hensel 2007), with several
different perspectives putting forth their own projections. These perspectives generally are
positive, negative, or dismissing of the importance of IOs in the world system. First,
institutionalists hold a positive perspective of IOs, which they theorize limit the impacts of
anarchy in the international system, and in so doing increase opportunities for cooperation
between states (Mitchell and Hensel 2007). This might occur through IOs’ purported ability to
reduce transaction costs and uncertainty, while also increasing the flow of information between
international actors (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Keohane 1984). On the other hand, it has been
suggested that institutions might contribute to reductions in the levels of cooperation, and even
an increase in levels of conflict between states (Mitchell and Hensel 2007). This is represented
by work showing when states with alliances might act against each other (Bueno de Mesquita
1981) and how shared membership in preferential trade agreements can encourage the use of
economic sanctions (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006). Lastly, there are those who hold
that IOs simply do not matter one way or another for the international system, based on the
argument that states will only bow to the stances of IOs when it is in their own self-interest
(Mitchell and Hensel 2007). Indeed, this last stance assumes that, should relative gains concerns
indeed be paramount, states will not cooperate with other states in situations where their security
concerns are compromised (Grieco 1988; Mearsheimer 1994-95). But might it equally be the
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case that similar logics to those above contribute to international politics impacting interactions
in international organizations, such as the UNGA?
This reverse relationship, wherein interactions between states influence subsequent
interactions in international organizations, in this case the UNGA, is of core interest to this
project. Importantly, studies of external factors influencing voting in the UNGA is not new,
though to this point, settlement attempts on territorial disputes has not been examined as a
potential factor of influence in voting patterns. The contribution of this dissertation to both the
study of territorial disputes and the United Nations is an expansion of theoretical linkages
between the two and an empirical assessment of this theory. By demonstrating how contentious
interactions over territory relate to voting in the UNGA we can get a sense for how direct
interactions between states shape and influence indirect interactions in the international system,
specifically the shape, role, and importance of international law in governing relations between
states. If violent interactions over territory are found to relate to voting in the UNGA against
greater roles for international law, and greater protections from the possibility of conflict and
war, states might be galvanized to act more directly in propagating international law and against
those states that seek to violate it through the use of force. In this chapter I present and test this
theory, with the hope that doing so will provide a greater understanding of new ways in which
territorial disputes matter to interactions in the international system, particularly in terms of their
impacts on international organizations like the UNGA.
This brings me to a more complete examination of the underlying rules that the United
Nations is based around, the presentation of which is necessary to understand why territorial
dispute settlement attempts will lead to specific voting patterns in the UNGA, and how violent
attempts will be indicative of protest against the US-led international system grounded in
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international law. Following this, I present an assessment of work done regarding UNGA voting
patterns in terms of realist hypotheses, liberalist hypotheses, and other factors that have been
found to possess influence. From there I present this dissertation’s theory on territorial dispute
management and UNGA voting, and then present how I aim to test this theory. I conclude this
chapter with a presentation of hypotheses on UNGA voting similarity between the disputants
involved in a territorial dispute, and hypotheses on voting similarity between the disputants and
the US as the main steward of the international system.

The United Nations in the Modern International System
Given the degree that the United Nations (UN), and by extension the international
community, has pursued measures to inhibit the forceful acquisition of territory, disputed or
otherwise, it stands to reason that states attempting to settle their territorial and maritime disputes
will see the methods they select result in effects on the behavior of their fellow disputants in the
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), or at the very least convey the degree the state is
contented or discontented with their place in the US-led international system. Perhaps the
methods of dispute management selected will even effect the distance between the average
general foreign policy preferences of UNGA state members beyond the dyad itself, both in terms
of average general foreign policy preferences and even individual foreign policy preferences,
such as human rights. This, however, might depend to some degree on the importance of territory
to states and in the international system.
That being said, before diving into the literature on territorial and maritime dispute
settlement itself, it is important to grasp an understanding of the international system as it
currently stands. Only in doing so are the connections between territorial dispute settlement and
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voting in the United Nations General able to be understood. The international system in its
current incarnation owes its existence to the actions taken by the Allied Powers during World
War II. Founded in 1945, the purpose of the United Nations has been to adhere to the four
components of its Charter outlined in article 1 (United Nations 1945a):
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace.
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace.
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these
common ends.
From the examination of these four guiding principles of the United Nation’s operations, it is
clear to see that the core of their activities are meant to spur on cooperation in the international
system and to prevent the outbreak of violence between its member states. These guidelines
likely come about as a reaction to the incidence of World Wars I and II, and a desire to avoid the
massive costs associated with these conflicts.
Another point of key importance that needs to be underlined in order to get at the link
between territorial disputes and voting in the United Nations General Assembly has to do with
the membership of the international organization. According to Chapter 2, Article 4 (United
Nations 1945c):
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1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which
accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the
Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
According to the Charter of the United Nations itself, “peace-loving states” are those to which
the international organization is open to and through whom it operates. It might be said then that
it is the expectation of the United Nations that peace be maintained in all legitimate interactions
between countries on the world stage. Those that violate said peace then might well be those that
have issue with the world order on which that peace rests.
Another important component of Article 4 deals with the mention of “states” themselves.
According to general accepted practice, in order to be categorized as a sovereign state, an entity
must possess its own territory, a permanent population, and the institutions through which it
might undertake the activities necessary of statehood. Key to this definition is the importance of
territory itself, for without territory it would be impossible to possess a permanent population
and vastly more difficult to construct the institutions necessary of statehood.
In international law, the principle of territorial integrity is generally invoked to prohibit
unilateral secession, to prevent border changes, or to prohibit the use of force by one state to
seize territory from another (Moore 2015). It is this last use in international law that is of special
relevance to the management of territorial and maritime disputes between states. Unless there is
just cause, the resort to military force in the management of these disputes is wrong according to
international law. Even in cases where conflict is justified, the way in which the state uses force
may be unjust (Moore 2015), such as in situations of failing to respect the distinction between
civilians and combatants, or utilizing a disproportionate response to an action by the other
disputant.
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Generally speaking, according to the international law of today, the acquisition of
territory by force alone is illegal (Shaw 2017). Even the United Nations (UN) has moved in this
direction with the 1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law by the UNGA, which
provides for the territory of a state not being an object of acquisition in situations wherein
another state uses threats or outright force (United Nations 1970). Even if the challenging state
should succeed in extending control over a territory in this manner, according to the UN this
acquisition will not be recognized as legal. The only way acquisition of territory through force
might become legitimate is through further action of an international nature, such as by the
creation of a treaty of cession or through the gaining of international recognition (Shaw 2017,
372).
Though this latter path does theoretically provide a path for the acquisition of territory by
force to become legitimately held, Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter (United Nations
1945b) states: “[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” Since being passed by member
states, this principle has been enshrined in international law, and as such is binding upon the
states of the international community (Shaw 2017, 854). For example, the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Claims Commission took the position that the use of force to settle their dispute would violate
international law even when some portion of the disputed territory was subject to a valid claim
by the state pursuing the use of force (Shaw 2017, 858). This brings me to the UNGA and the
examination of the voting that occur within it.
According to this approach, states would then have a range or cooperative or conflictual
strategies to choose from in pursuit of their goals (Mitchell and Hensel 2007), which by
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themselves will signal information about state preferences. This is important for a number of
reasons for this study of territorial dispute settlement attempts influencing UNGA voting. In the
case of territorial dispute settlement attempts, it is hard for violent and peaceful attempts to be
interpreted as anything but what they are: confrontational non-cooperation and contempt for the
international laws underlying the contemporary US-led international system, or conciliatory
collaboration and respect for these same international laws. Given that private information
provides incentives for states to misrepresent their interests in pursuit of gaining advantages over
opponents (Fearon 1995), these public interactions make clear where states stand regarding these
issues and the international law governing how they are supposed to be settled. International
organizations then, in this case voting in the UNGA, can provide an objective reaction and
source of information (Abbott and Snidal 1998) as to how states react to dispute settlement. In
addition, according to Keohane (1984, p. 94), international organizations are further a source of
independent information regarding disputes, as they actively collect such information when they
become involved, which is then circulated amongst members. In the case of territorial dispute
settlement attempts, it stands to reason reactions to which are chosen by disputants will be
reflected in voting in the UNGA. Most importantly, IOs establish generally adhered to patterns
of legal liability or accountability (Keohane 1984; Mitchell 1994), as well as new norms and
practices in the international system due to their status (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). This
brings me to a more complete presentation of the theory of how territorial dispute management
impacts voting in the UNGA.
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A New Theory of Territorial Dispute Management and UNGA Voting
To this point I have demonstrated the importance and usefulness of the UNGA and voting
patterns to understanding conflict and interstate interactions in the international system. Previous
work has suggested voting preferences as being derived from structural or internal factors, but
what if we go one step further and examine voting patterns as being influenced by state
interactions outside the UN, specifically as a result of signaling? What about specific issues that
states really care about, such as territory and how states go about settling disputes over it? This
brings me to the reiteration of the two major questions driving the core of this research
dissertation:
Question 1: To what degree do these attempt methods influence disputant foreign policy
preferences, as indicated by voting preferences in the United Nations General Assembly?
Question 2: To what degree does the information actively conveyed by the settlement attempt
method utilized by states in managing their ongoing territorial and maritime signal contentment
with the US-led international system? How is this reflected in general UNGA voting relative to
the voting of particular disputants?

The causal story behind the relationship between territorial dispute interactions and
voting patterns in the UNGA is straightforward. Following the formal establishment of the
territorial integrity norm in the UN Charter, states that became members of the UNGA became
obligated to respect the norm and refrain from the use of force in any territorial dispute they were
engaged in. When states act to attempt to settle their territorial disputes they are signaling
information of how they perceive the role of international law in the US-led international system.
Peaceful attempts signal a respect for international law and present the state acting as such as
being more trustworthy and worthy of cooperation. Violent attempts signal a lack of respect for
international law and present the state acting this wat as being worthy of suspicion and less
cooperation. With this information being conveyed regarding the respect for the territorial
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integrity norm and international law, voting patterns in the UNGA will converge or diverge
respectively. For example, one might expect a state that uses violence in their territorial dispute
interactions will vote in a manner to limit international law whereas those that pursue peaceful
methods might vote in line with preserving, and even expanding the influence of international
law on the international political system. This brings me to the literature on signaling.
According to the literature, signaling might best be thought of as:
“…the purposive and strategic revealing of information about intent, resolve, and/or
capabilities by an actor A to alter the decisions of another actor B to improve the chances
that an outcome desired by A is reached when the desired outcomes of A and B are
dissimilar (Gartzke, Carcello, Gannon, and Zhang 2017, 5).”
In general, signaling occurs when one actor is made aware of information relevant to another
actor’s decisions (Morrow 1999). Given pervasive uncertainty regarding another state’s
intentions and resolve, states signal information to the degree they can in order to either threaten
or reassure, depending on their goals (Fearon 1994b; Kydd 2005; Schultz 2001). Signaling is
important to all types of interactions between states in the international system. In cooperation or
peacebuilding, conveying peaceful intentions and a commitment to follow through in
collaborative efforts can ensure peace is maintained, while signaling strength in coercive
bargaining situations might lead to the attainment of goals without costly conflict (Kertzer,
Rathburn, and Rathburn 2020).
Early research into signaling has found that most outcomes in foreign policy tend to be
dependent on the interactions between multiple actions, particularly in terms of the extent that
one actor’s behavior is dependent on the intent and capabilities of other actors (Gartzke,
Carcello, Gannon, and Zhang 2017). Further work has been done on the signaling of resolve in
crises (McManus and Yarhi-Milo 2017; Schelling 1966; Carson and Yarhi-Milo 2017; Fearon
1994b; Schultz 2001) and as a means of reassurance to escape a detrimental security dilemma
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(Axelrod 1984; Glaser 2010; Jervis 1978; Keohane 1984; Kydd 2005). Since interactions over
territorial or maritime disputes might be thought of as zero-sum interactions, issues of
incomplete information and commitment arise, since states have an incentive to misrepresent
these issues to make it more likely to achieve their policy goals (Fearon 1995). Attempts at
settlement, then, might serve as good active communicators of information to fellow disputants
to the extent they are indicative of their commitment and what they are bringing to bear on the
settlement attempt process. This is to say the more costly a threat is the more likely it is to be
credible in conveying a state’s commitment, in the hope that such would disincline their fellow
disputant from acting for fear of suffering the costs (Fearon 1990, 1992, 1994). Fearon (1997)
specifically references tying hands, wherein costs increase in a state backs down, and sunk-costs,
wherein first actions are costly, as examples of this signaling in action. For this projects
purposes, and to the UNGA as an organization, these actions might also indicate contentment or
discontent with international law underlying the US-led international system as a whole.
Generally speaking, signaling at its core is purposive, such that any recipient will acquire
information from the action, and if no such information is gained, then no signaling occurred
(Cho and Kreps 1987). In addition, signaling must also be strategic, in the sense that it will
influence the payoffs of the involved actors (Gartzke, Carcello, Gannon, and Zhang 2017). Even
the number of actors might influence the impacts of signaling, such as through the creation of
additional avenues of information transmission (Trager 2015). Extra-dyadic ties (an example
being networks of trade partners discussed in Gartzke and Weseterwinter (2016), or in the case
of this project the UNGA) might also be useful in credibly sharing information about a state’s
resolve regarding an issue. After all, acts as simple as diplomacy and talking can change the
perceptions and payoffs for the disputing actors (Trager 2010).
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Since territorial disputes often are zero-sum in nature, signaling to exchange information
might help avoid bargaining failure, and prevent the progression from militarized interstate
incidents from progressing into a full-blown war (Gartzke, Carcello, Gannon, and Zhang 2017,
7). For the purposes of this project, signaling might be utilized to demonstrate discontent with
the international law-based, US-led international order (Fearon 1997) via a violent attempt at
settlement, or to demonstrate a contentment with a US-led international order (Keohane 1986)
via a peaceful attempt at settlement. Core to this is the place of the territorial integrity norm
enshrined in the UN and in international law, under which the borders of a state are considered
sacrosanct in the international community and the use of violence to redistribute them is seen as
in violation of the international system as it currently exists. Violent attempts contrary to this
norm, therefore, are a rebuke to the international system and can be expected to be reflected in
UNGA voting patterns as other states who pursue more peaceful, international law-based
interactions will have differences preferences for the functioning of the international system.
When it comes to the selection of the dispute settlement method for putting a territorial or
maritime dispute to rest, one of the factors that can influence the selection is the state’s
willingness to relinquish control of the power to influence the outcome (Gent 2013). In general,
bilateral negotiations stand at one end of the spectrum with the disputant states retaining the most
amount of control over the dispute settlement (both process and eventual distribution of the
territorial or maritime dispute) while adjudication stands at the other end of the spectrum with
the least amount of control over the dispute settlement retained by the disputing states. To select
a dispute settlement method that gives up a large amount of control to international courts would
seem to indicate that much more commitment on the part of the disputant states to settle the
dispute.
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In the case of an attempted settlement, however, does it even matter which method is
used? Given the importance of territorial and maritime disputes to states, it is expected that the
resulting impacts of settlement attempts will be manifested in the foreign policy preferences of
the disputing states, as represented by ideal points in UNGA voting data. Since territory is so
important to the existence of states in the international system, to act in certain ways over
disputed territorial or maritime areas would be an effective means to signal contentment or
discontentedness with their position in the US-led international system, which in turn, we could
expect to be manifested in the voting patterns of the UNGA.
To be clear, the causal logic holds that, when interacting over territorial disputes, states
might be engaged with multiple audiences. Fearon himself indicates that in certain situations
leaders might well be signaling to multiple audiences, both foreign and domestic, and not just
one specific state (Fearon 1997). In terms of how we might expect signaling conveyed by
territorial dispute interactions to impact foreign policy preferences, it comes down to
perspectives on international law. Interactions over territorial disputes are tied to the fundamental
foundation on which states, territory, and since international law outlines the behaviors that are
and are not acceptable in the international community of states then states will inherently wish to
stay aware of how others are behaving regarding this subject. States behaving aggressively
regarding their territorial disputes likely see such actions as their most effective option in settling
the dispute in their favor, or that any punishments levied against them as being minor compared
to losing the dispute. In terms of foreign policy, then, these states might be expected to act in
other political areas in a manner that limits international law and potential punishments that
might be imposed upon them. From the perspectives of other states, seeing the threat of states not
bound by the territorial integrity norm they will act in a manner to protect their security and
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sovereignty, such as through efforts to maintain and expand international law or efforts to
pressure states that engage in violence to fall back in line.
Ideal points, also termed dynamic national ideal points, in this case they consistently
serve to capture the position of states in UNGA voting compared to how the US votes on all
measures. Ideal points generated from UNGA voting are an effective means towards glimpsing
the preferences of member states towards specific spheres of foreign policy, and by extension
their contentedness with the US-led international system. Without these ideal points to serve as
reference to UNGA state preferences, and to present the US as a central point indicative of the
character of the international system, it becomes much more difficult to determine the preference
pattern of states and whether they are content or not with prevailing international law and the
US-led international system.
Violent attempts at settlement by a state will convey information that they are aggressive,
untrustworthy, and lack respect for the US-led international system. UNGA ideal points,
indicative of each disputant’s foreign policy preferences, might be expected to diverge as the
target of the aggressive attempt at settlement expresses their displeasure with the actions of their
counterpart in the dispute. Conversely, if a state were to pursue peaceful dispute settlement, they
will actively convey information about being a good citizen of the US-led rules based
international system, a respect for rules of international law, and the potential of being a more
trustworthy partner. UNGA ideal points in this second situation might be expected to converge
as the target of the peaceful attempt conveys reciprocal trust in the actions of their counterpart in
the dispute. In general, it might also be expected that settlement attempts of a violent or peaceful
manner will result in similar levels of the respective states dissatisfaction or satisfaction with the
US-led liberal order in the international system.
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By starting with an examination of the degree foreign policy preferences represented by
voting preferences in the United Nations General Assembly, I first assess if there is a link
between behavior in dispute settlement and UNGA voting. From there, if a link is found, then it
becomes possible to see the degree that the voting itself is in line with or contrary to the US-led
international order. Again, this is possible through the use of ideal points generated from UNGA
state preferences, which utilize US votes as the central point to indicate to what degree the
member states’ votes vary, thereby indicating preference for the structure of the international
system, and by proxy the contentedness for it being US-led or not.
So why exactly would it matter if UNGA votes are close to the US position or not? It
comes down to the research conducted by scholars like Voeten (2001) who have found
interactions in the UNGA to be influenced by the shape and structure of the international system
around it. Given the liberalist motivations that can be tied to the UN from its founding in large
part by the United States after World War II, such as the reduction of conflict in the international
system and a general respect for a territorial integrity norm, it stands to reason the aims of the
UNGA as an institution and the United States will be close. That being said there can still be
variation between the closeness of voting by other states and the United States, which can be
theorized to be indicative of the stances of these other states regarding the US-led international
system as represented by the UN. This is important as if alignment in voting is close between a
state and the US, there is less room for conflict which makes the international system that much
more peaceable, whereas if voting diverges by a significant degree, there is more room for
conflict, which in turn might spill over into the international system itself. Since the UNGA does
not exist inside a black box, but is likely influenced by interactions between states within the
international system itself, it stands to reason (in following an issue-based approach to
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interactions in the UNGA) that certain issues will have impacts on overall voting. In search of a
sufficiently important issue to test this with, one need look no further than territorial and
maritime disputes. Given this projected influence on voting patterns from state interactions over
territorial and maritime disputes, it is important to understand the struggles over territory
between states, how these disputes might be settled, and the perceived values a territory might
possess, which are addressed in the coming sections.

Testing A Theory of Territorial Dispute Management and UNGA Voting
The focus of this current research, then, is to assess the impacts of different settlement
scenarios of territorial disputes in which states actively signal information when attempts at
settlement are made, and the consequent voting actions taken by the members in the UNGA.
These voting actions can be examined both comprehensively as average voting scores, and
specifically by examining average voting within issue types, such as human rights. Particularly,
in situations like this, are there settlement attempt methods that might actively convey
contentment or discontent with the states place in the US-led international system, and result in
actions in the UNGA that are more in line with those who respect the US-led international order
or instead indicative of a divergence from this perspective? Generally speaking, crises in the
international system are sequential in nature, with states proceeding in an action-reaction
progression (George and Smoke 1974). Understanding how states choose to actively signal their
objectives, and the means and commitment with which they will pursue them, can provide
insight into how the management of territorial and maritime disputes might convey the
perspectives of contentment or discontent with the disputant actor’s place in the US-led
international system (Gartzke, Carcello, Gannon, and Zhang 2017), particularly in terms of their
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foreign policy preferences such as those indicated by UNGA voting. With this in mind, the
hypotheses of this project are as follows.

Settlement Attempts and (Dis)satisfaction Within the Dyad
These initial hypotheses deal with the degree that types of settlement attempts interact
with the foreign policy preferences of the states within the disputing dyad, as represented by the
UNGA votes by each state.
H1: Peaceful settlement attempts will be significantly related to foreign policy
convergence between the disputants, as indicated by the ideal points generated from
UNGA voting.
H2: Violent settlement attempts will be significantly related to foreign policy divergence
between the disputants, as indicated by the ideal points generated from UNGA voting.

Previously it was mentioned that signaling occurs when one actor is made aware of
information relevant to another actor’s decisions (Morrow 1999) and that signaling is at its core
purposive, meaning any recipient will acquire information from the action, and if no such
information is gained, then no signaling occurred (Cho and Kreps 1987). Given the position of
the UN in the international system, and the UNGA as one of the best arenas for examining the
changing patterns of interactions between states, it also serves as a good indicator as to the
settling of territorial disputes conveying information that, in turn, shapes the foreign policy
preferences of states as represented by UNGA voting.
Should empirical findings indicate no significant differences between settlement then the
conclusion might be reached that interactions over territorial disputes do not convey information
that causes shifts in foreign policy behaviors at the level of the UNGA. Given that no state is
more likely to shift its foreign policy behavior than the one directly impacted in the dispute itself,
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it stands to reason that examining these dyadic interactions first and foremost will be the initial
required step to determine if signaling in territorial dispute interactions is occurring and having
an impact at the level of the UNGA Should support be found for H1 and H2, this would align
with the embeddedness of the territorial integrity norm in the current world order stewarded by a
US-led UN. In addition, by directly comparing the voting preferences of the disputants
themselves, we will see individual country level respect for the territorial integrity norm as it
directly applies to disputants over the distribution of territory. This will in turn will provide
further support for this theory’s hypothesized relationship between interactions over territory and
UNGA voting in the set of hypotheses.
Regarding the direction of significance in these first hypotheses and given previous
research into territorial dispute settlement, we might expect that peaceful settlement attempts
might contribute to greater efforts of cooperation, or in this case a convergence of foreign policy
preferences as indicated by UNGA voting. Contrary to this, if violent settlement attempts are
pursued, we might expect the relationship to be in the opposite direction. In other words, there
will be foreign policy divergence as represented by UNGA voting. The expectation with this first
set of hypotheses is that, given the personal salience of the territorial dispute to the states in the
dyad, they are the most inclined reward or punish their counterpart with their voting preferences
in the UNGA.

Settlement Attempts and (Dis)satisfaction With The US-led International System
There are a number of additional hypotheses that touch on how settlement attempts
within a disputing dyad potentially impact the voting patterns of the other states in the UNGA.
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H3a: Peaceful settlement attempts will be significantly related to UNGA voting
convergence between the disputants of a territorial dispute settlement attempt and the
United States.
H3b: Non-binding peaceful settlement attempts will be significantly related to UNGA
voting convergence between the disputants of the settlement attempt and the United
States.
H3c: Binding peaceful settlement attempts will be significantly related to UNGA voting
convergence between the disputants of the settlement attempt and the United States, at a
level greater than non-binding peaceful settlement attempts.
H4: Violent attempts at settlement will be significantly related to UNGA voting
divergence between the disputants of the settlement attempt and the United States.

Much like in the first set of hypotheses, and again based on previous research, we might expect
peaceful settlement attempts to be indicative of contentment with the US-led international system
as these disputants of the settlement attempt are acting within the framework of the Charter on
which the United Nations is based. Going a step further, by moving from non-binding to binding
attempts at settlement, the disputants involved in the settlement are expressing more contentment
with the structure and function of the US-led international system. Likewise, violent attempts
made will be indicative of discontent with the US-led international system and should be
reflected in UNGA voting.
This line of thinking owes itself to the place of the territorial integrity norm in the
international system and how the UN has tied into its adoption by the international community.
Understanding the evolution of norms explains how important this territorial integrity norm has
become based on the work of the UN. A norm itself is defined by Finnemore and Sikkink (1999,
p. 251) as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors of a given identity and an international
regularity norm is strong when it is respected and viewed as legally binding by the great majority
of states.” Put simply, then, the territorial integrity norm can be thought of as the growing respect
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by sovereign states for outlawing of force as a legitimate means with which to alter boundaries
between states. A number of studies have gone on to assess respect for the territorial integrity
norm, one of the most important being by Hensel, Allison, and Khanani (2009). In the project,
Hensel, Allison, and Khanani (2009) examine not just the successful violent seizure of territory
but unsuccessful violent attempts as well. They find that, in general, the territorial integrity norm
has reduced territorial conflict, and that the greatest impacts of the norm appear to stem from
pressure by the states who have wholeheartedly accepted it, rather than any one specific treaty on
its signatories (Hensel, Allison, and Khanani 2009).
That being said, the respect for territorial integrity is an anomaly when you examine the
span of recorded human history. The medieval world did not have any true international
boundaries like those that separate the territories of states today. Authority over land was
constantly overlapping and shifting (Clark 1961). For this reason, the legitimacy of borders was
often tied to dynastic lines, such as royal or noble families, and each had the absolute right of
rule within these boundaries (Zacher 2001) unless challenged by another seeking to usurp this
control. This would result in the majority of wars occurring before the emergence of the modern
world order being over the acquisition or preservation of territory, and even then, wars of this
nature occasionally occur up to the current day. It would not be until the creation of territorial
states with exclusive authority over their domains that the modern world would emerge (Zacher
2001). Even then, it was not until the 1700s that precisely surveyed national borders would
become common (Clark 1972).
According to the work of Zacher (2001), which primarily draws on war data compiled by
Holsti (1991) (with additional data pulled from Bercovitch and Jackson 1997; Goertz and Diehl
1992; Huth 1996; Kacowicz 1994; and Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1998), the percent of wars
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that led to the redistribution of territory was 79% from 1648-1712, 80% from 1713-1814, 80%
from 1815-1917, 88% from 1918 to 1945, and finally 30% from 1946 to 2000. This abrupt shift
in percentages in large part owes itself to the attempt to enshrine a respect for territory in the
League of Nations, which was ultimately more successful following the creation of the United
Nations and its support of the territorial integrity norm. Regarding the emergence of this norm,
and the consequent time period at the core of this research project, Finnemore and Sikkink
(1999) present norm development as going through three stages: emergence, acceptance, and
institutionalization.
The first stage for the territorial integrity norm, emergence, began with the ending of
World War I and is primarily typified with Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant, with
many of the major proponents of it being Western democratic states (Zacher 2001). In the time
leading up to the creation of the League Covenant, President Woodrow Wilson spoke of the need
of such covenants to create mutual guarantees for both political independence and territorial
integrity of all states regardless of status or power (Zimmern 1939; Egerton 1978; and Knock
1992). Ultimately enshrined in the Article 10 previously mentioned, it read: “The members of the
League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity
and existing political independence of all Members of the League (Zacher 2001),” and signified
the first formal support of the territorial integrity norm. Regardless, from this period up until the
start of World War II several multilateral treaties and declarations came into being that strove to
uphold the new territorial integrity norm. Zacher (2001) lists the 1919 League Covenant, the
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the League of Nation’s adoption of the Stimson Doctrine in 1931,
which denied the legitimacy of territorial changes as a result of force (Stimson and Bundy 1948),
as the most prominent examples. That being said, this time frame only counts as the emergence
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stage of norm adoption due to the general tolerance by state actors of the actions taken by
Germany, Italy, and Japan in their search for territorial expansion, which culminated with the
brutal actions of World War II due to the lack of effective efforts in preservation of the new
territorial integrity norm by states party to the League of Nations. The greatest war in recorded
history would have some benefits for the territorial integrity norm, however, in that once the
conflict concluded there was a surge in support for adoption of the norm (Zacher 2001). As such,
the international political system following the end of World War II would go on to be structured
around three central tenets: equal sovereignty of states, competence internally regarding
domestic jurisdiction, and the preservation for existing territorial boundaries (Elden 2006).
The acceptance stage, typified by growing support for the norm and integration of in into
state interactions such that it becomes legally binding (through treaties being one example),
began with the adoption and ratification of Article 2 (4): in the UN Charter during June of 1945.
This was due to the Western Allied Powers exhibiting strong support for the integrity of state
boundaries following the aggression of World War II, though the Soviet Union in particular
continued to view boundaries through a more classical perspective, namely that the winners in a
conflict were entitled to claim their opponent’s territories. Though most states recognized the
expanded boundaries of the Soviet Union after the war, all party to the San Francisco conference
of 1945 agreed to recognize the existing boundaries in the UN charter, specifically that: “All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. (UN 1945b).” According to Zacher
(2001), the most important multilateral accords from this stage were the 1960 UN declaration
that set out to protect the integrity of states’ territories and that the colonies still in existence at
this time were eligible for self-determination based on their current borders, the Organization of
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African Unity’s charter provision in 1963 and 1964 resolution respected boundaries inherited
from their status’ as former colonies, and lastly the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. For this reason,
given the time span of these efforts, it is no real surprise that this acceptance stage endured up
through the end of the 1960s and early 1970s. In addition to these international organizations,
many others have enshrined territory integrity in their founding charters, such as the Arab
League (1945), the Organization of Arab States (1948), and the African Union (2000) (Elden
2006). Even the European Union and NATO require all states seeking to join their organizations
to set aside all territorial disputes before they are allowed in (Elden 2006).
The final stage of norm adoption is the institutionalization stage which is typified with
the adoption and integration of additional international accords, and the implementation of
multilateral efforts to more effectively result in state compliance. According to Zacher (2001)
this last stage started in 1976 and continues on to the present. Further solidifying the hold of the
territorial integrity norm were the efforts by the International Court of Justice to adjudicate
several territorial disputes, with the principle of uti possidetis (literally “as you possess”)
contributing to rulings that found that states have rights to the territories ceded to them by prior
governing states, and that other states, as such, do not have legal right to take these territories by
force (Prescott 1998). In the case of a large number of African states, upon gaining independence
they sought to preserve the previously existing colonial boundaries, despite them cutting across
natural and ethnic boundaries in many areas (Malanczuk 1997; Ratner 1996). Part of the
reasoning of these newly independent states at the time was that any challenge to a border of an
African state as being illegitimate would cause all the borders to be thrown into question
(Malanczuk 1997; Ratner 1996; Zacher 2001). Thus, international law attempts largely to protect
existing borders, perhaps even more so than recognizing their artificial nature (Elden 2006).
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Ultimately the UN would have the effect of encouraging the acceptance of the territorial
integrity norm through its numerous resolutions, monitoring devices, and even commissions that
touched upon this purpose (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). From here things really began to take
off. In 1999, the leaders of the European Union (EU) all agreed that member states should submit
their remaining territorial disputes to the International Court of Justice for review, which had the
benefit of contributing to the stability and legitimacy of the EU. This was also the approach
taken by the successor states of the Soviet Union in their acting to respect their existing
boundaries. Generally, this has been the pattern for those who account themselves members of
the UN since its formation, as demonstrated by the relatively few cases of coercive boundary
changes between states since the creation of the international organization and expansion of its
membership from fifty to more than one hundred and ninety (Zacher 2001).
The arrival at a territorial integrity norm would not have been possible had democratic
states declined to pursue the standard practice of territorial annexations following their victory at
the end of World War II, and it certainly would not have endured had they (especially the United
States) demonstrated a willingness to bring their military and economic forces to bear in the
subsequent decades. Make no mistake, however, that the underlying premise of the successful
adoption of the territorial integrity norm was a strong commitment by states, especially the
United States, to a global political order in which this largest force of international violence was
declared illegal (Zacher 2001). Even in the case of claims for independence, outside of
colonialism the principle of territorial integrity is a strong protection for any parent state (Vidmar
2012). Thus, any intentional violation of the territorial integrity norm by a state is not only in
violation of this norm, but acts contrary to the will and structure of the US-led international
system in the decades since the founding of the UN.
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In summation, my theory presents territorial dispute management interactions as
influencing voting patterns in the UNGA, in which the attempts themselves signal information
on each state’s preferences regarding international law in the US-led international system as
helmed by the UNGA. This is dependent on the degree that the UN and the international
community as a whole has acted to institute a norm against violent acquisition of territory. States
acting in accordance with this territorial integrity norm by attempting to settle their disputes
peaceably will signal respect and adherence to the role of international law in the international
system, whereas as states who pursue violent actions will demonstrate the opposite. As stated
previously, and key to this perspective, it is difficult for violent and peaceful attempts at
settlement to be interpreted as anything else but what they appear to be. Peaceful efforts signal a
state as being worthy of cooperation and trust, whereas violent efforts will lead to relationships
of distrust and suspicion. The information as a result of these interactions will convey either a
respect for or a disrespect of the territorial integrity norm and international law, which in turn
will contribute to a convergence or divergence respectably in voting patterns within the UNGA
itself.
In the next two chapters I test the two sets of hypotheses I introduced above. If support is
found, peaceful dispute interactions will be reflected in convergence between the disputants in
terms of UNGA voting (H1), whereas violent dispute interactions will see divergence between
the disputants in UNGA voting (H2). In addition, peaceful dispute interactions should also be
related to voting convergence with the US in the UNGA (H3a), and that the strength of this
convergence should increase as these settlement efforts become more binding (H3b; H3c).
Conversely, violent dispute interactions should result in the opposite and see a divergence with
US voting patterns in the UNGA (H4).
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Quantitative Analyses
Introduction
In considering the overall methodological design of this research study, the use of a
multimethod approach is an effective means to assess the impacts settlement attempt methods on
the voting of disputants in the UNGA. A multimethod approach allows for fresh perspectives to
be brought to bear on subjects of research, while also allowing for results of different methods to
be corroborated (Hammond 2005). Indeed, using a multimethod approach can provide further
clarification of findings, and even allow for the results of one method to inform another. For this
reason, this study will utilize self-contained components of quantitative and qualitative
approaches to the examination of the impacts of settlement attempt methods on foreign policy
preferences, represented by the ideal points of UNGA voting data. I expect that by following this
approach, the quantitative analyses for all states over the time period of study will assess the
theory for external validity, while the case studies that follow will assess the theory for internal
validity and provide additional verification for the findings of the quantitative analyses.
Moreover, since the case studies focus on a number of disputes that include China, the main
country held up as a challenger to the US in the international system, the second set of
hypotheses that focus on contentedness with the US-led international system are more effectively
tested as well. This chapter will focus on the quantitative analyses with the following chapter
focusing on the presentation of a number of qualitative case studies relevant to the project.

Research Design: Quantitative Method
To quantitatively test my theory, I analyze a sample of interstate territorial disputes
amounting to 19,083 dyadic observations over the time period of 1946 to 2015. The unit of
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analysis for this data is claim-dyad-year, indicating that there is one observation for each year
from 1946 to 2015 for each of the dyadic pairs of states involved in a claim over disputed
territory. To be included as a valid dyadic claim, an authorized representative of the disputing
states needs to explicitly claim a geographic area, which is in turn claimed by at least one
additional state (Hensel 2013). The inclusion of disputes is based primarily on those initially
used by the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project (Hensel 2001) and elaborated upon in the
Territorial Peaceful Resolution of Disputes (TPRD) Dataset (Wiegand, Powell, McDowell
2020), the latter of which is used for the analyses. The TRPD dataset covers a total of 183
territorial disputes from around the world over the period of 1945 to 2015. It follows the ICOW
project in defining territorial disputes as being specific instances in which the authorized
representatives of two or more states put forth competing claims over a particular area of land
(Hensel 2013). For the TPRD dataset, territorial disputes are included from the first year that
states issue competing claims, and they exit the dataset once exclusive sovereignty rights are
established and acknowledged by all the disputes, or at 2015 when the observation period of the
dataset ends. Each year includes whether or not a settlement proposal is made, as well as what
type the proposal is, which for the purposes of this project has been modified to be negotiations,
arbitration, and adjudication.

Dependent Variable
The main dependent variable utilized is the ideal points of the UNGA voting data. This
data is originally sourced from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017), and include 4,335 divisive
roll calls over sixty-seven sessions from January 1946 to December 2012, but has since been
expanded to 2015. Dynamic national ideal points, in this case consistently capturing the position
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of states compared to a US-led liberal order in the international system, were generated using
resolutions that were identical across years to serve as bridge observations to help make the
preference estimates of states in the UNGA comparable over time. The votes themselves are
broken down into three options: yea, nay, or abstain. When it comes to abstentions, generally
they can be treated as not conveying as much disapproval as a nay vote. Bailey, Strezhnev, and
Voeten (2017) set up the data for each state to have a unidimensional ideal point in each year,
with each ideal point centered on zero with a standard deviation of one. In my dataset, I also
modify the data into dyadic form, and generate a new variable to represent the absolute value
difference between the ideal points of each state in the disputing dyad. There are 13,355
observations in this data with a mean of 1.019 and a standard deviation of .995. What this
indicates is that UNGA votes between states and the US voting position is roughly in the middle
between voting with or against the US across all the observations. One standard deviation out
from this middle grouping of data indicates that there are some votes wherein the results of the
voting are overwhelmingly in line with the US ideal point or overwhelmingly against it. This
distribution of the UNGA voting data might in turn make it easier to determine if territorial
dispute interactions consistently interact with the voting patterns. In addition, the percent
agreement of each states voting in the UNGA with the US and China are included as well.
The main alternative to ideal points used in the literature to examine UNGA voting is the
S score presented by Signorino and Ritter (1999). The S score is a cardinal measure of foreign
policy preferences, which is based on the votes cast by countries in the UNGA as compared to a
specific country, most often the US. These S scores are created by examining one country and
the US, which is computed as being one minus the absolute difference between the first country
and the US’ vote scores in the UNGA, summed over all included votes, and then divided by the
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number of votes. There are three advantages to using the ideal point approach as compared to
affinity or S scores. According to Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017), the estimates allow for
more valid intertemporal comparisons, the greater ability to distinguish signal from noise in
identifying meaningful shifts in foreign policy orientations, and lastly for a more sensitive ability
to determine which state in a dyad is responsible for their moving closer or further apart in their
foreign policy orientations.
Using UNGA voting data constructed as ideal points allows for an easier comparison
between disputants, and between the initiator of the dispute attempt with average UNGA policy
preferences. This makes the degree that states are diverging or converging with both their
counterparts in the dispute and the average member of the UNGA easy to determine, and by
extension their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the status quo of the international system.
Further, by examining these data over in the dyad-year format, it makes it easier to capture and
examine variation in the ideal point preferences over time as they interact with differing types of
dispute settlement. Unfortunately, due to the fact the UNGA exists for a period shorter than the
availability of territorial dispute data lends itself to, my analyses are bounded by the availability
of UNGA voting data turned into ideal points, which lasts from 1946 until 2015, making the
dataset temporally a fifth bigger for the analyses of this project.

Independent Variables
The first independent variable utilized is peaceful settlement attempt in a given dyad
year, which can be broken down into: (0) no attempt; (1) bilateral negotiations attempt; (2)
nonbinding/arbitration attempt; and (3) binding/adjudication attempt. This variable is utilized
from the Territorial Peaceful Resolution of Disputes (TPRD) Dataset version 1.0 (Wiegand,
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Powell, and McDowell, 2020) and broken down separately as dichotomous (dummy) variables to
account for whether or not a peaceful attempt of the relevant type occurred in a given dyad-year
or not. Bilateral negotiations are defined as being discussions that occur between the authorized
representatives of each disputant to debate the sovereignty of the dispute (von Glahn and Taulbee
2013; Wiegand and Powell 2011; Wiegand, Powell, and McDowell 2020). Arbitration is a
binding settlement method based formal procedures that leads to a formal award of the territory
by a arbitral panel between the disputants (Merrills 2011). International adjudication is also a
formal binding settlement method, but tends to be more inflexible in terms of the rules and
procedures as compared to arbitration. This last settlement occurs in international courts like the
international court of justice (ICJ). In the TPRD dataset, some disputants proposed multiple
settlement methods in a given year, which could sometimes vary in terms of their type. With this
in mind, each observation where this occurs was coded as the highest formality for each
disputant in the given year, even if they differed, which is in-line with what has been done in the
past (Powell and Wiegand 2010; Powell 2020; Wiegand, Powell and McDowell 2020).
The primary motivation in utilizing this dataset over ICOW, which has been widely used
for territorial disputes, created by Hensel (2001) is that the TPRD dataset extends settlement
attempts out to 2015, which is fourteen years longer than ICOW and amounts to a twenty percent
increase in the duration of the dataset. In my non-directed dyad dataset, the presence or absence
of a peaceful attempt in a given dyad-year allows me to test for the impact of these attempts
based on ideal points. If in line with my theory, the impact of these settlement attempts will
result in a decrease of the spread between the disputant’s ideal points, that is to say, their voting
patterns in the UNGA will be more similar in the relevant dyad-year.
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The second key independent variable of interest is dyadic MIDs, from the Correlates of
War dyadic MID data (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004; Palmer, D’Orazio, Kenwick, and
McManus 2020) for the years 1816-2001. MID onset is a dichotomous variable that indicates
whether or not a MID occurred in a given dyad-year. As the alternative to the peaceful
approaches presented in the TPRD Dataset, the incidence of MIDs related to the dyadic disputes
should be related to an increased spread between the disputant’s ideal points, showing that the
voting patterns of the disputants in the UNGA will be less similar in a relevant dyad-year. To
determine if the relationship between the four independent variables and the dependent variable
of UNGA voting ideal point similarity is in line with the theory presented previously, each of the
settlement type variables are assessed alongside the general voting ideal points for the within
dyad hypotheses (H1 and H2). Following this they will be analyzed with the percent voting
agreement of US and China for the second set of hypotheses (H3a through H4).

Control Variables
To assess the robustness of my analyses, I also include a number of control variables that
have commonly been used in similar research projects. I control for the influence of power
differences between dyadic pairs by utilizing the Composite Index of National Capabilities, more
commonly known as CINC scores (Greig and Enterline 2017; Singer, Bremer and Stuckey
1972). Given that war has been linked to state behaviors in the international system, it would
stand to reason that the existence of power parity in a disputant dyad will result in foreign policy
preferences more sensitive to attempts at dispute settlement in the dyad.
I also account for rivalry, as this may influence future interactions between the states
(Thompson 2001), and the disputants may well be more sensitive to attempts made in the
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presence of an ongoing rivalry. Specifically, I examine strategic rivalry (Colaresi, Rasler, and
Thompson 2007) which is calculated as being based on perceptions of threat, enmity and
competition within a dyad, though the occurrence of militarized interstate disputes is not a
necessity for a dyad to be categorized under this type of rivalry. In addition, I include rivalry and
enduring rivalry as calculated in Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006). According to Klein, Goertz and
Diehl (2006), rivalry is a dyadic, interstate relationship in which two states confront each other
over a similar set of issues in at least three militarized interstate disputes. Should this rivalry
eventually see a minimum of six militarized interstate disputes over a period of at least 20 years,
the rivalry is re-categorized as an enduring rivalry.
As not all territories might be valued the same, I also control for salience of the territories
based on the coding of ICOW datasets (Frederick, Hensel, and Macauley 2017; Hensel 2001;
Hensel et al. 2008) and work by Huth and Allee (2002). Types of salience accounted for include
size and population, resource, ethnic or religious claims, among others, and each of these
variables is dichotomous. The logic here is that if a territory under dispute is less salient (i.e. seen
as having less value) then states in the UNGA may be less divergent in their voting patterns as
compared to disputants who see their disputed territories as having greater salience. Further, with
economics in mind I also account for trade between the states of each dyad (Rider and Owsiak
2015), which is presented as being in millions of USD per year.
There are also a number of variables relevant to the characteristics of territorial disputes
themselves that need to be controlled for as well. These range from the purely domestic
motivations, to the types of value territory might hold for the disputing states, and even how best
to leverage disputes into advantages for states that hold other interests. In terms of domestic
motivations, the leaders of states might suffer domestic punishment if they take any missteps in
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attempting to manage outstanding territorial disputes. This domestic accountability explanation
holds that vulnerable leaders of states with territorial disputes should avoid territorial
concessions, threats or even the use of force to otherwise avoid potential punishments from their
domestic constituents (Wiegand 2011a). Specifically, the idea here is that leaders wish to remain
in power, so in order to do so they strive to keep the general population happy by avoiding any
policies that might be considered unpopular (Huth 1996; Wiegand 2011a). In addition, when a
territory possesses some sort of value leaders will be less likely to offer concessions (Huth and
Allee 2002). A number of studies have further elaborated on support for this link between
domestic accountability and behavior in dispute settlement attempts (Allee and Huth 2006;
Brody 1984; Chiozza and Choi 2003; Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Huth 1996; Mueller 1973;
Ostrom and Simon 1985; Rusett 1990).
Additional factors that might shape attempts at territorial dispute settlement deal with the
perceived values a territory in dispute might possess (Diehl and Goertz 1988, 1991; Diehl 1992;
Forsberg 1992; Hensel 2001). The idea here is, based on what these values are, a state might be
more (or less) inclined to use force to seize the disputed territory or be more (or less) inclined to
use peaceful attempts if the value is perceived as not being enough to warrant war. In general,
however, the more valuable the disputed territory, the higher a price states will face when
considering compromises or offers of concessions regarding the dispute (Fravel 2008). Strategic
worth is the first of several values that a territory in dispute might possess. Having its roots in
research as early as the first decade of the 20th century, strategic worth namely deals with the
security value a disputed territory possesses for a state (Mackinder 1904; Spykman 1944; Sprout
and Sprout 1968). In general, when a territory in dispute is strategically located, the possessor
will act to consolidate their position, whereas the other state in the dyadic dispute will be less
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likely to escalate with conflict (Carter 2010). Related to this work is the research on shared
borders and contiguity, where researchers attempted to assess the degree shared borders and
proximity to another state would contribute to the likelihood of war, from which significant
linkages were found (Bremer 1992; Starr and Most 1976, 1978; Siverson and Starr 1990; Senese
2005; Starr 2002; Starr and Thomas 2005; Vasquez 1995).
A disputed territory might also possess intrinsic worth. Rather than focusing on the
strategic, military value of a territory, intrinsic worth arguments are focused on the wealth or
resources that a territory possesses. Oil, gas, and mineral wealth in particular have been assessed
in regards to territorial conflict, though there was not found to be a link in terms of their duration
(Lujala, Rød and Thieme 2007; Sorens 2011). Luckily, in best case scenarios the value of a
territory can be broken down, thereby becoming divisible, and thus leading conflict to not be
inevitable if the disputants come up with a way to equitably divide the disputed territory
(Rosenau 1966, 1967).
The value placed on a territory for disputing states might also be intangible, yet still
contribute to an escalation in conflict to the level of war (Vasquez 1983, 1995). When a disputed
territory appears to have high intangible values (i.e., symbolic worth) the chances of conflict
breaking out is much more likely (Hassner 2006; Hensel and Mitchell 2005). This could be due
to how the possession of this symbolic value makes it difficult for a disputed territory to be
divided up, with the result that it can be treated as indivisible making compromise in settlement
attempts unlikely or even impossible (Goddard 2010; Hassner 2003, 2009; Toft 2003; Walter
2003). Even if part of a territory were to be successfully acquired in a settlement, by acquiescing
to possession in part by the other disputant could be seen as a defeat by that party (Anderson
1988; Toft 2006). This brings me to the last valuation that a territory might possess, that is not
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being valuable in regards to any specific characteristic but in terms of it simply existing as a
point of contention between states.
To account for the influence of regime type on settlement, I utilize a number of
Democracy Index scores from the latest research published by the V-Dem Institute (Coppedge et
al 2020). The indices included are: the Electoral Democracy Index; the Liberal Democracy
Index; the Deliberative Democracy Index; the Participatory Democracy Index; and the
Egalitarian Democracy Index. Each of these indices are interval variables with a low of 0 and a
high of 1, though they are representative of different aspects of democracy. Firstly, the Electoral
Democracy Index is the main conceptual variable of democracy within the V-Dem dataset
project, and is understood as comprising the essential elements of any representative democracy,
whether it be liberal, participatory, deliberative or egalitarian. The index itself is calculated by
taken the weighted average of the sub-indices with data on freedom of association, clean
elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage, combined with the five-way
multiplicative interaction between them. Secondly, the Liberal Democracy Index is calculated to
assess the degree a state emphasizes the importance of protecting the individual and minority
rights of its citizens against the tyranny of the state or majority. Thirdly, the Deliberative
Democracy Index is calculated to assess the degree to which a state emphasizes the deliberative
process in decision making of the polity, which is, generally speaking, one where public
reasoning is focused on the common good. Fourthly, the Participatory Democracy Index is
calculated to assess the degree a state emphasizes the participation of its citizens in its political
processes, both in terms of electoral and non-electoral activities. Lastly, the Egalitarian
Democracy Index is calculated to assess the degree that a state holds that material and immaterial

56

inequalities inhibit the formal rights, liberties, and the capacities of citizens and has taken strides
to address this.
Each of these democracy indices are included for both states in each dyad involved in a
territorial dispute, and an additional variable is generated for the absolute value difference of
each of the indices for the dyad pairs to more concisely examine the differences in democracy
between the disputants. Given the trend in the international system to being more democratic,
states in the UNGA might be less inclined to diverge in their foreign policy preferences in
democracies as compared to more authoritarian regimes, particularly when violent attempts are
made. Lastly, a variable constructed to account for years since the last incident of a militarized
dispute, labeled as peace years, which would be linked to tension levels between disputants, and
temporal dependence is accounted for by including a peace years squared, and peace years cubed
(Carter and Signorino 2010). The expectation here is that, as the attempt made recedes in time,
the less of an impact it will be exerting on the foreign policy preferences of the disputants, as
conveyed by the ideal points of the UNGA voting data.

Analyses
In my analysis, I run several regressions on different combinations of variables to assess
the relationship between settlement attempt types and voting ideal points in the UNGA. I
estimate the first regression for the relationship between settlement attempts and UNGA voting
within the dyad to estimate the foreign policy positions of states compared to the United States
(Bailey, Strezhnev, Voeten 2017). To eliminate the possibility of reverse causation arguments, I
lag the dependent variable by one year. The aim of this first analyses is to assess the support of
the first three hypotheses underlying the theory, which hold that the territorial dispute
management attempts will exert influence on the disputants voting in the UNGA. If no
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significant differences are found, the null hypothesis will be supported and the theory will lose
value. However, if results are in line with the theory, as is expected, support will be found to
show that peaceful settlement attempts are significantly related to voting convergence in the
UNGA (H1) and violent settlement attempts are significantly related to voting divergence in the
UNGA (H2).
Following this first analysis, I run two further regression models examining the
settlement attempts and UNGA voting as compared to first the percent agreement with US
voting, then the percent agreement with China voting. These analyses are run to compare both
the comparisons of foreign policy preferences within the disputant’s dyad, and to compare the
initiator of the dispute settlement attempt compared to the ideal points of the United States and
China. The last regression buttresses the case studies, and will focus on the ideal points of those
who make settlement attempts as compared to the ideal points of China. This serves as an
indicator in the case studies for the degree UNGA voting ideal points are similar between China
and its fellow disputants. This serves as a proxy for contentment for the international law based
international system as led by the United States, as well as how potential challengers to the status
quo of the international system might see interactions over issues that have been enshrined in
international law when the United States ascended up the ladder of power following the end of
World War II. As such, this second set of analyses are used to assess support for the last four
hypotheses of the theory. If support is found, as is expected, peaceful settlement attempts will be
significantly related to voting convergence between disputing states and the US (H3a). Nonbinding peaceful attempts will be related to voting convergence with the US (H3b), and binding
peaceful attempts will be related to voting convergence at an even higher level (H3c). Lastly,
violent attempts will be significantly related to voting divergence (H4).
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Table 1.1 presents the results of the first model examining the impacts of settlement
attempts on overall voting patterns in the UNGA, with time dependency controls. Overall, the
results of this first model supports my theoretical claims. In terms of MIDs, it was positive and
significant, indicating that the occurrence of militarized interactions over disputed territory in a
dyad tends to lead to UNGA voting divergence, which supports my second hypothesis. In the
settlement attempt dyads where MIDs have been attempted the difference between UNGA voting
alignment increases from .62 to .70 when the combined MID attempt rises from 0 to 1. These
results signify that when states engage in conflictual behavior over shared territorial disputes,
their voting behavior in the UNGA is impacted such that more dissimilar votes occur.
The results from the models for peaceful settlement attempts provide support for the first
hypothesis, that when peaceful settlements occur, voting patterns will converge in the UNGA as
well. Firstly, and again as theorized, the occurrence of negotiation attempts at settlement were
significant and in the direction of UNGA voting convergence. In settlement attempt dyads where
negotiations have been attempted, the difference between UNGA voting alignment decreases
from .67 to .55 when the combined negotiations attempt rises from 0 to 1. Overall, this indicates
that when negotiations between two disputing states occur, there tends to be voting convergence
in the UNGA. Unfortunately, of the three peaceful settlement attempts arbitration was found to
lack in significance. Though not found significant, in settlement attempt dyads where arbitrations
have been attempted, the difference between UNGA voting alignment increases from .64 to .68
when the combined arbitration attempts rise from 0 to 1. This result would seem to indicate that
arbitration is not factored in as much as the other attempt methods for settlement when it comes
to voting convergence or divergence in the UNGA. Lastly, adjudication attempts at settlement
were significant and in the direction of UNGA voting convergence for this first model. In
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settlement attempt dyads where adjudication have been attempted, the difference between
UNGA voting alignment decreases from .64 to .51 when the combined adjudication attempt rises
from 0 to 1. Much like negotiation attempts at settlement, when adjudication occurs between
disputants voting convergence follows in the UNGA.
An important and interesting result in these analyses is that, as peaceful attempts go from
non-binding to more legal and binding, voting convergence increases in strength. Though no
hypothesis was made regarding this difference for all states in the UNGA, it should be noted that
this would seem to indicate some support for the idea that more binding methods of peaceful
settlement attempts have greater influence on subsequent voting patterns (H3c), which is to say
that states that pursue more legal and binding methods end up seeing greater voting similarities
in the UNGA with their fellow disputants as compared to those who pursue bilateral
negotiations. In addition, it is also interesting that the strength of the impact of violent attempts is
less than that of peaceful attempts. This might well indicate that disputing states in the UNGA
take peaceful settlement attempts into account more than violent attempts when considering
voting. When these findings are taken together, the null hypothesis is rejected, and support for
the hypotheses on peaceful attempts leading to convergent voting in the UNGA (H1) and violent
attempts leading to divergent voting in the UNGA (H2) indicate important backing for the first
half of the theory, as well as some additional support for the second part of the theory (H3c).
Among the control variables, a number of them have a significant relationship with
voting patterns in the UNGA. First, the ratio of material capabilities of states, as represented by
the CINC scores, are positively and significantly related to voting divergence in the UNGA.
Accordingly, as the ratio between the states increases, power disparity goes up and the disputants
will have less similar voting patterns than otherwise might have been the case. This result would
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seem to indicate that power remains important for the determination of states preferences when it
comes to voting in the UNGA. States that are strong will have different preferences and vote
differently to some degree than those states still developing. Given the distribution of power in
the international system, even though not tested explicitly, this would seem to indicate support
for Western powers voting differently than states in Central and South America, Africa, the
Middle East, and parts of Asia. Interestingly, rivalry, another factor often examined in regards to
territorial disputes and state power, turns out to have different relationships to UNGA voting
patterns depending on how the variable is conceptualized. Strategic rivalry, as formulated by
Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson (2007), has a positive and significant relationship to UNGA
voting patterns, whereas rivalry as formulated by Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) has a negative
and significant relationship. In terms of strategic rivalry, which is dependent on the perception of
threat and competition, this result makes sense, but the second conception of rivalry, being based
on the occurrence of at least three militarized interstate disputes, does not fully fit within what
the theory grounding this project might expect. Perhaps the degree that states have interacted
violently as rivals is an explanation. Even though states might see each other as rivals, if they
don’t approach the level of strategic rivals it is possible that this relationship might be
ameliorated to some degree in terms of its impact on UNGA voting.
Trade was also found to be positive and significant, though given the amount of trade
involved between states it would take a large increase in trade value to have a measurable impact
on UNGA voting pattern divergence. Regardless of the scale of impact, it is still interesting that
trade is related to voting divergence in the UNGA. In the long term, given enough products and
goods flowing across borders, it is possible that preferences in the UNGA and the consequent
voting might become more divergent and lead to greater tensions in the UNGA. In terms of
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territorial valuations, resource salience, strategic location salience, and offshore salience
variables bear mentioning. According to the results of the analysis, an attempt at settlement on a
territory that has resource value has no significance in the model. This result might indicate that
the resource value of a territory might not matter so much its status as an offshore claim, or its
strategic value. When offshore status of a dispute was examined it was found to be associated
with UNGA voting convergence. This is interesting as it appears to indicate that states might
care more about offshore disputes, with the results that attempts to settle them are received more
favorable by the disputing dyad, which is reflected in voting within the UNGA. Conversely,
however, for dispute settlement attempts over territory that has strategic value, voting patterns in
the UNGA will see divergence. This makes sense to a certain degree, as states that are concerned
about their physical security and their continued existence will see disputed territories that
contain strategic worth as extremely value for these ends. Perhaps attempts to settle these kinds
of disputes will lead to divergence in UNGA voting as peaceful attempts will see some degree of
compromise in the disbursement of the territory, and violent attempts seek to circumvent the law
to attain the territory for one state. In both situations, the optimal outcome of attaining the
strategically valued territory does not occur for both states in the disputing dyad, likely leading to
hard feelings and divergent voting as a result.
The democracy indices examined here were interesting much the same that the rivalry
variables were. While polyarchy democracy and deliberative democracy were found to be
positive and significant, liberal democracy and participatory democracy was found to be negative
and significant. This is interesting as it indicates that shared democratic or authoritarian status of
the disputants itself might not have a fixed impact on voting patterns in the UNGA, but may in
fact vary based on nuanced attributes of democracy or the lack thereof. The way in which a
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democracy or authoritarian regime operates might well influence positive or negative
perspectives of other states based on the degree they share similar ways of operating.
Lastly is time since the occurrence of the latest MID in the dispute. The model finds that
time since last MID lacked significance, indicating that the passage of time does not have a
measurable influence on voting patterns between a dispute in a positive or a negative direction
between the disputants. This brings me to the second set of analyses examining the impacts of
settlement attempts on voting similarity in the UNGA to the United States that are used to assess
support for the second part of my theory (H3a; H3b; H3c; H4).
Table 1.2 presents the results of the second two models examining the impacts of
settlement attempts beyond the dyad in terms of percent agreement in voting patterns of the
UNGA with the US and then with China. Though not explicitly mentioned in the second set of
hypotheses, the inclusion of the relationship of settlement attempts voting similarity with China
serves an important purpose for the assessment of my theory. As these latter hypotheses are
aimed at assessing contentedness with the international law based, US-led international system, it
is expected that support will be found indicating that peaceful attempts will be related to UNGA
voting convergence with the US (H3a), that the degree of voting convergence increases as
peaceful settlement attempts move from nonbinding to binding and legal (H3b and H3c), and
that violent attempts at settlement will see UNGA voting similarity to the US diverge. As China
is the main challenger of the US for the role of most powerful state in the international system,
should different relationships between the settlement variables and UNGA voting be found to
differ in the case of similarity to China’s voting, this would indicate that China’s perspective on
territorial dispute settlement, including the value it places of the different types of settlement and
the importance of international law, would be different from the US. If this is the case this is one
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more piece of support for the theory that China might well be discontented with its’ current role
and the use of international law, especially in terms of territorial dispute settlement, and the place
of international law in the international system.
The results of these models also are largely in line with the second set of hypotheses, and
moreover, are interesting for a number of reasons on which I will elaborate. Firstly, in terms of
using percentage vote similarity with the US, the findings are in line with what could be
expected in terms of the theory presented previously. MIDs were found to be positive and
significant leading to divergence from voting agreement with the US. In the model controlling
for CINC scores, rivalry, trade, salience, and democracy, in settlement attempt dyads where
MIDs have been attempted, the difference between percent voting agreement with the US
increases from .10 to .11 when the combined MID attempt rises from 0 to 1. Essentially this
means that in dyads wherein militarized attempts are made in managing disputant’s territorial
disputes, voting alignment with the US in the UNGA will decrease slightly.
In addition to MIDs, both negotiations and adjudication were found to be negative and
significant. In the model controlling for CINC scores, rivalry, trade, salience, and democracy, in
settlement attempt dyads where negotiations have been attempted, the difference between
percent voting agreement with the US decreases from .11 to .09 when the combined negotiations
attempt rises from 0 to 1. Thus, when disputants engage in peaceful settlement attempts of
negotiation regarding their shared disputes, they are operating in line with what international law
calls for regarding territorial management, and a convergence in voting with the US in the
UNGA occurs. Adjudication has an even stronger impact, and in the model controlling for CINC
scores, rivalry, trade, salience, and democracy, in settlement attempt dyads where adjudication
have been attempted, the difference between percent voting agreement with the US decreases
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from .10 to .07 when the combined adjudication attempt rises from 0 to 1. These findings are
important as they indicate that the US is largely voting in line with the rules that it help construct
for interactions in the international system over territory, specifically the push against violent
actions and encouragement of peaceful settlement attempts. Though not found significant, in the
model controlling for CINC scores, rivalry, trade, salience, and democracy, in settlement attempt
dyads where arbitrations have been attempted, the difference between percent voting agreement
with the US decreases from .10 to .098 when the combined arbitration attempt rises from 0 to 1.
When these findings are taken together, the hypotheses underlying the second part of the theory
are modestly supported. Support is found for the hypotheses on peaceful attempts leading to
convergent voting in the UNGA with the US (H3a). Further, while non-binding peaceful
attempts are significant and related to convergent voting with the US (H3b), binding attempts at
settlement are found to lead to an even greater convergence (H3c). Lastly, violent attempts are
found to be significant and related to divergence in voting alignment with the US in the UNGA
(H4).
Control variable results for the US UNGA voting similarity model are similar to those
presented previously. CINC scores are positive and significant, indicating that as the power
disparity of the dyad increases, voting patterns will diverge. This would appear to indicate that,
in the case of the US, the level of power a state has is related to the degree they will have similar
votes in the UNGA. As mentioned previously in the general sense, this finding would seem to
indicate that in the case of the US the level of power a state has will see more similar voting in
the UNGA, presumably bringing it into greater alignment with western powers compared to
others. Strategic rivalry (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007) is again found to be positive and
significant, whereas rivalry (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006) is again found to be negative and
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significant, though enduring rivalry is found to have a similar positive and significant
relationship to spatial rivalry. This would seem to indicate that, in the case of the US, the
presence of a rivalry matters in some situations, such as it being of a strategic nature or enduring
over a longer period of time, but not in others. Given the global reach of the US and its concern
with the stability of the international system that it stands atop, it stands to reason that actions
between states that might upset the status quo would lead to divergent voting in the UNGA.
Trade is also found to positive and significant at a similar level previously found. Again,
this indicates that the financial ties that a state has with the US would bring into greater voting
alignment in the UNGA by a small amount. In terms of salience, if the territory in dispute is
considered homeland of the target state, the identity of the target state, or an offshore territory it
had a significant and convergent relationship to voting alignment with the US in the UNGA. For
the first two, these results seem to indicate that putting cultural disputes to rest is seen by the US
as bringing stability between disputants, thus aligning with their desires for peaceful interactions
in the international system. The findings regarding offshore territories is particularly interesting,
as this seems to indicate the US places additional value on these disputes being put to rest,
perhaps indicating an awareness of how much these disputes have a possibility of spiraling out of
control, such as those that exist in the South and East China Seas. In the other direction, if a
territory possessed resource salience, strategic salience, or was subject to either an identity or
historical claim by the challenging state in a settlement attempt, there is a significant and
divergent relationship to voting alignment with the US in the UNGA. It is possible that these
values indicate to the US a greater likelihood of a settlement attempt upsetting the status quo,
leading to divergent voting behavior as a result. Lastly, while polyarchy democracy was found to
have a significant divergent relationship to US voting in the UNGA, participatory democracy
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was found to have a significant convergent relationship. This again indicates that nuances of
democracy matter for voting alignment with the US in the UNGA rather than a simple yes or no
status.
The second model analyzed here covers percentage vote similarity of disputing dyads to
China in the UNGA. Though not explicitly theorized about in the hypotheses, this model is
important to the perspectives and values of the main challenger to the US in the international
system, both to determine if China sees settlement attempts the same way and to set up the next
chapter that more explicitly examines case studies involving China and its’ disputes. While MID
onset is ultimately just non-significant, the direction of the relationship is still in the same
direction as was found in the other models. Though not found significant, in the model
controlling for CINC scores, rivalry, trade, salience, and democracy, in settlement attempt dyads
where MIDs have been attempted, the difference between percent voting agreement with China
increases from .096 to .11 when the combined MID attempt rises from 0 to 1.
Further, though negotiations and adjudication were found to be non-significant,
arbitration was found to be significant and in the direction of the relationship to UNGA voting
similarity to China was positive. In the model controlling for CINC scores, rivalry, trade,
salience, and democracy, in settlement attempt dyads where arbitrations have been attempted, the
difference between percent voting agreement with China increases from .10 to .19 when the
combined arbitration attempt rises from 0 to 1.While it would have been preferable for all three
other explanatory variables to possess significance, the fact that arbitration was found to have the
significant and divergent relationship with voting by China in the UNGA is indicative of support
of the theory that China reacts to settlement attempts differently than the guiding norms and rules
of territorial disputes in the US-led international system. As a result, this relationship carries
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important connotations for the theory, which will be elaborated upon in the next chapter’s case
studies.
The control variables for this second of these latter grouping of models is mostly the
same in terms of significance and direction of relationship to percentage Chinese voting
similarity in the UNGA. In terms of rivalry, strategic rivalry is found positive and significant
whereas rivalry is found, again, to be negative and significant. When it comes these different
kinds of rivalry, China seems to be more concerned with those that are strategic in nature,
perhaps in concern that they might be more likely to spiral into conflict. Resource salience and
offshore claim also are again found to be negative and significant, while strategic location
salience remains positive and significant. This would appear to indicate that China is more
concerned with how disputants interact over strategic territory than territory that possesses
resource salience or is categorized as being offshore. The democracy variables have similar
results, with polyarchy democracy and deliberative democracy being positive and significant,
whereas liberal democracy and participatory democracy remain negative and significant. Again,
this would seem to indicate the grouping of states as simply being a democracy or not does not
quite cover the whole relationship that modes of governance have with voting alignment in the
UNGA. Peace years and peace years squared have opposed relationships to the percentage
Chinese voting similarity in the UNGA. This is interesting in the sense that time since settlement
attempts occurred has no strong interaction on China’s voting in the UNGA. Lastly, one variable
stands out as being especially interesting: trade. Though trade has the same divergent and
significant relationship, its impact on UNGA voting divergence is a whole power lower
compared to that found in the other models. This means that the impact trade has on increasing
divergent voting in the UNGA is, in the case of China, a tenth of what it would be for the United
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States. For China then, while trade still carries weight it perhaps other characteristics of disputant
situation carry more importance, such as the greater emphasis put on a dispute being part of a
strategic rivalry as compared to the US.

Conclusion
My theory emphasizes the relationship between territorial settlement attempts, whether
violent or peaceful, and voting alignments in the UNGA, as well as a state’s opinion of the
structure of the international system as manifested in voting patterns of the UNGA in terms of
similarity to the US and to China. In order to test this theory, in this chapter I conducted two sets
of quantitative analyses of all territorial dispute settlement attempts (both violent and peaceful)
from the founding of the United Nations in 1946 up until 2015. The first set focused on within
dyad voting alignment following territorial dispute settlement attempts. I found support for
peaceful attempts leading to convergent voting in the UNGA (H1) and violent attempts leading
to divergent voting in the UNGA (H2). In the second set of analyses additional support was
found for the second set of hypotheses. Peaceful attempts were found to lead to convergent
voting in the UNGA with the US (H3a). While non-binding peaceful attempts were significant
and related to convergent voting with the US (H3b), binding attempts at settlement were found to
lead to an even greater convergence (H3c). Lastly, violent attempts were found to be significant
and related to divergence in voting alignment with the US in the UNGA (H4). In the last model,
though not tied directly to the hypotheses that were tested, the examination of voting alignment
with China was included as a means to see if the main challenger to the US in the international
system had different perspectives and reactions to settlement attempts, which would signify that
discontent with the international law-based US-led international system as applied to the
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management of territorial disputes. While it would have been preferable to find significance for
all the explanatory variables of interest, the fact that arbitration was found to have the significant
and divergent relationship with voting by China in the UNGA, the opposite of the US, is
indicative of support of the theory that China reacts to settlement attempts differently in the USled international system than the guiding norms and rules for the handling of territorial disputes.
In the literature, significant research has been conducted demonstrating the robust
relationship of territorial disputes to conflictual behavior between states in the international
system. It is clear from these analyses that this relationship might be expanded upon to say that
interactions over territorial disputes can impact peaceful interactions such as in the UNGA.
Moreover, even interactions beyond the dyad disputing itself can be affected, as demonstrated by
the significant effects on voting agreement with the US and China in the UNGA. Control
variables largely behaved as expected, though there were a few surprises discussed above which
will be further elaborated on in the concluding chapter. Generally speaking, given these results,
states should be more aware that their actions within their territorial disputes will be reflected in
other aspects of their relationship with their fellow disputant, in this case specifically the UNGA,
but also could well affect their relationships with states not involved in the dispute itself. In
terms of takeaways for policymakers and scholars of both territorial conflict and interactions
within international organizations, specifically the UNGA, my results are a new, small step in
demonstrating greater importance of interactions between states beyond the phenomena under
examination. In the case of this project, the decision to vote certain ways on issues presented to
the UNGA are influenced by events beyond the Assembly Hall. Understanding that actions have
consequences for interactions in international organizations, whether favorable or unfavorable to
a state, is important towards gaining a greater understanding of the ebb and flow of the
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international system itself. Hopefully gaining this understanding will contribute to more peaceful
and cooperative activities. In the next chapter, I set out a number of case studies to present a
more focused examination of support for or against the hypotheses I laid out at the start of this
project.
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Chapter 4: Case Study Analysis of Five Territorial and Maritime Disputes Involving China
Introduction
In search of finding more support for the relationship between settlement attempt types
and the resultant UNGA actions of the disputants, multiple cases studies following a most similar
cases design (several disputes that China has with different disputants) is pursued, with
differences in the government types and relative power of the second disputant. To best control
for the potential range of responses by the UNGA to settlement attempts, five dyadic pairs are
examined including: the Chinese-Russian frontier disputes over such areas as Yinlong/Tarabarov
Island, Heixiaz/Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island and China’s eastern and western border; the ChineseIndian Frontier disputes over such areas as the Shaksgam Valley, Demchick, Chumar, Kaurik,
Shipki Pass, Jadh, Lapthal, and Arunachal Pradesh; the Chinese-Vietnamese disputes over
Tonkin Gulf, the Paracel Islands, and Spratly Islands; the Chinese-Japanese dispute over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; and lastly, the Chinese-Filipino disputes over the Spratly islands and
the Scarborough Shoal. To further illustrate the reactions the UN has to the activities of the
disputants, tables showing the general voting alignment in the UNGA with China over each of
the disputes time period is also included, utilizing voting agreement data for the relevant
timeframes from the work of Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017).
An important caveat to this outlined approach to these case studies is that the data utilized
to illustrate and examine the individual case studies will not be the full range (1945-2015) but
instead a truncated one from 1971-2015. This abbreviated data is due to the representation of
China in the United Nations was held by the Republic of China (i.e. Chinese Taipei or Taiwan)
from the founding of the international organization in 1945 until the vote on General Assembly
Resolution 2758 in 1971, which passed with over 2/3’s of the UNGA votes and switched the UN
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representative seat from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China, which held
majority control over the mainland Chinese territories. This being the case, the discussions of the
case studies below will provide historical background as relevant, though the context of the
period of 1971 to 2015 will be of particular importance to understanding Chinese territorial
dispute settlement attempts and resulting interactions in the UNGA in terms of voting in the
same dyad year. In illustrating these attempts, academic search engines like Nexis Uni were
utilized in the search for relevant news sources for each dyad to confirm if a peaceful/conflict
settlement attempt occurred in a given year. Though there is a dearth of government documents
directly linking dispute settlement activities to voting responses in UNGA, there were resources
that demonstrate China’s thinking about the role of international law and the UN generally, from
which we can infer how China will react to settlement attempts in terms of voting in the UNGA,
which are reflected in the tables at the end of each section where I examine them alongside
voting ideal points in the UNGA.
General agreement on UNGA resolution voting is based on publicly available data of the
voting record for each of the states in the selected dyads. Given that all we care about is the
voting positions themselves, no additional qualifiers (outside the bounded timeframe of 1971 to
2015) are used. I follow the lead of Voeten in how to calculate agreement between the disputing
dyads on UNGA voting (which was already done for the US, Russia, and India) for Japan,
Vietnam, and the Philippines. For the given resolutions in each dyad, each is coded as a 1 if they
both vote the same, a .5 if either one of them abstains, and as a 0 if the votes are different. If one
or both states is listed as non-voting, in other words not participating, I treat that data point as
missing for the purposes of my analyses. Further, for the purposes of my analyses, I code and
examine the voting data based on the year the vote occurs, not in terms of the UN session
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number as this sometimes overlaps with a two-year timeframe. Lastly, each dyad is presented in
terms of the historical interactions of the selected dyads over the disputes.
In the pages to follow I begin by presenting a general overview of why China was
selected as the state in common for the individual case studies mentioned above. From there I
present information on China’s perspectives of international law and the UN, and why we might
expect China to have a similar reaction to certain settlement attempts (i.e., negotiations) and not
others (i.e. adjudication) in terms of voting alignment with their fellow disputants in the UNGA.
I then proceed to outline the backgrounds of the specific case studies and interactions over the
disputes themselves. After examining each case study, I discuss some of the relevant UNGA
resolutions for their voting similarities between the disputing dyads and then I present some
general conclusions.

Why China’s Disputes?
China was selected as the country in common for these disputes for several reasons.
Compared to many countries, China has had a greater number of disputes in which there has
been different types of territory involved and different actions seen, rather than a one-size-fits-all
approach to the disputes. These different types of territory include some that could be classified
as homeland, frontiers, and offshore islands. Interactions over these disputes have included high
level conflicts, low level conflicts, a mix of conflict levels, and peaceful resolutions. In addition,
many of the disputes that China has been involved in are rooted in the 19th century or earlier.
Since a number of these disputes are still ongoing, it would stand to reason that they would loom
higher in the priorities of the disputing states, and thus be more likely to influence their direct,
and indirect, relations. Lastly, recent research has found that China’s increasing power has
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coincided with efforts to erode international norms like those regarding democracy, sovereignty,
human rights, international order, and non-interference, especially between the period of 1999 to
2009 (Brazys and Dukalskis 2017). As a result, if this project’s theory is supported UNGA
voting will generally shift between China and its fellow disputants in line with the interactions
over the territorial disputes, and specifically over UNGA resolutions on topics related to
democracy, sovereignty, human rights, international order, and non-interference. For these
reasons, China offers an excellent source of disputes to examine in a case study format relevant
to the overriding theory of this dissertation.
An additional point of importance for selecting China lies in how, by understanding how
interactions in these disputes ties to interactions in the UNGA, we will gain insight into an
expanded impact on the international community beyond the dyadic interactions. In the time
period selected to examine China’s dispute interactions, the country went through significant
political and economic changes, the reverberations of which continue to this day. When the
examination of this is combined with the generally western imposed system of international law
and acceptable international behavior, it is hoped that these interactions give increased insight
into how China has reacted to its place in the US-led international system. Further, to ensure the
rigor of the examination of these disputes, the case studies will be examined over the period of
time from China’s ascension to its current seat in the UN during 1971 until 2015. Again, the
hope is that this will make it easier to trace how the interactions over these disputes between
China and its fellow disputants have impacted their actions in the UNGA over time.
Finally, the selection of China as the country in common for all the cases examined is an
attempt to provide a further examination and insight into the “China question” in international
relations research. This question is essentially summed up as whether or not China’s rise will be
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characterized by peaceful or violent actions (Fravel 2008), given how fast it has accrued power,
wealth, and prestige over the past fifty odd years. The former scenario would see China take its
place in a new multi-polar international system, while the latter would see it destabilize the
international system. Though a simplification of the options and how they might occur, this
question does compliment this dissertation’s examination of the impacts of territorial dispute
interactions on UNGA voting. In addition, this may well be a timely examination given
continued tensions in interactions between China and its fellow disputants over the South China
Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. It is expected regarding these disputes that, given the value
of territory to states that was presented in the first chapter, it would stand to reason that these
interactions over disputed territories will affect interactions in the UNGA.

China, International Law, and the UNGA
For a long period of time China had significant issues with the application of
international law to govern the interactions between states. To China, it was the Western powers
who had created, interpreted, and propagated international law and expected all others in the
international system to follow it (Chan 2014). In Qing China, the monarchy resisted all intrusions
and efforts to apply the foreign international law to their territory, although it did sporadically
use international law itself to defend its sovereignty and attempt to renegotiate the grating
concessions it had been expected to make to the European powers (Chan 2014). In fact, China’s
use of international law and the League of Nations in an effort to defend its’ sovereignty and
territorial integrity from the Japan-backed Manchuria helped contribute to the rise of customary
international law and that it is unlawful to recognize a state or territory that comes into existence
through the threat or use of force (Chan 2014). Communist China would also initially object to

76

the role of international law in interactions between states, again holding it to be merely an
imperialist tool to oppress weak states, and in that period to also prevent worldwide communist
revolution. This would change gradually after 1971, however, when China realized through its
interactions with international organizations that recognizing it and working within international
law would allow China additional influence in how international law and international relations
were conducted in the world system (Chan 2014). Over time this would see China engage more
in the international legal regimes as well (Potter 2007). Despite this, the question still remains to
what extent China’s increased participation in the international legal regimes has resulted in an
internalization of the normative underpinnings of international law (Potter 2007).
In its early years in the UN, China’s activities made it clear that it had no perennial
friends or foes, only consistent interests it was pursuing (Kim 1974). China would often take a
twofold approach to diplomacy, wherein it would release militant revolutionary announcements
on one hand and on the other pursue cautious, even pragmatic behavior on the other (Kim 1974).
Over time it became clear to the other member states of the UN that China was neither a state
seeking to break the international organization nor fully committed to widespread structural
reform, deciding instead to largely follow the established rules regarding the protection of world
peace (Kim 1974). Working within the UN allowed China to participate as an influential actor in
shaping the international system, though it also had a stance against unbridled expansion of the
UN’s role or its functions. For this first decade, the conclusion would be that China had minimal
impacts on the governance of legal issues, and tended to at once present qualified acceptance of
the traditional international law yet also worked towards the establishment of a new legal order,
as their interests and situation required (Kim 1978). Interestingly, Kim (1978) attributes these
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actions in part to historical memory of the unfair international treaties imposed on them prior to
the first World War.
That being said, China’s relationship with international law again shifted in the years
after Mao’s death. In the period of 1979 to 1986, China would take greater strides to embrace
international law, seeing it as part of an effort to catch up with the rest of the world (Kim 1987).
Even in doing so, however, China still remained concerned with protecting its status, its security,
and most of all its sovereignty (Kim 1987). For this reason, international law became to be seen
as a tool to use to attain foreign policy goals and objectives, thereby inextricably tying it to the
domain of politics (Kim 1987). If used correctly, international law would allow China to more
easily fulfill its quest for a stable and predictable international environment (Kim 1987).
In more recent years this has led to China being more active in international law, such as
by supporting the creation of an international criminal court. Such a court would grow into an
expectation that states could more easily pursue peaceful settlement of their disputes, and help
inhibit military and other leaders from conducting illegal activities (Zhu 2015). Unfortunately,
though the court came into existence China opted to remove itself as party to its jurisdiction,
cited that the way the court was constructed violated principles of state sovereignty (Zhu 2015).
Rather than sign on and signal to the rest of the international system that China would abide by
decisions in the court, China instead decided to follow the lead of past decades of policy to
protect its sovereignty to the utmost.
Overall China has a bit of a mixed record regarding the application and adherence to
international law. On the one hand, in the UNSC, China’s voting behavior and stated arguments
in front of the Security Council has demonstrated the importance it places in the role of
international law in the international system (Chan 2013). According to Chan (2013) this is no
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clearer than the repeated reference to international norms and principles in the drafts of Security
Council resolutions, though it consistently defends non-interference in the internal affairs of
states. On the other hand, to some extent China’s participation in the international legal arena
seems to reflect its power aspirations and that, should international law fall against it,
participation would be withdrawn until its state interests might be restored (Potter 2007). Across
some issues this has meant that China attempts to accommodate the international community,
while in others complete disregard is shown (Feinerman 1995). Justifications for this are
nowhere clearer than how it presents international laws relationship with domestic law.
To the Chinese, international law should be treated as a legal system separate from
domestic law, though in a supplementary fashion, and thus is not a replacement to it (Pan 2011;
Vanhullebusch 2015). Further, for the Chinese, international law comes about due to the efforts
and wills of states in the international community, and as such should be subject to the wills of
the states themselves (Pan 2011). China has carried over theses perspectives in their interactions
in the UNGA, where they consistently demonstrate a sense of strategic purpose in regards to
when, where, and how to pull their weight in the organization as it applies to their foreign policy
goals (Cooper and Fues 2008). For this reason, China for a long time acted as a bit of a system
stabilizer in the UNGA, as it enjoyed the structure of the status quo in the international system,
though as it has increased in power and rank, a new mixture of pressures have emerged on it,
namely one to assist in reforming the organization to be more in touch with the current state of
world politics (Cooper and Fues 2008). In the worst-case scenario, the argument has been made
that should China continue to see the UN as being dominated by the interests and values of
Western states, China might turn to regionalism and Southern alliances as alternatives to
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engagement in this organization, instead reducing their activities or even outright withdrawing
(Cooper and Fues 2008).
With the inherently close ties between international law and the operation of the UN,
China endeavored to make clear where they stand on how the latter is applied in the 66th Session
of the UNGA (China State News Service 2011). In the document, China affirms its support for
the UN’s central role in international affairs, as well as its commitment to uphold the purposes
and principles of the organization, as elaborated upon in the Charter of the United Nations, that
world peace, common development, and international cooperation all might be realized. That
being said, China also reaffirms and reiterates a number of caveats to these functions in the
following pages. When it comes to interactions and interventions, China upholds that consent of
the parties is required, impartiality must be applied, and that non-use of force is required except
in scenarios of self-defense (China State News Service 2011). Moreover, the core of this stance
is that sovereignty and territorial integrity must be fully respected, and other states must refrain
from interfering in local political disputes or impeding a peace process (China State News
Service 2011).
With putting so much emphasis on these qualifications to the role of the UN and
international law, it is clear that China is stating its preference for negotiations as the primary
peaceful means with which to settle their disputes with other states, particularly those involving
territory. If this holds true, negotiations as a peaceful method should predominate in the case
studies below, and arbitration or adjudication efforts in settlement would likely be introduced by
China’s fellow disputants rather than China. Given this history, China’s stance on international
law and the role of the UNGA, we might expect a number of observations in the five case studies
examined below. First, peaceful interactions, predominantly negotiations, over the territorial
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disputes should lead to convergence in UNGA voting due to China’s preferences (H1). Violent
interactions should similarly lead to more divergence in UNGA voting (H2). In terms of voting
alignment with the US, we also might expect that China’s engagement in peaceful interactions
will contribute to UNGA voting convergence (H3a), which will be higher in the event that
arbitration and adjudication are used (H3b; H3c). Violent interactions will remain related to
UNGA voting divergence as well (H4). Having given background on China’s perspective on
international law and the UNGA, as well as how this might apply to settlement interactions over
their territorial disputes, this next section provides a brief introduction to the types of territorial
disputes China is engaged in before presenting the first of the five dispute dyads involving
Russia.

China’s Frontier and Offshore Island Disputes
Regarding the territorial disputes themselves, the Chinese disputes come in two main
types: frontier disputes and offshore island disputes. China shares land borders with fourteen
countries, and the border disputes that went with them were inherited by the Chinese Communist
Party once they rose to power in 1949. For the purposes of this dissertation, the China-Russia
and China-India disputes are particularly worthy of attention. These two disputes are useful for
several reasons. First, both exhibit within-case variation in terms of policy decisions, which
further vary over time regarding the specific territorial disputes. Secondly, there is cross-case
variation in terms of the ultimate resolution, or lack thereof, in these border disputes, with the
Chinese-Russian disputes being resolved, while the Chinese-Indian disputes continue to plague
relations between the two Asian powers. Both of these disputes have further utility for case
studies due to their longevity. With each lasting at a minimum of several decades, it allows for
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an examination of the development of settlement attempts over time. Lastly, the border disputes
themselves are larger and possess greater strategic importance compared to some of the other
Chinese border disputes, with the result that the salience of them in their interstate interactions
should be higher.
In addition to its border disputes, China also shares several water boundaries with
neighboring states. China shares the Yellow Sea with North Korea and South Korean, the East
China Sea with Japan and South Korea, and the South China Sea with Brunei, Malaysia,
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Much like the border disputes with Russia and India,
China inherited these maritime boundaries with its neighbors in 1949, but unlike the border
disputes these areas were not demarcated. As such, China has disputed its neighbors over four
distinct island groups; the White Dragon Tail (Bailongwie) Island in the Gulf of Tonkin, the
Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea, and the Paracel (Xisha) and Spratly (Nansha)
Island groups in the South China Sea. Tied up in all these claims are sovereignty of islands and
rights to maritime features including rocks, reefs, shoals, territorial seas, contiguous seas,
massive Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelves, as well as the resultant
ownership of resources. Unlike the more flexible policies China has pursued in its territorial
border disputes, the policies that China has utilized toward its offshore island and maritime
feature disputes have been more stringent. In point of fact, as of 2015 China has only
compromised on the White Dragon Tail Island dispute with Vietnam. For the other offshore
island and maritime feature disputes, China has generally pursued delaying tactics or aggressive
actions since 1949. Since 2009 the disputes in the East and South China Seas have been
increasingly intense, such that a failure to include these dyadic disputes as case studies in this
dissertation would overlook important data for the illustration of this project’s theory. Thus, for
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the purposes of this dissertation, in addition to the two previous cases mentioned, the ChinaVietnam, China-Japan, and the China-Philippines island disputes are also included.
To briefly reiterate, my theory seeks to explain interactions in the international system at
the level of voting in the UNGA by examining the interactions over territorial disputes by
disputing states. Based on how these interactions are in line with or against the founding
principles of the UN and prevailing international norms regarding the use of force, violent
interactions between China and its fellow disputants will lead to a voting divergence in the
UNGA, whereas peaceful interactions will lead to a voting convergence in the UNGA. This
being projected, and having already tested this theory in a large N quantitative analysis, I now
seek further support by examining specific case studies that include China. The examination of
each of the cases concludes with a regression analysis mirroring the previous chapter in format,
but limited only to the universe of dispute cases involving China and these five disputants.
Overall, and apart from the consistent case variation, this set of five Chinese dispute cases are
important for understanding the stability of the international system as a whole, given China’s
status as a great power and, increasingly, one of the main challengers to the US led international
system. Understanding how Chinese territorial dispute activities relate to their approach to the
UNGA can provide insight into how China approaches its place in the international system, as
well as potentially serve as a means to predict when future convergence with or divergence from
the US led international system might occur.
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China-Russia
Dyadic Information
Beginning in the middle of the 16th century, Russia directed its eastward expansion in
Siberia with simultaneous expansions south to the Pacific seaboard (Maxwell 2007). Gradually
this expansion brought Russian territories into contact with Chinese claims where previously
there had been no contact between their frontiers prior to the 17th century. In particular,
contention began to increase between the states following Russia’s expansion into the Amur
basin and the river that lead into the estuary (Maxwell 2007).
By the mid-17th century, the rulers of China saw the threat of unchecked incursions by
the Russians in the north and began to make forceful overtures to remove the invaders. What
followed was a series of small conflicts between the two sides in the areas around the Amur
River beginning in 1652 and lasting more than thirty years. The two sides would meet in
Nerchinsk in August of 1689 to create the first boundary agreement between Russia and China,
to be called the Treaty of Nerchinsk. This treaty would result in the delimitation of a frontier
between Russia and China rather than a specific boundary, as the language was based on major
geographical features rather than specific lines on a map to precisely separate each party’s area
of control (Maxwell 2007).
The Treaty of Nerchinsk was a success and initially satisfied both sides of the dispute.
The Manchu rulers of China at the time saw the treaty as an effective means to prevent the
further eastward expansion by Russia, as well as a means to remove their outposts in the Amur
basin, thereby ensuring the stability of China’s eastern frontier which would allow them to direct
more attention inwards to deal with domestic upheaval and consolidate greater political control
(Changbin Jiang, Guojie Dongduan de Yanbian 2007, pg. 68-71). Similarly, the Russian
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Emperor was content with the treaty as it provided legitimization of his control of territory in the
Far East, and a much larger territory than he originally thought he would be able to get at that,
which constituted some 90,000 square miles (Changbin Jiang, Guojie Dongduan de Yanbian
2007, pg. 63).
The status quo resulting from this treaty would last for over one hundred and fifty years
until the mid-19th century (Sidorov 2014). Seeing how the British Empire and France were
successfully exhorting a weakened China, Russia coerced Chinese leaders into a new series of
territorial treaties, part of which was to eventually create a Manchurian shortcut between
territories controlled in the form of a new railway (Carlson 1986). The resulting Treaty of Aigun
(1858) and Treaty of Beijing (1860) would establish much of the modern border between Russia
and China (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1981; Maxwell 2007). The new Treaty of Aigun
would reverse the Treaty of Nerchinsk by forcing China to concede the equivalent of the land
area of France on the northern bank of the Amur River directly to Russian control.
The Treaty of Beijing that was signed two years after the Treaty of Aigun would allow
the Russians to further consolidate the territorial gains that had coerced out of China. According
to this treaties terms, the eastern boundary between the two empires would be set along the
Argun, Amur, and Ussuri Rivers, with the result that all the land along the Ussuri boundary
would now be folded into Russian control and provided an opening for the creation of Russian
consulates in Mongolia and Xinjiang (Maxwell 2007).
By the time the CCP rose to power in China in 1949, the Russians (now in the guise of
the Soviet Union) had been able to secure full control over Manchuria, using the railway that
crossed to Port Lushun (Arthur) to develop interests in Xinjiang and maintain control over the
Mongolian People’s Republic, a Soviet puppet state that had previously been Outer Mongolia
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(Maxwell 2007). Despite steps to counter Soviet influence in Manchuria and Xinjiang in the
early 1950s, the Soviet presence in these areas would remain significant with them refusing
immediate departure nor a return of Chinese control to the Trans-Manchuria Railway, the Port of
Lushun, or the Port of Dalian (Daren). The boundary rivers of Argun, Amur, and Ussuri, core
components of the previous territorial treaties, would largely remain under Soviet control as
well. Things would spiral in open fighting in the late 1960s along the disputed border, and
despite the deplorable Siberian conditions vicious fighting and deaths for both sides resulted
(The Guardian 1984).

Dispute Settlement Interactions
Before the settlement of the border issue between Russia and China, there were three
Chinese-Soviet/Russian borderlines. The first of these was the Treaty Line, which had been
defined by the series of treaties previously discussed that had been signed by previous Chinese
governments and Russian Emperors. The Chinese government saw these treaties as being
unequal and the source of some 930,000 square miles of territorial losses to Russia. That being
said, while the Chinese government did not recognize the validity of these treaties that the Qing
government had signed, thy were open to using them as the start of border negotiations with the
Russians. The second of these borderlines was the Map Line, which referenced the small map
that Russia had attached to the Treaty of Beijing, and was contrary to the wording of the treaty
itself in that it appeared to give more territory to Russia than the wording of the treaty allowed
for (Maxwell 2007). Last was the Line of Actual Control which, in a number of places, actually
lay further to the south of the Map Line. As can be imagined, these three contradictory
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borderlines complicated the settling of border issues between Russia and China for quite some
time.
Partly as a result of this, the Chinese-Russian border since 1949 was broken into two
sectors, an eastern and a western, that was separated by the buffer state of Outer Mongolia. On
the map, the eastern sector shows Chinese Manchuria bordering the Russian Far East, and the
western sector shows Xinjiang province bordering what would eventually become Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (Maxwell 2007). Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, these borders
would total almost 5000 miles between the states, though this would be reduced to just over 2600
miles in 1991 as the western border with Russia would mostly disappear barring a small 36-mile
section remaining. Given that the majority of the western border with Russia ceased to exist in
1991, due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the eastern border area receives the majority of
attention in this case study following this period in time.
The problem of the eastern border area between China and the Soviet Union/Russia
largely stems from the Treaty of Beijing, which left a great deal unspecified and inconsistent,
especially considering the included map (Maxwell 2007). Regarding the Argun, Amur, and
Ussuri rivers, the text of the treaty denotes each as boundary rivers without actually stating
where the boundary line itself falls, thus meaning it was unclear who actually held sovereignty
over the rivers themselves, nor the river islands that lay within them. The included map denoted
all of the rivers up to the Chinese banks (which included some 700+ islands and islets) were
exclusively under the control of the Russians. The Heixiazi/Tarabarov Island and the
Abagaitu/Bolshoy Ostrov Islet are two major ones included in this demarcation. Covering almost
750 square miles, this area was a significant water, fishing, and lumber resource for whomever
controlled it which, according to the disputed Map Line, was the Russians.
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While there is a lack of China’s participation in the United Nations until the vote to
recognize it in 1971, this period is still worthy of particular focus to be brought to bear in terms
of Chinese-Russian interactions, especially regarding the increase in tensions between the two
during the period of the Soviet Union’s existence. These tensions increased in 1964 following
the refusal by Khrushchev to negotiate a new treaty, with the Chinese reacting by framing the
border contest not solely as a territorial dispute but also as a struggle against the Soviet’s social
imperialism. This situation occurred despite China declaring that same year that they renounced
any claim to the roughly 60,000 square miles that Tsarist Russia had annexed in previous
centuries in the unequal treaties that China had be goaded into signing (BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts 1981). Further, China presented a readiness to settle all border issues with the Soviet
Union if they were will to proceed (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1981).
In October of 1969 the Sino-Soviet border talks would go ahead, but in the process of
negotiations the Soviets would change their minds, despite this change being contrary to the
earlier understanding of what the starting point of the border talks would be (BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts 1981). Despite this and other, similar acts of bad faith on the Soviets part,
China asserted that both states should continue to work towards the complete settlement of the
disputed boundaries through peaceful negotiations, even if this meant that the unequal treaties
that had been signed hundreds of years ago would serve as the starting point (BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts 1981).
Starting with clashes between the states in 1969, the tensions between China and the
Soviet Union remained high throughout the 1970s, especially with each acting to secure the
loyalty of the inhabitants in these areas, such as through economic investment (Maxwell 2007;
Paine 1996). Military actions to attempt to assert control would also prove popular, with the
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Soviets deploying additional forces in 1972, and the Chinese pursuing a nationwide program of
war preparations for the possibility of war breaking out. Demonstrating how serious they took
the threat of the Soviet Union, China re-designated them as their primary opponent, over and
above the capitalist US, and as such the greatest potential source of war (Lieberthal 1978, 56).
China was clearly apprehensive over its vulnerability to an attack from the Soviet Union, and
knowing that it would be at threat of annihilation in such a war, made overtures to the US to try
to bring the countries closer together, even though the Chinese were scornful of the US policy of
détente (US News and World Report 1975b). There was even some speculation that China
sought to be brought under the nuclear umbrella of the US (US News and World Report 1975b).
As a result of these concerns, the disputed border areas took on greater importance to
China, as they represented a primary avenue of attack by the Soviet Union into Chinese territory,
as well as a potential source of security for China if they could be secured. Luckily for China, it
would be around this time that Peking began to accrue greater influence in Asia, at the cost of the
Soviet Union. With the situation on the ground changing, the Soviets could not afford for the
possibility that a war involving both China and the US broke out, and began to act in a manner to
ensure that the two states were not pushed into colluding (US News and World Report 1975a;
US News and World Report 1976b).
Despite the awareness of what a potential war might look like, outside observers were
still of the opinion that the border disputes would not be resolved anytime soon. There were just
too many elements separating what each state wanted out of a settled dispute (US News and
World Report 1976c). Even with China’s future being up in the air due to the aging Mao Tsetung and sickness of the Premier Chou En-lai, the possibility of the states remaining foes endured
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(US News and World Report 1976a). Nonetheless, due to Soviet concerns and Chinese fears, the
1970s would see consistent attempts at negotiation between the states over their shared disputes.
Throughout the 1970s China would be more concerned with cultivating ties with the US
as a counter to the Soviet threat that minimal efforts were exerted in the Far East for the
communist cause (US News and World Report 1977). No meaningful progress would be made in
negotiations during these years, and China would clash with the Soviets across the disputed
4,500-mile borders multiple times. The most serious of these fights occurred in March 1969
when more than 200 Soviet soldiers and more than four times that many Chinese troops were
killed in skirmishes over the small island in the Ussuri River near Khabarovsk in the Far Eastern
Siberia (Wallace 1979). Rather than accelerate into outright war, the border violations continued.
In May of 1978, Soviet troops would again cross over into Chinese territory, though Moscow
would attempt to frame this as a mistake (Wallace 1979). By this time there were more than
800,000 Soviet troops, six heavy-tank divisions, and 2,000 aircraft and rockets placed along the
border, as well as nuclear missiles targeted on Chinese targets (Wallace 1979). The Chinese
themselves deployed between 70 and 80 Army divisions, amounting to a larger number of
personnel along the border facing their Soviet rivals (Wallace 1979). The large scale of these
forces contributed to additional border violations and sabre rattling between the disputes through
the rest of the 1970s.
However, the calculus changed again in the 1980s, with the distribution of the border
areas becoming less crucial, as China expanded its military capacity and ability to deploy
medium to long-range missiles. This technological advancement culminated in China’s
successful deployment of intercontinental missiles and medium-range bombers. As a result, the
ownership of the islands and disputed border areas in Manchuria suffered a reduction in
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importance, as now China and Russia both could strike deep into the other’s territory if a war
were to break out. Perhaps related to these developments was the thawing of the Soviet position
regarding their relations with China, with China itself quickly following. The Soviets themselves
still likely feared Chinese diplomacy leading to an alliance with the US and Japan (US News and
World Report 1980). The resulting overtures for negotiations made to China resulted in a
positive response, especially following the death of Mao (Zagoria 1983).
Though these greater agreements to pursue a phased settlement for the territorial disputes
signaled efforts to avoid conflict, the fears of such a conflict still lingered. These fears were
particularly high in Xinjiang, which shared a long border with the Soviet Union, contained
restless religious and ethnic minorities, and Peking was overall doubtful about their committed
loyalty (Wallace 1982). At least 250,000 Chinese troops were always stationed in the region in
the hopes of warning off an incursion by the Soviets (Wallace 1982). For the Soviet’s part, they
possessed several concerns relating to the disputes as well. Chief among them was the
accusations they leveled against Chinese scholars as attempting to misrepresent history in the
form of territorial claims, and keeping the border issue in reserve as a means to hamper relations
between the states (The Xinhau General News Service 1983). In response, China reiterated
multiple times that it had no territorial claims on the Soviet Union, nor did it demand the return
of the territories ceded to Tsarist Russia (The Xinhua General News Service 1983). In fact, they
took pains to convey that their primary hope was for the overall solution of the border issues to
occur through peaceful negotiations and taking into consideration the actual conditions on the
ground (The Xinhua General News Service 1983). The progress towards settlement began to
make more sustained progress under Mikhail Gorbachev when he came to power (S. 1985). It
was the Soviet’s leaders’ hope to realize China and the Soviet Union as two great neighboring
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socialist states (S. 1985), a status that would be far easier to achieve if the territorial disputes
could finally be settled.
The Soviet position would gain greater flexibility starting in 1986, when Gorbachev gave
his July speech in Vladivostok, in which he championed a cooperative strategy with China over
their shared border disputes, as well as greater cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Soon after,
formal proposals of normalization of relations began to occur (Macleod 1986). Progress was
gradual, slowly moving from bilateral trade and investment to cultural and knowledge
exchanges, until outright economic and technological cooperation culminated in the
normalization of relations between the two states following the visit of Gorbachev to Beijing in
1989. Part of the commitment to bringing this about, the Soviets promised to ease tensions along
the 5,000-mile frontier by thinning out troops and accepting a Chinese position on the dispute
over the Amur and Ussuri rivers that had been the site of so much violence in the 1960s
(Macleod 1986).
For the disputants, this commitment would bear fruit in renewed promises for both China
and the Soviet Union to resolve their boundary disputes through equal consultation according to
the principles of understanding and mutual accommodation (BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 1987a). As a side effect, these actions would lead to greater economic activities,
such as trade expansion and Soviet ships being repaired in Chinese shipyards, as well as shared
investments between the powers were increased (Handelman 1988). This would prove to be
particularly important to the Soviets, since in this period of time they had an urgent need to cut
back military spending in order to inject new life into domestic industries (Ries 1989).
Tensions decreased even further following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991,
and as a result cooperation continued, and even increased, between the two states following the
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end of the Cold War. Even when the Soviet Union broke up, China maintained the course
towards peaceful settlement, as it recognized the need to continue to maintain normal state
relations with Russia, and to avoid returning to the level of animosity that governed their
relationship prior to the 1990s (Agence France Presse 1991b). Also, occurring in this period was
a rapid increase in Chinese nationalism which, when combined with the post-Tiananmen Square
sanctions by the United States and other countries, resulted in China being angry, particularly
with the United States. Progress towards settling these disputes was finally made in 1991 with a
boundary agreement for the eastern sector signed in May of that year that stated that the
boundary ran in the median line of the Argun, Amur and Ussuri rivers, and that the islands that
straddled these lines would be allocated to either state based on recommendations given by a
joint commission (Bakshi 2001). The rest of the outstanding territorial disputes were left to the
future to be settled. This approach would again bear fruit with new agreements reached with
Boris Yeltsin that further reduced armed forces along their shared borders and the ushering in of
a new period of cooperation between the two states (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1992;
Helmer 1994; Preston 1992). China and Russia even went so far as to reach an agreement on not
aiming nuclear weapons at each other and to never use force against each other (Specter 1994).
With the eastern sector agreement made, the demarcation work was conducted between
1992 and 1997, resulting in fairly even divisions of the territory between the two sides (Fravel
2008, 142). Part of this agreement was to recognize Zhenbao Island as being in China’s territory,
while the Heixiaz/Bolshoi Ussuriysky island and Abugaitu/Bolshoy Ostrov shoal were firmly in
Russia’s control (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1993). Building off this good will, the
western boundary agreement was signed in 1994 (Bakshi 2001). They formally announced the
settlement in December of 1999 and with that their thirty-year-old border dispute had been
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successfully resolved. From the signing until the formal announcement China expanded its
investment and trade with Russia, while Russia provided China with armaments and assistance
with infrastructure development (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1995a; BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts 1995b; IPS Correspondents 1995; The Globe and Mail 1994).
Despite progress, there were some on both sides who continued to distrust their previous
foes, especially for some Russians who saw a drawback in military forces in the Far East as
putting Russian territory at risk of being lost to China (Delyusin 1996). Private citizens and
paramilitary forces even took it upon themselves to patrol the border areas in an effort to prevent
border violations (York 1997). Nonetheless, diplomatic relations continued to flourish and
cooperation continued to occur on outstanding issues (Magistad 1996), such as the remaining
disputed borders, though this might well be in part due to the inability of Russia to effectively
project military strength beyond its own borders into China by this point (Garnett 1996). This
reduction of their military presence in the region likely contributed additional support to
statements about managing their borders peaceably made in 1994 (Xinhau News Agency 1996).
Likely the continued pace of expansion for NATO indirectly contributed to cooperation as well
(Platt 1999). Nonetheless, the 1990s would conclude with recommitments to bilateral
negotiations (ITAR-TASS 1998) and calls by both sides for international disputes to be settled
peacefully through the UN, while still respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
countries (Saiget 1999).
In the early 2000s the extent of cooperation between Russia and China would again be
expanded with an eye to the future (ITAR-TASS 2001). Instances of cooperation like this would
pave the way to an eventual joint-summit in 2004 in which both countries announced a new
supplementary agreement to the previous two made regarding the delimitation of the border
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between the two states (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 2004b). The remaining disputed
islands along their shared border were distributed between the two parties in 2004, and the
distribution agreement was in turn ratified by the respective legislative branches of each state in
2005. Eventually this would culminate in finally putting the boundary disputes to rest with a joint
announcement in 2008 (Russia & CIS Diplomatic Panorama 2008). These settlements would
hold despite occasionally resurgent concerns that China has designs on reasserting control over
portions of Russia’s Far East, especially considering its low population in the area (The Observer
2009).

Discussion
In the thirty-eight years of the China-Russian disputes presented in Table 3, there were
twenty-four years where only peaceful interactions occurred, two years where only violent
interactions occurred, and six years where both peaceful and violent interactions occurred. The
convergence or divergence pattern of these settlement interactions on voting in the UNGA is
mixed and unclear. For peaceful interactions, for ten years there was divergence and for fourteen
years there was convergence. For violent interactions, there was an even split of divergence and
convergence. Lastly, in the years in which both peaceful and violent interactions occurred, there
were four divergences and two convergences. That being said, when I calculated averages for
each of the interaction types the pattern becomes clearer. Peaceful interactions saw years with
closer convergence on UNGA voting on average (mean =1.4265) over purely violent interactions
(mean = 1.6952). The higher average UNGA voting divergence (mean = 1.8977) might be
explained by 1979 being really tense due to a large number of border violations and increased
fortification and reinforcement of troops along the border by both sides, and 1993 to 1994, when
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settlement efforts resulted in neither side completely getting the territory they claimed and fought
over in the previous decades.
The relatively close spread of settlement attempts on UNGA voting convergences and
divergences, as well as the similar voting alignment averages, might be due in part to the unique
nature of the China-Russia dyad. Starting in 1969, there were several border clashes between the
Soviet Union and China, which helped contribute to the former becoming essentially the main
foe of China from the period of 1971 to 1991. As a result, each violent interaction over these
disputed territories would see highly divergent voting in the UNGA (mean = 1.6952), and even
for peaceful attempts (mean = 1.4265), albeit at a slightly lower extreme. That being said, the
value and importance of the disputed territories between the disputants varied over this time
period, which was reflected in their interactions. In the 1970s, there were little changes in the
value of the territorial disputes between the two states, with the result that a delaying policy
towards the disputes was pursued by both sides. This would shift starting in 1986 when the
economic values increased and military importance declined, leading to cooperative policies that
would continue until 2004, and the next year would see the dispute resolved peacefully by both
sides and concluded in 2008. Further spurring on these interactions would be the shared concerns
over US military adventurism in the international system following the end of the Cold War.
Examining several years in which the change in convergence or divergence is high adds
additional context demonstrating the variety of UNGA resolutions that the disputing dyad
respectively agree or disagree on, indicating that it is not just the case of a few types of
resolutions being influenced. For example, in 1976, where China and Russia had a peaceful
interaction over disputed territory the previous year, they voted the same on a range on
resolutions, including such topics as the status of previously colonized states, the importance of
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self-determination, the topic of Palestine, and human rights (see these sources for examples: UN
General Assembly 1976e, 1976f, 1976h, 1976i). In addition, in 1978, where they engaged in both
a peaceful and a violent interaction over disputed territory the previous year, they voted the same
on some resolutions, including ones on former colonial states, self-determination, Palestine, and
human rights topics (see these sources for examples: UN General Assembly 1978a, 1978b,
1978f, 1978i, 1978j), while voting differently on resolutions dealing with non-interference in the
internal affairs of states, the non-use of nuclear weapons, and the status of the Western Sahara
(see these sources for examples: UN General Assembly 1978c, 1978d, 1978g, 1978h). Thus,
with all these findings taken together, and explanations offered for the few years that don’t fully
align, support has been found for peaceful settlement interactions having values indicative of
convergence (H1) as compared to violent attempts being higher, and in the direction of more
divergent voting (H2). Unfortunately, there can be no conclusions reached regarding specific
kinds of peaceful attempts having different impacts, as for each of the years in the time period
examined only negotiations are presented as having occurred between the disputants as peaceful
interactions.

China-India
Dyadic Information
The next dyadic interaction that I examine is the border dispute between China and India.
The basis for the disputed frontiers between China and India are found in the nineteenth century
during a surge in imperial expansion by the British Empire that brought territorial control up to
where Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. During this period of expansion, the British proposed up to
eleven different boundary lines for the area, as claims shifted back and forth based upon the
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political situation on the ground. The first, and only, border alignment proposed to the Chinese
government was the Macartney-MacDonald Line of 1899, in which the majority of Aksai Chin
and the entirety of the Karakash valley was enveloped in the western frontier. Since China never
responded to this proposal by the British, they took it as a sign that they agreed to the new
boundary area (Maxwell 1970). Finally, there is the MacMahon Line established in 1913, in
which a conference was held between the Chinese, the Tibetans, and the British Indian
governments. In this conference, secret negotiations occurred with the Tibetans in which they
ultimately agreed to move their border north along the crest of the Himalayan Mountains,
thereby moving the border up some sixty miles. Again, none of these eleven boundary lines were
ever accepted by the Chinese government in the years in which they were penned, and it is their
wide variation that has resulted in a range of complications for the Chinese-Indian border
following the dissolution of the British Empire in India. For China, it would be these actions that
would sow the seeds of the boundary disputes it would later have with an independent India
(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1982a).
As it currently stands, the borderline between China and India is roughly 2,100 miles
long and, excluding the border between Sikkim and Tibet, is defined by the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) which is not designated on the ground nor mutually accepted maps. Roughly
speaking, these eastern, middle, and western sectors together constitute some 77,000 square
miles. The eastern sector itself covers roughly 56,000 square miles south of the McMahon Line
and north of what China claims as being the customary boundary of Tibet. The smallest of the
three is the middle sector, which comprises 1,200 square miles of disputed area between Aksai
Chin to the west and the borders with Tibet, India and Nepal in the east, which is under Indian
control. Lastly, the western sector composes roughly 20,500 square miles next to Xinjiang and
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Tibet’s Ali District, most of which is controlled by China as part of its Xinjiang Autonomous
Region, though it is called Aksai Chin whereas India claims it as part of Ladakh. The reason why
these disputes have not been resolved singularly is a result of how they have often been used
individually as leverage in negotiations over the others. That being said, in general, since the
eastern and western sectors are so much bigger they have been the primary source of the contest
between China and India in recent decades.

Eastern Sector
The eastern sector, generally called Arunachal or South Tibet, is the greatest source of
economic value of the three disputed areas. The region itself is extremely fertile, allowing for the
growing of rice, maize, millet, wheat, sugarcane and ginger among other crops. In addition,
roughly eighty percent of it is covered by evergreen forest, which is a boon for the forest industry
that operates there. The Brahmaputra River (Yaluzangbu River according to China) runs through
Arunachal Pradesh and is a major source of irrigation as well as a potential source for massive
amounts of hydroelectricity. Apart from the richness of the soil, the area is also rich in minerals
such as hydrocarbons, quartzite, limestone, and marble. Lastly, the area has a rich biodiversity
with a climate that ranges from snowy mountains in the north to the plains of the Brahmaputra
valley in the south.
China has claimed this are from as late as 1951, following the time that Tibet was
annexed by China. From the Chinese perspective, part of what makes this region so valuable is
how Tawang is the cradle of Tibetan Buddhism, and a religious and cultural symbol of much
importance to the ethnic Tibetans that have become a part of China. For this reason, the Chinese
government holds that attaining control of Tawang is necessary to cement legitimate control over
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the Tibetan region as a whole. In essence, should China be able to bring the Tawang Monastery
and greater territory into the Tibetan region, it will contribute stability to the area by showing
that the Chinese are capable to safeguarding Tibetan culture and reunite a large number of
Tibetans and source of history and culture back into Tibet (Reeves 2011). Due to this, China is
not able to admit that Tawang is non-Chinese, as this would signal that the holy sites of Tawang
are outside their control, at which point it would become questionable for China to claim that
Tibet was truly part of Chinese territory and thus make it that much harder to control.

Western Sector
The western borderland of Aksai Chin is essentially a vast, desert plain doted by a few
salt lakes and rocky pinnacles. Due to the high altitude, combined with the harsh weather and
barren soil, has made it harsh enough that there are no permanent residents apart from some
Chinese soldiers stationed there. The further lack of any valuable natural resources, such as oil or
minerals, means that the population of this area will not likely change in the near future. That
being said, it possesses the greatest military importance among the three disputed sectors, thus
leading to the main developments here being strategic or military oriented.
The Aksai Chin plain itself is the most easily accessible land bridge between Xinjiang
and Tibet, which has been reflected in passage through this area between the two since ancient
times. Moreover, due to the geographical advantages of the area, Aksai Chin is a natural fortress
on western China’s border. In point of fact, should major war break out between China and
India, Chinese forces in Aksai Chin would easily be able to descend down and overrun New
Delhi and from there into Mumbai, potentially securing a quick Chinese victory. Lastly, with it
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being located so close to Kashmir, if India and Pakistan were to go to war, China would be able
to intervene if they so desired, giving them additional leverage in the area.
Events that occurred there in the 1950s and 1960s illustrate the military importance of
this area well. The first of these events is the Tibetan rebellion of 1959, that stems from the
occupation of Tibet by China nearly a decade earlier. Following their victory in the civil war,
Chairman Mao Zedong sent troops to seize Tibet to be integrated into China, in large part due to
its strategic importance. As a result of this, on May 23 of 1951, the governments of Beijing and
Lhasa signed the Seventeen-Point Agreement, allowing the Chinese to move into control Tibet in
1951 without resistance, that it might be saved from imperialist forces (Davis 2008). Protests and
demonstrations against the Chinese were held in Tibet in early 1952, and though the Chinese
government tried to adjust policies to placate the population the measures were at best
temporary, for they did not bridge the profound issues facing the annexing of Tibet. Even this
domestic discontent would contribute to outright resistance and rebellion in Lhasa and
throughout Tibet in the following years.
Unfortunately, despite putting a rebellion down. In the late 1950s, China’s concern over
the stability of Tibet would remain as the Dalai Lama and his followers had fled to India under
the cover of the conflict. India quickly granted them asylum and allowed them to set up the
Tibetan government-in-exile at India’s Dharamsala. Further complicating the situation is how a
significant number of Tibetan rebels were able to flee into India as well, where they would
eventually take up station near the frontiers and be re-supplied with weapons, medical supplies,
and food to continue the struggle, a significant part of which was due to overwhelming sympathy
and support from India’s public, who were largely critical of the PLA’s suppression of the
rebellion in Tibet (Jian 2006).
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There were further suspicions directed against India by China when they learned the
central leadership of the rebellion was established in India’s Kalimpoing, as this meant it was
possible, perhaps even likely in Chinese eyes, that the Indians had been working with the Tibetan
rebels behind the scenes. Such was possible as an independent Tibet would have served as an
effective buffer zone between India and China. Regardless, due to the fact that the now exiled
Dalai Lama and the remnant of the Tibetan rebels were established on the northwestern frontier
of India, the value of these contested borderlands for the security of China increased. Should
China be able to attain control of these areas, it would be easier to maintain control over Tibet.
The second event contributing to the military importance of this sector had its basis in the
events of November 2, 1961, on which day the Indian government issued the “Forward Policy”
ordering that Indian patrols range as far as possible past the positions that India occupied towards
the international border, as recognized by India (Noorani 1970). There were several reasons
underlying this action, calculated on India’s part as a means of attaining their goals without
leading to war with China (Garver 2006). In terms of geography, China was surrounded by the
military power of the Soviet Union to the north, the United States to the east and south, and India
to the west. Essentially this means that China was in a vulnerable strategic location with the
possibility that either the Soviets or the Americans might intervene in any border conflict with
India. The difficult situation facing the Chinese was further exacerbated by the ongoing
economic difficulties of the time resulting from several years of natural disasters and the
disastrous Great Leap Forward campaign. With more than 90% of Chinese forces deployed to
the north and east of their country, the forces available to them in Tibet were limited and already
preoccupied with maintaining control over the post-rebellion Tibet. As a result of these factors,
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more than 100 Indian posts were created along the disputed borders, with some even being set up
past the McMahon line in the eastern sector.

Settlement Attempt Interactions
From 1962 to 1985 both states continually blamed each other for violating the LAC, and
occasionally instances of violent interactions occurred. In the 1960s, border violations are
committed by both Chinese and Indian troops into Sikkim (Mint 2017), which ends up
contributing to the 1967 clash between India and China is the last major fighting to occur in the
disputed border (Krishnan 2020). There were high tensions in 1971 during the war between
Pakistan and India, though due to a lack of dominant positions along their shared border, China
did not act militarily in support of its ally Pakistan, but instead called for an immediate ceasefire
(The Economic Times, 2017). Later in 1973 China accused India of committing aggression on
the Sikkim (Mint 2017), and in 1975 a patrol of Assam Rifles, Jawans were ambushed by the
Chinese at Tulung La in Arunachal Pradesh (Krishnan 2020). Both sides later described the clash
as an accident with both patrols losing their way in the fog (Gilani 2020). It was interactions like
these that contributed to China working to reinforce the disputed border areas in 1977 and 1978,
bringing the number of deployed troops up to 350,000 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
1979b).
Despite the potential threat these reinforcements posed, India reaffirmed its long,
peaceful friendship with China and declared an intent to continue with cooperation on their
disputes (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1979a). Yet at the same time, India also
demanded that China return territory seized in Aksai Chinduring the border war in 1962, an area
equal to 14,000 square miles, that India insisted that China was illegally occupying (BBC
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Summary of World Broadcasts 1980a; Hazarika 1979). Ignoring these calls to return the
territory, China continued to ramp up the deployment of troops to the disputed border areas
(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1980c). Eventually reconciliation was pursued with
interest by both sides, not only to settle the disputes by also to increase trade and investment
(Francis 1981).
Building on these earlier events, India and China met in Delhi for another round of talks
related to their outstanding boundary disputes, and though no concrete results occurred, a general
outline of the issues themselves was agreed upon (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1982b).
Though China expressed commitment to peaceful settlement, they also put forward a proposal
that the currently occupied territories would remain Chinese, while no new claims would be
pursued (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1982b). Needless to say, India was not exactly
enamored with this proposal. Despite this disconnect negotiations would continue, especially
considering that India was just as much fixated on the threat from Pakistan, if not more so,
considering the structure of their military and its budget (Defense and Foreign Affairs 1983).
With the likelihood of future conflict with Pakistan being high, India and China instituted
additional rounds of negotiations in 1983 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1983).
Unfortunately for the overall peace process, the negotiations in this period would be
marred by distrust and acts of bad faith. China repeatedly released statements to the effect it was
committed to improving relations with India, that they shared no conflicts of interest, that China
was not threatening India, and that China had no ambitions regarding its neighboring countries
(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1984a). The realities of the matter, however, were that
China was still consistently trying to acquire pieces of Indian territory, often sending troops past
the contested border areas to plant Chinese flags, though they would invariably be driven back
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by the Indian armed forces, events that took place during all negotiations since 1980 (BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts 1984a). Further, India expressed concern over an atlas released
by China during this time that appeared to show large parts of the border areas as belonging to
Ancient China, including the whole of Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, eastern Nepal, the whole of
Sikkim, Bhutan and Aramachal Pradesh (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1984b). The link
between this atlas’ release and the negotiations was clear, as it had been carefully published and
publicized just before the resumption of talks that year (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
1984b). Moreover, it was common knowledge by that point that China had used similar
cartographic ploys to attempt to justify territorial claims with other neighboring states (BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts 1984b). As if by magic a number of periodicals contained
statements about a number of areas in north-eastern India that were referenced in this atlas as
belonging to China in the past. These rounds of negotiations would continue to occur between
China and India, though hopes for a conclusive settlement remained out of reach (Tenorio 1985).
The status quo was changed in 1986 following an increase in border tensions in the
eastern sector, arising in part because of differences over the precise boundaries of the McMahon
Line in Arunachal Pradesh (Mint 2017). China consistently insisted that the McMahon Line is
not legitimate (United Press International 1986), and that India was engaging in frequent border
violations. When asked about its own violations, China ended up rejecting that Chinese forces
intruded into northeastern India as being propaganda (United Press International 1986). Further
complicating settlement attempts in this year, General Sundarji of India implemented a forward
policy, including Operation Chequerboard and Operation Falcon along the Indian-Chinese
border, which included air-land exercises, airlifting heavy equipment like tanks to Arunachal
Pradesh, and even going to so far as to occupy neutral areas in the eastern sector and moving
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troops past the McMahon Line. Even worse from the perspective of the Chinese, India granted
Arunachal Pradesh statehood and increased military capabilities there, at which point China
expressed strong condemnations of these actions (Mint 2017).
Accusations of border violations by India continue, with China warning that these forces
need to be withdrawn to prevent unpleasant responses (Mann 1987). India responds to say
accusations are baseless and that no conflict is wanted (Mann 1987). Though tensions continued,
both sides reiterated an agreement by both to avoid conflicts over the territory and to push to
improve relations in other areas before attempting to settle the differences over their disputed
borders (The Associated Press 1987). The next round of talks move ahead, though like the
previous rounds there is not much hope for conclusive settlement (The Associated Press 1987)
especially as reports continue that Chinese and Indian troops clash in several skirmishes, even
though both sides have consistently denied the fighting (Sydney Morning Herald, 1987).
Accusations fly back and forth that India is nibbling away at the border, and that China is
deploying troops in preparation for a large-scale attack (Sydney Morning Herald 1987). Despite
these accusations of massing troops, India takes pains to again remind China that peace must be
maintained along the border and that each of the disputes must be settled via negotiations (BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts 1987b).
Unfortunately, the chances of peaceful settlement decrease due to India’s unilateral
declaration of statehood for the disputed territory of Arunachal Pradesh (The PRS Group 1988).
China issued strong protests against this action, leading to sharp exchanges between the two
states, and by May each accused the other of renewed border violations around Arunchadal
Pradesh (The PRS Group 1988). By fall of 1987 tensions have eased enough, and border talks
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have contributed to an atmosphere of optimism to such a degree, that China invites the Indian
Prime Minister to Peking for talks.
In 1988, the Indian Prime Minister engaged with the Chinese government in talks aimed
at rebuilding friendship and addressing their shared border disputes (Tyson 1988). Unfortunately,
like earlier direst negotiations, both sides said that no breakthrough will result that year in the
territorial disputes dividing the two states (Tyson 1988). Ultimately this contributed to India
taking a two-track approach to improving relations in other areas while still trying to make
progress on the shared border (Pomfret 1988).
These efforts seemed to be well received by the Chinese, as in 1989 the Chinese VicePremier made a visit of his own to New Delhi to discuss troop along the India-China borders,
though once again India downplayed the hopes of an imminent resolution to the disputes (IPSInter Press Service 1989). The primary result of this latest effort would be a continued
commitment to hold another round of border consultations and pursue the setup of a bilateral
demarcation committee, though critics would say this largely came about when India refused to
condemn China for the crushing of the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy uprising, to which the
Chinese responded by accelerating the pace of border negotiations (Japan Economic Newswire
1992a).
In the early 1990s the possibility of meaningful progress on settling the disputes
peacefully continued to improve. The Prime Minister of India, when asked about an upcoming
meeting of the India-China working group, stressed that there is will on both sides to resolve the
boundary issue but also that there continued to be a need to broaden the spectrum of cooperation
with China into other fields (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1990). In 1991, Chinese
Premier Li Peng visited India to pledge Chinese resolve to address the boundary question
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through friendly consultations (Mint 2017), with the Prime Minister of India echoing these calls
at a banquet held in the visiting diplomats honor (Agence France Presse 1991a).
In 1993, these efforts would finally bear significant fruit when the Prime Minister of
India visited China to sign the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the
Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border areas (Gilani 2020), in which both states
agreed to reduce deployed armed forces along the 2,433-mile Himalayan border dispute
(MCGirk 1993). The agreement did not completely settle the two countries’ conflicting territorial
claims. Instead, both nations said they would abide by the existing Line of Actual Control, a
buffer zone drawn up between the two countries when the Chinese army spilled into the extreme
western and eastern flanks of India in 1962 (McGirk 1993). To further reduce tension, both states
agreed to notify each other in the event the conducted military exercises in the Himalayas, and
that a team of diplomats and military officials would meet later that year to pinpoint which parts
of the mountainous terrain belong to whom (McGirk 1993).
Likely due in part to the effectiveness of these actions in reducing tensions, India and
China began talks on further reducing deployed forces and an outright redrawing of the
Himalayan boundary after three decades of tensions (Guruswamy 1994). The talks would
continue into 1995, when both India and China agreed to pull back troops in the disputed eastern
sector (Mint 2017). These talks also arrived at an agreement to pursue a phased demilitarization
of the disputed frontier, as well as a commitment to pursue more concise demarcation of the Line
of Actual Control along the border (Agence France Presse 1995).
By 1996 the agreement had been reached, so Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited India
to sign the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC in
the India-China Border Areas. (Gilani 2020; Mint 2017). While a step forward in terms of the
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peaceful settlement, India remained suspicious of China, as it also continued in this time to
supply missiles and nuclear technology to Pakistan, and set up new military bases in Burma
(Srivastava 1996). Fortunately for both states, an influential section of policy-makers in both
states began to view continued hostility and suspicion against each side as being detrimental to
both the regional and global interests of each state (Srivastava 1996). For this reason, along with
the agreement on the Line of Actual Control, an agreement was signed to further reduce troop
deployments in this area (Srivastava 1996). Finally, after successful drawdowns of troops, India
and China agree to go ahead in consultations to define the Line of Actual Control in 1999
(Kazmin 1999).
In 2002, India and China agreed to quicken the pace of LAC delineation in order to
resolve the border disputes in a reasonable time-frame (Mint 2017). As a result, negotiations
continue more openly and consistently from this point until 2015 (Mint 2017). Perhaps helping
in this regard was India’s acknowledgement of the Tibet Autonomous Region as being part of
the territory of China and reiterated its commitment not to permit Tibetans living in India to
engage in anti-China activities. In return, India received de facto recognition from China of
Sikkim’s status as a state of India (Thakur 2003). From this point negotiations appear to
accelerate further, with negotiations entering a fast track, though India still had issues in framing
the settlement attempts as being in mutual interests (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 2004a).
Nonetheless, this fast-tracking of negotiations and exchange of mutual recognitions of
different territorial controls lead to several positive developments. In 2005, the Protocol on the
Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along
the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas was signed (Gilani 2020), and the
trade route through Nathu La on the disputed border was opened again in an attempt to further
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dispel diplomatic distrust that had plagued relations between citizens in China’s southwest and
India’s northeast (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2006). Ten of these productive talks would
occur between 2003 and 2007 (Agence France Presse 2007).
Unfortunately for the settlement, a wrench would again be thrown into the process in
2007, when Indian intelligence agencies began reporting a consistent rise in Chinese intrusions
deep across the border, to include as many as 130 separate actions by the end of 2007 (Shukla
and Unnithan 2007). Further, an increase of 10,000 soldiers would be stationed by China in the
Tawang Sector of the Arunachal Pradesh border (Shukla and Unnithan 2007). There was even an
intrusion into east Sikkim, the area previously recognized as being rightfully under to
sovereignty of India, almost as if all these actions were part of a renewed Chinese strategy to
strengthen claims to the disputed border areas (Shukla and Unnithan 2007). All this occurred as
India had been building infrastructure along the Chinese border for the past several years
(Raghuvanshi 2008), and entered into an eleventh round of border negotiations since 2003
(Bezlova 2008).
At this point it should be noted that Tawang had taken on the status as the largest
tinderbox in relations between India and China. To the Chinese, it was the primary focus of their
territorial disputes with India, as tied into it was Chinese claims of sovereignty over all historical
Tibet (Rupee News 2009). In this time period both states acted to further cement their claims to
Tawang. The situation would heat up in 2008 when the Dalai Lama announced for the first time
that Tawang was a part of India, bolstering India’s territorial claims and infuriating China
(Rupee News 2009). Though India officially recognized Tibet as part of China in 2003, and the
Chinese reciprocated by recognizing Indian control over Sikkim, it was unlikely that anything
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similar would happen with Tawang as that would weaken China’s credibility and authority over
the Tibetans that reside within their borders.
Thankfully by this period in time relations between the two states, beyond that of their
territorial disputes, had grown enough to ensure that there was no real likelihood of a sudden
outbreak of violence (Shadiq 2011). Instead, efforts were channeled into creating a border
apparatus to handle the different perceptions of the Line of Actual Control and restart the joint
military exercises between Indian and Chinese army from earlier in 2012 (Shadiq 2011). India,
perhaps taken advantage of this progress, pushed for China to compromise more, especially
given how they have compromised with states in other territorial disputes (Wu 2012).
In the rest of the time period under observation India and China would not attain a
conclusive settlement, but they would make positive progress in signing the 2012 Establishment
of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs and
the 2013 Border Defense Cooperation Agreement between India and China (Gilani 2020). The
significance of China and India having signed agreements in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 and 2013
that outline ways to maintain peace along the borders between them is a positive development. In
the future, perhaps these agreements will serve as the basis for further de-escalation and eventual
settlement.

Discussion
In the forty-four years of the China-India disputes presented in Table 4, there were thirty
years where only peaceful interactions occurred, three years where only violent interactions
occurred, and seven years where both peaceful and violent interactions occurred. Much like the
case of the Chinese-Russian disputes, the convergence or divergence patterns of these settlement
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interactions on voting in the UNGA are mixed and unclear. For peaceful interactions, for
fourteen years there was divergence and for sixteen years there was convergence. For violent
interactions, there was an even split of one divergence and one convergence, with one year being
the first observation. Lastly, in the years where both peaceful and violent interactions occurred
there was four divergences and three convergences.
That being said, again like in the Chinese-Russian case, when averages were calculated
for each of the interaction types, the pattern becomes clearer, albeit in a way that challenges the
theory to a certain degree. Peaceful interactions saw years with more divergence on UNGA
voting on average (mean = 0.2980) over purely violent interactions (mean = 0.1583). This result
might be explained by the gradual increase in tensions and a feared outbreak of a new conflict in
the years following these three years of only violent interactions in the early 1970s, which would
remain roughly even until the end of the Cold War in 1991, wherein the Soviet Union dissolved
and the calculations changed such that voting convergence, even in the face of continued
sporadic tensions, drew closer. It should be noted, however, that when both violent and peaceful
interactions occurred in a given year, the voting divergence (mean = 0.5299) in the UNGA was
higher than for the years that saw purely peaceful interactions, which is more in line with what
the theory would predict. Overall, the lower divergence in UNGA voting across settlement
interactions as compared to the rest of the case studies might be due also to the consistent and
long-term engagement of peaceful negotiations that saw roughly similar progress towards a
settlement, as well as the fact that India was especially concerned with their dispute with
Pakistan whereas China was concerned with their border disputes with Russia, who to them was
a larger military threat up until the 1990s.
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Examining several years in which the change in convergence or divergence is high adds
additional context demonstrating the variety of UNGA resolutions that the disputing dyad
respectively agree or disagree on, indicating again that it is not just the case of a few types of
resolutions being influenced. In 1976, where China and India had a violent interaction over
disputed territory the previous year, they voted differently on a range on resolutions, including
on resolutions dealing with the non-use of force in international relations, emoluments for the
International Court of Justice and the disarmament of nuclear weapons (see these sources for
examples: UN General Assembly 1976a, 1976b, 1976c). For an example in the other direction, in
1992, where they had a peaceful interaction over disputed territory the previous year, they voted
the same on a range on resolutions, including topics like the prohibition of nuclear weapons,
colonial independence, self-determination, the law of the sea, national sovereignty, and human
rights in Iraq (see these sources for examples: UN General Assembly 1992a, 1992b, 1992c,
1992d, 1992e, 1992f). With all these findings taken together, and explanations offered for the
few years that don’t fully align, support has again been found for peaceful settlement interactions
having values indicative of convergence (H1) as compared to violent attempts being higher, and
in the direction of more divergent voting in the UNGA (H2). Much like in the first case,
unfortunately, no conclusions are able to be reached regarding specific kinds of peaceful
attempts having different impacts, as for each of the years in the time period examined only
negotiations are utilized between the disputants as peaceful interactions.
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China-Vietnam
Dyadic Information
In recent decades, the majority of tensions between China and Vietnam have laid over
their contested offshore territories, most specifically the White Dragon Tail Island, the Paracel
Islands, and the Spratly Islands. Overall, China has approached each dispute in a variety of ways
over time, thus an overall examination of each of these disputes is important in order to fully
grasp a background of their dyadic interactions.

The White Dragon Tail Island
In the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin, the shared water boundary between China and
Vietnam, lies the White Dragon Tail Island (known as Bai Long Wei in China and Bach Long Vi
in Vietnam). The island itself lies almost in the middle of the gulf, though it is slightly close to
the Vietnamese coast. The dispute itself can be traced back to 1955 when the Vietnam war broke
out between the North and South, each supported by allies in the struggle to see whether
communism would rule or be stomped out in the reunified state. Two years later in 1957, Mao
Zedong decided to hand over the White Dragon Tail Island to the control of North Vietnam. The
handover itself was quietly done and it has only been in recent decades that it has attracted more
attention.
White Dragon Tail Island is plateau roughly three square miles in size, and though it is
covered by grass and surrounded by beaches, it has only limited freshwater, arable soil or other
natural resources. That being said, the waters surrounding it are a major source of fish and
mollusks, though this is true of the Gulf of Tonkin at-large, as it is one of the main fishing zones
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for both China and Vietnam. The economic value of the island increased over time, starting in
the late 1970s when hydrocarbon resources were discovered in the gulf.
In addition to the economic value of the island and its nearby waters, White Dragon Tail
Island also possesses some military value due to its strategic location near the center of the gulf,
positioning it well to serve as an important outpost for either state. This can be demonstrated
with the outbreak of the Vietnam War in 1955, after which the White Dragon Tail Island became
a transportation hub through which Chinese support flowed through to the North Vietnamese. It
was further reinforced as a military base, with radar, air defenses, and communication assets
constructed on the island to fortify it against the South Vietnamese as a way to provide an early
warning system for the coastal cities of North Vietnam.
One point of interest regarding the White Dragon Tail Island is that the Chinese
government never reported the transfer of the territory over to the hand of the North Vietnamese.
Not much is known about the handover itself, though the two governments are confirmed as
signing a treaty to transfer the island in 1957, and it is possible that part of the agreement was for
North Vietnam to recognize Chinese claims in the South China Sea (Fravel 2008). It was not
until the signing of the “Agreement on the Delimitation of the Tonkin Gulf” that White Dragon
Tail Island was clearly, publically stated as belonging to Vietnam (Keyuan 2004). Roughly four
decades after the transfer the Chinese public finally knew what happened during the Vietnam
War.

The Paracel and Spratly Islands
Additional islands under dispute between China and Vietnam include the Paracels (also
Xisha in Chinese and Hoang Sa in Vietnamese) and the Spratlys (also Nansha in Chinese and
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Truong Sa in Vietnamese), both of which are in the South China Sea. The Paracels themselves
are also roughly midway between the southern coast of Hainan island and the central coast of
Vietnam, while the center of the Spratleys is a bit closer to Vietnam’s coast than it is to Chinese
territory. Of the two, the Paracels is quite a bit smaller with only 23 islands, rocks, reefs and
shoals, split into two groups including the Cresent Group in the west and the Amphitrite Group
in the east. The Spratlys are spread over a wider area and number more than 230 features.
Though each is claimed by more than two states, the Spratlys have received the most attention
given the geographic spread of their features.
Both the Paracels and the Spratlys have economic value stemming from three resources.
First on the features themselves, each possesses natural resources like guano deposits and
coconut palms. This is further buttressed by the fact that the waters surrounding these features
are full of fish, with many fisherman plying the South China Sea using them as fishing bases and
shelters from storms for centuries. Perhaps most importantly to the Chinese, however, is the fact
that the South China Sea lies between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean with transoceanic
shipping lanes linking China and its neighbors to the West. In the periods before modern states,
these sea lanes were a sort of Maritime Silk Road, and with the Paracels and Spratlys
strategically placed in between shipping lanes they will continue to play an important role in
both trade and security for which state ends up controlling them.
In terms of history from the Chinese perspective, the strategic importance of these island
groups was not fully recognized by leaders until the 1970s. This makes sense to a certain degree
given the United Nations embargo on China and Mao Zedong’s resulting policy of self-reliance,
both of which contributed to a general lack of economic relationships with other countries
around the world. This situation was made worse due to a number of campaigns implemented by
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Mao during his tenure, such as the Three-Anti/Five-Anti campaigns (1951-1952), the Hundred
Flowers campaign (1956-1957), Anti-rightist Movement (1957-1959), the Great Leap Forward
(1958-1961), and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Under the policies tied to these political
campaigns, China’s economy stagnated and, as a consequence, little attention was directed to the
resources and opportunities that the South China Sea represented.
Further impacting the perceived usefulness of the island groups was that, prior to 1982,
coastal states under traditional international law were only allowed three nautical miles of
territorial sea rights with no maritime zones like EEZs or continental shelves allowed to be
claimed by states. After 1982, this territorial sea limit would be extended to 12 nautical miles and
license to 200 mile EEZ and continental shelves due to the ratification of the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea. As a result of this, the economic values attached to both the
Paracels and the Spratlys shot up, especially as technologies advanced allowing greater
exploration and exploitation of offshore hydrocarbons previously not accessible.
There were an additional two factors that increased the perceived economic value of the
South China Sea island groups in Chinese eyes. The first was due to the growing population of
China and the resulting demand for additional resources. Given the expanding population was
quickly consuming available resources, the acquisition of resources in the South China Sea
began to acquire more significance to Chinese leadership, especially since China still relied
significantly on self-sufficiency at this time.
The second of these factors was China’s “Reform and Opening Up” policy, which
quickly expanded a Chinese presence on the economic world stage. By 1987 the fleet of Chinese
merchant ships expanded to over 1000 and Chinese ports quickly attained attention by the rest of
the world’s shipping. The South China Sea itself saw roughly 90% of Chinese trade and the
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import of 80% of the hydrocarbons that China needed to keep expanding its economy. As
pressure grew to acquire more, the reserves in the South China Sea near the disputed islands
acquired more importance. Further increasing this attention was the presence of fisheries that
would both feed their expanding population as well as increase their market share of this
valuable sector of the global economy.
When it comes to the military salience of the Paracels and Spratlys, both have acquired
such principally based on their geographic locations in the South China Sea, which lie within the
principle sea lanes. Access to the Paracels and Spratlys allows China additional capabilities to
monitor the shipping and air traffic lanes in the area and, if outright occupied, would
significantly enhance Chinese power and leverage in the region. With bases and missile batteries
on these disputed islands, it would allow China to block hostile forces from venturing into
China’s coastal waters to launch attacks against their provinces and ports. Loss of control of
these features, however, would result in a greater strategic threat to China itself. That being said
the overall emphasis of the South China Sea for security purposes varied over time before rising
to high importance in the current time.
During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s, the states bordering the South
China Sea were broken up into Communist and Anti-Communist groups, with the greatest threat
to China coming from the alliance between the United States and South Vietnam. This would
change by the 1970s when the Vietnam War ended and China-US relations shifted due to a
readjustment of interactions, culminating in Nixon’s visit to China and the signing of the joint
Communiqué in 1972. What followed was a period where the Us withdrew military forces and
there was a gradual improvement in Chinese-American relations, and the military importance of
the South China Sea region decreased as a result.
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This situation did not last long, however, as by 1975 Soviet penetration into the region
reasserted the military importance of the South China Sea for China. There was concern that the
Soviets would continue to encircle China, especially given the recent border clashes in 1969.
Tensions in 1975 ratcheted up when Vietnam entered into a number of agreements with the
Soviet Union. For economic and military support, Vietnam granted the Soviet Union military
access to its facilities in Da Nag and Cam Ranh Bay, which allowed the Soviets to link their
Pacific fleet with its forces in Northeast Asia, at Vladivostok. Without the Soviet Union posing a
threat to China, the Paracels and Spratlys gradually increased in importance as a way to check
Soviet adventurism in the region. Should the Soviets have seized these islands, the southern coast
of the Chinese mainland would be under threat, but if China were to secure them the naval threat
the Soviet Union posed would be pushed back several hundred miles. Thus, actions were taken
to push back the joint Vietnamese-Soviet threat.
The situation changed against in 1985, however, when the newly ascended Gorbechev
signaled that the Soviet Union would be beginning the process of scaling back financial aid and,
more importantly military presence, in the region. Without backing by the Soviets, Vietnam did
not have the resources to meaningfully challenge China, and with their withdrawal from
Cambodia by 1989 the relations between the two countries improved with fully normalized
relations by 1991. With the reduction of the US military presence in the Philippines also
occurring around this time, tensions in the South China Sea would largely disappear for nearly
two decades
Lastly, in terms of symbolic value for the Chinese, the discovery of many of these islands
by Chinese mariners goes back as long as two thousand years. That being said, however, the fact
that there is only a historical connection but no long-term occupation of any of these islands by
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the Chinese results in a hit to their legal claims. In fact, both the Chinese and Vietnamese
historical claims to both the Paracels and the Spratlys “…rely on the discovery, temporary or
repeated occupation, or the maintenance of relations of any kind to the islands (Dieter Heinzig
1976, p. 21).”

Settlement Attempt Interactions
In terms of how this was manifested in their strategies for attaining recognized
sovereignty over the disputed islands, China pursued a general delaying strategy in the 1950s and
1960s by tolerating South Vietnam’s activities in the region, though by the early 1970s this was
replaced with a more aggressive approach. Given the still improving nature of their naval
capacity in the 1970s, China directed the majority of its attention to the Paracels, as the Spratlys
were too far afield. By the early 1970s, China had taken possession of the eastern Paracels with
South Vietnam, though this would change in 1974 when China began waging skirmishes on the
land and sea, claiming that sovereignty disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands had started
(Japan Economic Newswire 1983). Launching a lightning strike backed by air support, the
Chinese Navy took over the western part of the Paracels and kicked South Vietnam out (Mehta
1993). Chinese troops engaged in conflict with military positions on the Duncan, Pattle, Robert,
and Money Islands, as well as launched attacks on a number of South Vietnamese warships,
inflicting extensive damage (Mehta 1993).
The new status quo would last until the administration of a unified Vietnam. At this
point, China complained that Vietnam was drawing too close to the Soviet Union and receiving
too much aid, to which the Vietnamese responded that a substantial increase in aid from China
would lead to a more independent Vietnam (Munro 1977). With tensions so high, the conflicting
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claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands were so volatile that each side could do little more
than reiterate their conflicting claims, even in situations where they were drawn together to the
conference table (Munro 1977). Eventually border confrontations in 1976 escalated into
firefights, and Vietnam would accuse China of a series of border violations, and demand they
stop apparent war preparations (The Associated Press 1980). Unfortunately, this was not to be, as
this in turn escalated into the outbreak of a border war in 1979 following the expelling of
thousands of Chinese from Vietnam (Japan Economic Newswire 1983).
Following the end of this brief border war, China and Vietnam held a number of
unproductive sessions discussing their shared territorial disputes (The Associated Press 1980).
Peking claimed that it had consistently advocated resolving their disputes with Vietnam through
negotiations and was ready to continue talks at any time, though Vietnam stated that they had
proposed holding another round of talks only to have China get embarrassed and present
implausible pretexts to reject the proposals (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1980d).
Tensions would remain high and violent interactions would continue to occur in the
following years. In 1981, China claimed to have killed more than 150 Vietnamese soldiers
following what they termed the largest border invasion since 1979 (Loong 1981). Vietnam
responded to these accusations that China was simply trying to heighten tensions in South east
Asia (Loong 1981). In 1982, China accused Vietnam in turn of committing forty-four
provocations along their shared border during the lunar New Year, despite Hanoi’s calls for a
cease-fire to last the duration of the holiday (UPI 1982). Vietnamese troops crossed into the
Yunnan and Guangxi provinces, planted mines, and directed gunfire at Chinese citizens (UPI
1982). For the rest of the year, both states continue to try to create the impression that the other is
responsible for the rise in tension and conflict along where the war had been fought in 1979 (UPI
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1982). In 1984, both China and Vietnam would report to the public that they had engaged in
inflicting staggering losses on the opposing armed forces across the border, while only suffering
light casualties, all of whom were civilians (Wren 1984). These events followed patterns of
clashes in 1981 and 1983, and China would end up rejected Vietnamese offers to negotiate. In
1985, China again stated that Vietnamese troops had attacked into Yunnan (AP 1985), and would
step up border attacks against Vietnam into 1986 (Crossette 1986). Things would remain tense in
the area into the late 1980s. In 1987 China would accuse Vietnam of border violations and
provocations, while Vietnam would make claims of having decimated a Chinese army division
that had attempted to seize four hilltops in the border province of Ha Tuyen (The Toronto Star
1987). As things stood the possibilities of a successful peaceful settlement were barely better
than zero.
Meanwhile, after having taken control over the Paracels, China spent fifteen years
fortifying their control over them and Hainan, with an eye towards eventually escalating in the
Spratlys. In 1987 China’s naval forces conducted military exercises over a wide area of the
western Pacific in the same time period the land border violations were occurring (The Toronto
Star 1987). It was not long after this that the Chinese established an observatory on Fiery Cross
Reef, which was strategically located in the geographic center of the Spratlys, which was further
surrounded by reefs that were occupied by Vietnam. Further, China constructed steles to denote
their control on eleven other unoccupied reefs in the area. Simultaneous with these actions was
the issuing of numerous statements by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterating their
claims of sovereignty over the Spratlys as well as protests over occupations therein by the
Vietnamese.
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For Vietnam’s part, they were caught off-guard by Chinese actions in the area. Since
Fiery Cross Reef is submerged at high tide by several feet of water, and not very close to the
Chinese mainland for that matter, it was not seen as a likely action by China. Reeling from
surprise when the Chinese did in fact occupy the strategic location, an alarmed Vietnam quickly
moved more troops to cement greater control over the Spratlys by occupying more reefs. In
addition, Vietnam also began to harass Chinese vessels involved in survey and construction
activities in the area, which ultimately contributed to a breaking out of confrontations between
the two states. Tensions came to a head in March of 1988, when a deadly incident occurred
between both sides, coming about due to Chinese occupation of the Fiery Cross, Johnson, and
Cuarteron reefs (Mehta 1993).
Several dozen Chinese warships were in the act of conducting naval exercises in the area,
when additional forces moved to occupy several reefs in the Spratlys, specifically the Fiery
Cross Reef, Huges Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef, and the Subi Reef. The Vietnamese media
would report that China was able to successfully occupy these features by using several warships
to block Vietnamese transport ships from entering the features (Boston Globe Forum 2015). Not
much later, Chinese forces push Vietnam out of the Johnson South Reef following a skirmish in
which it is claimed that sixty-four unarmed Vietnamese navy engineers are killed and several
ships reported as being sunk (Boston Global Forum 2015). Moving quickly, China rapidly
constructed fortresses on six features in the area, and turned Fiery Cross Reef into a man-made
island with a wharf, oil reservoir, heliport and observation station. Essentially, they became
footholds from which to acquire other Vietnam held features once the Chinese were ready to do
so.
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After the success of 1988, China again largely moved to implement a delaying strategy
with regards to the Paracels and Spratlys. Though China sometimes pursued joint development
of resources in the area with Vietnam, overall limited progress has been made, especially as
China was unwilling to share control over the Paracels and primarily sought greater access into
areas controlled by Vietnam in the Spratlys.
By 1992 Chinese forces had successfully occupied all of the Paracels and nine features in
the Spratly islands. Despite these changes in China’s favor, the relationship with Vietnam began
to thaw following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Announcements were made that both states would normalize relations after years of conflict and
China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (Wilhelm 1991). Further, both states released information
to the effect that they were considering joint development projects of the disputed islands
believed to sit on top of rich hydrocarbon deposits (Wilhelm 1991). New negotiation sessions
discussing the disputes would occur in Vietnam, and greater efforts were exerted to indicate the
sides were interested in settling their sovereignty issues over the oil exploration area, with China
in particular being open to business cooperation (Japan Economic Newswire 1992b).
Part of the motivation behind these moves for Vietnam was the fact they had lost a
substantial amount of Soviet economic aid and political support, without which it would be far
harder to challenge China militarily (Wilhelm 1991). A brief point of tension arose when
Vietnam accused China of violating sovereignty in an oil deal that lay close to the Vietnamese
coast, but that they still remained open to peaceful negotiations (Mehta 1993). Though both firm
in their claims of sovereignty, the promises to refrain from military actions seemed to indicate
the path forward for both had opened. As if in support of this, joint working groups were
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established to discuss the three disputes, with priority given to the land boundary and Gulf of
Tonkin (Storey 2008).
Unfortunately, by 1993 it appeared that Vietnamese and Chinese negotiations had failed
to reach a compromise of the disputes. While they had been drive to settle the border dispute,
both had stuck with their historical claims and refused to give much ground (Mehta 1993).
Further complicating progress was China continuing to send conflicting signals about its
intentions, ranging back and forth between threats and uses of force to the more peaceful pledges
of negotiations (Mehta 1993). Perhaps aware of how this was impacting their neighbors, both
China and Vietnam took additional steps to promise no escalation in the disputes and promised
the nearby states that there was a general willingness on both sides to attain a peaceful
settlement. They even announced the formation of an expert group to navigate the conflicting
claims in the Spratly Islands in the hopes a satisfactory settlement might be found (Wilhem
1994). While all this was formally proceeding, each continued to act to explore oil deposits in the
Spratlys and the Tonkin Gulf, and acted to further secure claims like Vietnam building
lighthouses on some features in the Spratlys while China reciprocated by deploying additional
naval forces (Wilhelm 1994). Perhaps partly due to these actions unofficial reports in this period
indicated little to no progress on negotiations (Wilhelm 1994), particularly after China sent naval
ships to blockade a Vietnamese oil rig, even though it resided in Vietnam’s international
recognized territorial waters (Boston Globe Forum 2015).
Another forum for negotiations was created upon Vietnam’s entrance into ASEAN. Much
like its fellow members, after joining the organization Vietnam formed a bilateral working group
with China to go over the claims in the Spratly Islands (Othman 1995). Part of this process was
to focus all bilateral discussion solely on the overlapping claims. Despite this expansion in
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engagement, China acted domestically in the National People’s Congress to pass a measure
confirming Beijing’s claims to the archipelagos (Nette 1996). Vietnam became increasingly
worried following this action as China continued to make progress in a massive modernization of
their armed forces, especially in terms of the creation of a new powerful, long range navy (Nette
1996). As a result of these concerns, and despite never ceasing to call for peaceful resolutions to
the disputes, Vietnam began to devote more resources to develop its military and scientific
infrastructure on the territory it occupied in the disputed islands (Nette 1996).
Tensions would go on to peak in the late 1990s through such actions as Vietnam filing
formal protests to China over a Chinese oil rig entering into Vietnamese waters (Phuong 1997).
Demands were made that all drilling cease immediately and that negotiations start. Thankfully,
though tensions were high, tangible progress was made when an agreement was reached on a
border agreement and efforts to settle the question of demarcation in the area of the Beibu Bay in
2000 (Fefofuk 1999). As a result, on December 30, 1999 the Land Border Treaty was finally
signed and would go into effect in July of 2000, following the ratification by both China and
Vietnam (Storey 2008). Not too long after this, after seventeen rounds of negotiations, Vietnam
and China signed the Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and
Continental Shelfs in the Gulf of Tonkin, which divided the gulf along equidistant lines. These
agreements were not ratified, however, until July 2004 due to protracted negotiations over
lucrative fishing rights in the area (Storey 2008).
In 2002 efforts were made to further reduce the possibility of conflict by China and the
ten Southeast Asian members of ASEAN, who passed an accord on ways to avoid conflict over
the disputed features (Penh 2002). Though useful, it would not be enough by itself to end
struggles over fishing rights, such as in 2005 when a Vietnamese fishing boat was assaulted by
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Chinese fishery officers in the western part of the Gulf of Tonkin (Boston Global Forum 2015).
Though outright violent militarized interactions were down, minor incidents would continue to
occur between China and Vietnam. In 2009, China would detain thirty-three fishing boats and
433 fishermen (Boston Global Forum 2015). In 2010, Vietnam would begin conducting surveys
to complete a dossier for the UN on the boundaries of their continental shelf when a group of
Chinese vessels would ram and sever deployed survey cables (Boston Global Forum 2015).
Detaining of Vietnamese fishermen and molestation of Vietnamese survey efforts would
continue into the following years, making it clear that ultimate settlement of these conflicting
claims still had a lot of progress to make.

Discussion
In the thirty-eight years of the China-Vietnam disputes presented in Table 5 where
UNGA voting occurs for both, there were eight years where only peaceful interactions occurred,
ten years where only violent interactions occurred, and five years where both peaceful and
violent interactions occurred. Much like as in the case of the Russian and Indian disputes, the
convergence or divergence pattern of these settlement interactions on voting in the UNGA is
mixed and unclear. For peaceful interactions, four years there was divergence, three years there
was convergence, and one year was the first of observation. For violent interactions, there was a
split of four divergence and six convergence. Lastly, in the years where both peaceful and violent
interactions occurred there was three divergences and two convergences.
That being said, when average convergence of UNGA voting is examined for the
different interactions, the pattern lines up more with the theory. The average UNGA voting
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convergence was closer during peaceful interactions (mean = 0.5600) as compared to violent
interactions (mean = 1.4380) with years of both interactions in between (mean = 0.6048).
The reason that mixed years that saw multiple types of settlement attempts resulted in a
UNGA voting average just above that of solely peaceful attempts years might be due to China’s
approach towards dealing with the White Dragon Tail Island dispute. As the leaders of states that
willingly give up territory are likely to be penalized for their actions, the Chinese were careful to
handle the White Dragon Tail Island dispute carefully that an upsurge in nationalist sentiment
and criticisms against the regime might be avoided. On the other hand, when it came to the other
disputes in the South China Sea, China escalated to the use of force as opportunities arose in the
contested areas, even in situations where promises to avoid conflict and pursue future
negotiations were made, likely due to the belief that their opponents would be unwilling to fight
a war or would back off from a confrontation due to lack of support from other actors. Perhaps
furthering this on Vietnam’s side were the still fresh experiences with the brief border war and
continuing struggles in the years of 1981 to 1988. For Vietnam, then, it is possible that this
pattern of actions might have manifested in a likely larger divergence in voting patterns in the
UNGA compared to China.
Examining several years in which the change in convergence or divergence is high
between China and Vietnam adds more context demonstrating the variety of UNGA resolutions
that the disputing dyad respectively agree or disagree on, indicating again that it is not just the
case of a few types of resolutions being influenced but more a general pattern in support of the
theory. In 1982, wherein China and Vietnam had a violent interaction over disputed territory the
previous year, they voted differently on a range on resolutions, including topics like security for
non-nuclear states, the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the role of the UN in Lebanon, the
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prevention of a space arms race, the non-use of force, and human rights in Chile, El Salvador,
and Guatemala (see these sources for examples: UN General Assembly 1982a, 1982b, 1982c,
1982d, 1982e, 1982f, 1982g, 1982h). Further, in 1992, where China and Vietnam had a peaceful
interaction over disputed territory the previous year, they voted the same on a range on a number
of resolutions, including ones with such topics as the prohibition of nuclear weapons, colonial
independence, self-determination, the law of the sea, national sovereignty, and human rights in
Iraq (see these sources for examples: UN General Assembly 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1992d, 1992e,
1992f). Again, with all these findings taken together, and explanations offered for the few years
that don’t fully align with the theory, support has been found for peaceful settlement interactions
having values indicative of convergence in UNGA voting (H1) as compared to violent attempts
being higher, and in the direction of more divergent voting (H2). Unfortunately, much like in the
previous two cases, no conclusions can be reached regarding specific kinds of peaceful attempts
having different impacts, as only negotiations are presented as having occurred between the
disputants as peaceful interactions in the years examined.

China-Japan
Dyadic Information
The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the South China Sea are a number of uninhabited islets
and rocks under dispute between China and Japan. The islands themselves lie a hundred miles
northeast of Taiwan, almost two hundred twenty miles east of China, and two hundred fifty miles
to the southwest of the island of Okinawa in Japan. For all the controversy surrounding who
reigns sovereign over them, the islands themselves are only about four-square miles in size, with
the largest one not even being two and a half square miles in size. Officially the islands have
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been under dispute between China and Japan since 1970, with each side having conflicting
claims over who holds sovereignty.
It has been China’s stance that it has the stronger claim to sovereignty over the islands
based on historical, geographical, and legal grounds. China asserts that it was their people that
discovered and named the Diaoyu islands, and that Chinese fishermen have been using them as
fishing shelters and nautical landmarks since as early as the fourteenth century. Further they
claim that China’s jurisdiction is further supported by their incorporation of the islands into their
coastal defense. They claim that the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the Chinese-Japanese
War in 1895 and gave the islands to Japan, was an unequal treaty that was effectively reversed
following the end of World War II in accordance the Cairo Declaration (1943), the Potsdam
Proclamation (1945) and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender (1945). Thus, it is no surprise that
China was upset when the United States included them under its trusteeship in 1951, and
recognized the renewed control over them by Japan 1971.
Japan, on the other hand, asserts that the islands were unoccupied as of 1885, and thus
capable of being formally incorporated into Japan according to their status as terra nullius in
1895. Even when under the trusteeship under the United States, Japan asserted claim to them so
when returned following the Okinawa Reversion Agreement in 1971 they asserted de facto
control. In 1996 Japan followed up by declaring an EEZ around the Senkaku islands, all the
while that China consistently protested their control over the islands stating that doing so
violated Chinese sovereignty.
When it comes to the value of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands they have economic, military
and symbolic worth to both China and Japan. The economic value of the islands primarily comes
from the rich fisheries off the islands and the extensive deposits of oil and natural gas. The
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fishing area covers about seven and a half thousand square miles with yearly yields of over
150,000 tons of fish. Fishing vessels from the nearby coastal provinces of China would
consistently fish in these waters until 1996 when Japan declared an EEZ over the islands and
utilized their Coast Guard vessels to prevent their fishing in the waters. In terms hydrocarbon
reserves, since 1969 there have been speculations that they were extensive resources present,
which began to be confirmed in 1982 with the Pinghu field, and the additional fields of
Chunxiao, Tianwaitian, Duanqiao and Longjing by 2000.
For the Chinese, these islands have increased in value over time for two reasons
pertaining to each of the present resources. With other fisheries nearer the Chinese mainland
being depleted, the greater reserves off these disputed islands are increasingly appealing. The
same goes for the hydrocarbon deposits in the area. With the Chinese economy continuing to
expand the need for energy resources has continued to grow, making access to the reserves
around the contested islands a strategic aim over those in the South china sea which are a bit
further away and harder to access.
In terms of military value both Japan and China recognize the geostrategic importance of
the islands. By lying essentially between both states, they serve not only as a source of national
defense but also a potential springboard for an attack, especially when ownership over the
islands would bring with it sovereignty over the nearby waters and the airspace over them. In
addition, for China, in order to access the Pacific Ocean and/or protect their shores from an
opponent in war, they would need to control two island chains, in which the Diaoyu/Senkaku
islands lies next to a gap in the first chain. In terms of geography, the Chinese naval bases face
either the East or the South China Sea, so for their naval forces to enter into the western Pacific
though would need to pass through the Miyako Strait (between the Okinawa and Miyako islands)
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or through the Bashi Channel (between the Philippines and Taiwan). If the Chinese had control
over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, however, their navy would have more options and easier
mobility in the area.
From the Japanese perspective things progressed a bit differently, which is owed in large
part to events since the end of World War II. Given the events of the war, the new Constitution
constructed for post-war Japan included Article 9 as means to curtain the state from again
threatening international peace. In Article 9, aggression is outlawed and Japan is denied any sort
of offensive military forces at all. Further, it dictated that the defense of Japan not be militaristic,
with no military establishment permitted even in the case where the industrial capacity to support
it developed. This would last for three years until the outbreak of the Korean War.
With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the majority of the forces of the American
occupation were transferred to the Korean theatre, which quickly left Japan relatively helpless in
its capacity to enforce the rule of law within their borders, let alone if a foreign power decided to
act against their interested. As a way to address this situation, the National Police Reserve was
created which, over time, turned into the Self-Defense Force (SDF). With tensions continuing to
increase between the West and Communism, the decision to keep Japan pacifist was set aside
and their military capabilities were upgraded over time. What followed was several decades of
improvements, starting with the First Defense Build Up Program (1958-1961) and continued by
a Second Program (1962-1966) and Third Program (1967-1971). Due to these actions the
Japanese defense forces developed from the 1950s and 1970s into a well-equipped military force.
When the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute arose in the 1970s, China and Japan were in the
process of improving their relations, including formalizing their bilateral relationship in 1972
and formally signing a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. This resulted in a lowering of
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tensions between the disputants, though they did not dissipate altogether. The military
importance of the islands rose to an entirely new level in 2009 when President Obama of the
United States announced a strategic pivot of naval forces and attention from the Middle East to
East Asia. As Japan is one of the United States most strategic allies in the region, it has played
host to a high-level military presence for some time. All told some 35,000 US military personnel
are based in Japan, including the United States Seventh Fleet out of Yokosuka and the Third
Marine Expeditionary Force based in Okinawa among others. Given the ties between these two
countries in the area, it comes as no surprise that the strategic placement of these disputed islands
has resulted in renewed tensions.
There is special symbolic significance attached to the islands for China as well. Given
that the Diaoyu area has served as a major fishery for Chinese sailors, and as it lies nearby both
the mainland and Taiwan, China places them within their historical control. Given the way in
which they had been originally attained from China by the Japanese, and retained in the period
after World War II, these past bitter conflicts have attached high Chinese nationalist significance
to the dispute. The First Chinese-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Second Chinese-Japanese War
(1937-1945), human experiments in eastern China, the Nanjing Massacre, these and many more
events have contributed to a general level of hatred and grief on the part of the Chinese that,
when tied to the dispute, make it that much more difficult to resolve. Viewed in this way, for the
Chinese the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are not just a territorial dispute but are also vested with
importance of national dignity and memory. Lastly, the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan is also
tied into this dispute. According to the governments of both China and Taiwan, the islands are
part of the Toucheng township of Yilan County in Taiwan. For this reason, China’s claims on
these islands and its claims on Taiwan can be seen as interdependent. If China decided to
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compromise on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, fully accepting Japan’s legal sovereignty over them,
its claim over the entirety of Taiwan might well be compromised (Zhongqi 2007). When this is
combined with the traditional rivalry between China and Japan, and the close relationship
between the latter and the United States, this has resulted in Japan being the target of much
Chinese nationalist discontent.

Settlement Attempt Interactions
Of all the states examined in these case studies, China and Japan had the fewest
interactions over their territorial dispute. Moreover, it is the only case examined here in which no
significant peaceful efforts in settling the dispute occurred. In terms of how each side has
approach their interactions over the dispute, there have been some variations over time. Initially
in the 1970s, China took a laid-back approach where the dispute was maintained, with occasional
flare-ups, but no concentrated consistent efforts were exerted to end the dispute in their favor. In
large part this was due to the security threat posed by the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. Acting to
counter this threat, China made efforts to improve its relations with the United States and Japan
(Lieberthal 1978).
In terms of the flare-ups that did occur, there are six in particular that stand out. The first
occurred in 1978, when the Japanese constructed a lighthouse on Diaoyu/Uotsuri Island which
lead to over one hundred Chinese fishing trawlers acting to surround the island in protest. The
result of this led to both governments acting to defuse tensions, and treating the structure as an
unofficial lighthouse.
Tensions would jump again in 1990 when the Japanese government reportedly accepted
an application to recognize the official status of the lighthouse, with some efforts then following
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to repair it. Much like in 1978, China lodged an official complaint which resulted in the
lighthouse again being denied official status. By the end of the 1990s tensions would heat up still
further when activists attempted to storm the disputed islands three times. One man would lose
his life following a clash in September of 1996, when tried to swim to Senkaku but drowned
before making it (Golovnin 2003). Later in June of 1998, a vessel with activists that sailed from
Hong Kong sank near the islands under uncertain circumstances. China would claim that a
Japanese patrol boat was involved in ramming it, while Japan would respond that they sunk
themselves as a provocation (Golovnin 2003).
The Chinese navy and government officials would engage in activities related to the
disputed islands as well. In 1996, when a new lighthouse was constructed on that same island,
the Chinese navy acted to blockade the island, though both sides ended up releasing statements
to downplay the issue (Kurtenbach 1996). Regardless of this attempt to mitigate the fallout of the
interactions, China went ahead to file a protest demanding that the structure be removed as a
violation of Chinese sovereignty (Kurtenbach 1996). In response to this backlash, Japan acted in
defiance, stating that under both historical control and current international law the islands
rightfully belonged to Japan and, though they did not wish to provoke China further, were
adamant in this claim (Kurtenbach 1996). In the years to follow the extent of interactions
between the two states would follow this general pattern.
In 1999, China’s navy conducted exercises in close proximity to the disputed islands, to
the extent that ten warships were nearby conducting drills from July 12-15, with research and
surveillance ships in the area as well (Golovnin 1999). Rather than escalate further, Japan opted
to take no measures against China at that time (Golovnin 1999). They would, however, commit
to actions of their own designed to buttress the claims Japan had to the islands. In 2002, Japan
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would make an agreement with the private owner of three of the five Senkaku islands, who
themselves lived in the Okinawa Prefecture in Japan, to commit to a yearly lease to be paid in a
lump sum (Japan Economic Newswire 2002). By engaging in this rental, Japan could take a
more active hand in the management and maintenance of the islands. Moreover, the lease had the
benefit of working to prevent the resale of the islands to other third parties as well as further
block the possibilities that individuals or groups might land there in protest of Japanese control
(Japan Economic Newswire 2002). While China would protest these actions as violating their
sovereignty, the fact of the matter was there was little they could do beyond what they had
already engaged in as protest (Golovnin 2003).
A series of incidents occurred in the early 2000s. In 2003, Japanese patrol boats would
impound a Chinese schooner carrying activists within the 12-mile Japanese control zone with the
intent of landing on the islands to protest for the return of the to Chinese control (Golovnin
2003). The consistent ability of Japanese forces to prevent landings on the islands and conduct
arrests was due to the fact that, for three decades, the Japanese Coast Guard had stationed at least
one patrol ship in the waters surrounding the islands twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year.
Unfortunately, these patrolling efforts were not one hundred percent full proof, as evidence by
activists successfully landing on the islands in 2004 (Yoshida 2004). It was around this period in
time that Japan would reiterate their stance that Chinese claims had only really emerged after
1968, when the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East had released a report after
conducting research that indicated the possibility of massive oil reserves around the islands into
the continental shelf in the surrounding areas (Yoshida 2004). Following these activities,
domestic protests broke out in parts of China over the shared dispute with Japan and, while
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Tokyo tried to smooth things over diplomatically, revenge attacks occurred in Japan against
Chinese banks and schools (Pocha 2005).
Similar events would occur in 2010 when Japan detained another captain of a Chinese
fishing boat after they collided with two Japanese Coast Guard ships near the disputed islands.
Though Chinese officials continue to demand that Japanese vessels not shadow Chinese patrol
boats in the disputed area, the Japanese Coast Guard continues to maintain a close watch of the
disputed islands, always on the lookout for the next Chinese patrol or ship of activists trying to
press closer. Up until the end of the observation period in this case study, while no major
incidents of violence occurred, no significant efforts of peaceful settlement attempts would be
forthcoming either.

Discussion
In the forty-four years of the China-Japan disputes presented in Table 6, there were nine
years where only violent interactions occurred, and zero years for the other kinds of interactions.
Much like as in the other cases the convergence or divergence pattern of these settlement
interactions on voting in the UNGA does not collaborate the theory directly. For violent
interactions, there was a split of two divergence and seven convergence, something that might be
expected not to occur given the hypotheses underlying the theory.
When average convergence of UNGA voting is examined for the different interactions,
using the presence of no interactions in lieu of peaceful ones, the pattern lines up more with the
theory. The average UNGA voting convergence was closer during no interactions (mean =
1.5436) as compared to violent interactions (mean = 1.6839). The level of divergence in UNGA
voting in years of violent interactions is similar to that of both Russia (mean = 1.6952) and
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Vietnam (mean = 1.4380) for this period of time. Much like these two other states, the higher
divergence in UNGA voting likely stems from security concerns, and particularly in the case of
Japan, the lack of consistent long term peaceful engagement to attempt to settle the outstanding
disputes over the Senkaku Islands.
In terms of the differences in settlement interactions compared to the other disputing
dyads, there could be a number of reasons for both the lack of peaceful settlement attempts as
well as why even in the years that saw a lack of violent interactions the UNGA voting
divergence was so high. First, the lack of peaceful settlement attempts likely are influenced to a
certain degree on the leftover bad feelings following the atrocities of World War II, the strategic
and economic value of other Chinese claims like the Paracels and Spratly Islands being higher,
and more immediate security concerns of the borders shared with Russia, India and Vietnam who
China was engaged in significant conflicts with in the 1990s and earlier. With all these points
taken into account it is possible that this explains in part the relative lack of interactions over the
Senkaku Islands, and why the divergent voting in the UNGA is closer to the alignment of voting
during the years when no violent interactions occurred.
Examining several years in which the change in convergence or divergence is high adds
additional context demonstrating the variety of UNGA resolutions that the disputing dyad
respectively agree or disagree on, indicating again that it is not just the case of a few types of
resolutions being influenced by the interactions over the disputed territory. For example, in 2000,
where China and Japan had a violent interaction over disputed territory the previous year, they
voted the differently on a range on resolution topics, including globalization, independence of
former colonies, the democratic international order, respect for the UN Charter, and human rights
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, and Sudan (see these sources for examples: UN
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General Assembly 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2000e, 2000f, 2000g). Similarly, in 2003, where
Japan was engaged with another violent interaction over disputed territory with China the year
before, they voted the differently on a number of resolution topics again, including the
prohibition of nuclear weapons, globalization, nuclear disarmament, children in armed conflict,
multilateralism in disarmament, and human rights in such states as the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Iran, and Turkmenistan (see these sources for examples: UN General Assembly
2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003e, 2003f, 2003g, 2003h). With these findings taken together,
and explanations again offered for the few years that don’t fully align, support has been found
for peaceful settlement interactions having values indicative of convergence (H1) as compared to
violent attempts being higher, and in the direction of more divergent voting (H2). Much like in
the case of the previous dyads examined in this chapter, no conclusions can be reached regarding
specific kinds of peaceful attempts having different impacts, as only negotiations are presented
as having occurred between the disputants as peaceful interactions in the time period examined.

China-Philippines
Dyadic Information
Given the complicated nature of overlapping claims for different territories in the South
China Sea, it is no surprise that China has dispute with another state over the Spratly Islands: the
Philippines. To briefly reiterate the appeal of sovereignty over these islands one must be aware
of the economic and strategic value they represent. Despite centuries over which these islands,
shoals and rocks being largely ignored except as hazards of navigation (Dolven, Kan, and
Manyin, 2013), in recent decades they have come to possess greater value to the disputants.
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To both states, the Spratly islands possesses value in the form of natural resources, such
as coconut palms and bat guano. Scattered around the islands are rich fishing grounds, and the
preferred areas for fishermen of the Philippines and China ply their trade. Given the
susceptibility of these areas to tropical storms, the islands and features in the disputed area are
used by many as shelters if they are unable to return to shore, a practice that has stretched back
centuries and one that has endured even in the face of this territorial dispute. Perhaps most
important to either state, however, is how these features of the South China Sea sit astride the
transoceanic shipping lanes that link China and the other states of Southeast Asia to business
partners and markets in the West.
After 1982, with the expansion of the territorial sea limit to 12-nautical miles and further
license granted to a 200-mile EEZ and the continental shelfs on which each state stood, the
potential economic values of these contested territories in the South China Sea shot up,
especially as technology began to be developed that would allow the exploitation of any
hydrocarbon deposits not previously harvested. Given its burgeoning population, especially in its
cities, having access to the rich resources of the contested South China Sea islands shot up in
significance to the Chinese leadership. Moving quickly to exploit the situation, China expanded
its fleet of merchant ships to one thousand by 1987 and began to gobble up all energy resources
it could get its hands on. The importance of these contested hydrocarbon resources increased.
Much as mentioned previously, the islands themselves would improve Chinese abilities
to monitor shipping lanes and air traffic in the region and, with the installation of additional
bases and missile batters, China would be able to buttress its security with the capacity to block
any hostile forces on its way to China’s coastal waters. Lastly, there remains some symbolic
value of the disputed islands to China as well, who hold that the discovery and use of these
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islands by Chinese mariners goes back thousands of years. To control these features would allow
China to take another step towards retrieving the prestige of its past.
Regarding the claims of the two states to the Spratly Islands, the claims by China and the
Philippines emerged in different ways. The most comprehensive claim by China is found in the
declaration they issued in 2009 in a notes verbale to the United Nations. This map of the South
China Sea was composed of nine dashes mimicking the map issued by the government of the
Republic of China in 1947 before their overthrow. This map itself was modified in the 1950s, but
the lines are themselves vague and China has since refused to clarify exactly where they lie
(Schofield 2013). For China’s part, they insist that the claim can be traced back to documents
created during the time of the Yuan Dynasty, that is the late 13th century, which showed the
regime as having established administrative control over the area. If true this would indicate the
claim they are asserting predates the ratification of UNCLOS, and as such supersedes the legal
document.
The claim put forth by the Philippines is of a more recent nature. Based on exploration of
the archipelago that occurred in the 1940s and 1950s, it would not be until 1972 to the claim over
53 islands and shoals in the Spratlys would be formalized by the Philippine government (Dolven,
Kan, and Manyin, 2013). Wiegand and Beuck (2018) provides a good overview of events form
the Philippine perspective since 1971 when the claim named the features the Kalayaan islands,
which were then incorporated into the province of Palawan in 1972. The Philippines would
further assert their control over the Kalayaan island group by declaring them subject to their
sovereign control with Presidential Degree No. 1596, and that their existence provided the
Philippines a 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone with Presidential Decree No. 1599
(Wiegand and Beuck 2018). This assertion of sovereignty would not change in 1984 when the
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Philippines signed on to the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in which
they declared that they were an archipelagic state that held sovereignty over the Spratly Islands
and reefs that fell within their 200-nautical mile EEZ.

Settlement Attempt Interactions
Though recognition and restoration of diplomatic ties was given to China in 1975, it
would not be until the 1990s that serious attempts began to be made to manage their shared
disputes. By 1991 China stated that it was ready to join other countries with claims to explore the
creation of appropriate mechanisms in a joint effort to secure peace and stability in the region
(Coloma 1991). Having done so, however, China also stated that such efforts should first be
attempted via bilateral negotiations, followed by sub-regional talks if they were to prove
unsuccessful (Coloma 1991). Despite these overtures to peaceful settlement, Beijing alarmed its
neighbors in 1992 when it passed a controversial law claiming ownership of the entire Spratly
Island chain, and asserted the right to use military force to protect these claims (United Press
International 1993). It would be actions like this that led to effort by the Philippines to mitigate
the tensions of the dispute. In 1993, the President of the Philippines visited China in an effort to
expand trade and investment ties, while also broach talks on the security situation tied to their
shared disputes in the South China Sea (United Press International 1993).
Though this would bear some fruit, and the Philippines would say they were satisfied
with agreements to prevent conflict over the Spratly Islands, they also continued to express
concern over China’s military buildup (Teves 1994). The Philippines was worried about China’s
military modernization, especially of their air force and navy, as the Philippines has a smaller
armed forces and smaller budget. This worry would soon prove to be warranted. In February of
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1995, Chinese forces moved in to occupy Mischief Reef, when they quickly established several
buildings (Boston Global Forum 2015). The Philippine government would go on to publish
several pictures of the Reef that showed the presence of several Chinese navy supply vessels, and
even a submarine support ship in anchor by the reef (Boston Global Forum 2015). The
government of the Philippines would again state that it had no intention of engaging China in a
military conflict over the disputed features, but China was still drawing to close to Philippine
shores for comfort (Flipo 1995). Thus, while the Philippines could not compete militarily
compete, it continued making efforts to reinforce defenses.
Following these events China and the Philippines gradually made the transition to
focusing on increasing trade, investment, and their overall relationship, setting the sole focus on
the dispute settlement before aside. At the same time, the Philippines hoped to use its links in
ASEAN to pressure China to toe the line in its diplomatic conduct (Agnote 1997). There was
speculation at the time that, without ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts, the territorial disputes in the
Spratly Islands might have grown into a full-scale conflict over the valuable hydrocarbon
deposits, thereby disrupting the stability and economic growth of the region (Agnote 1997).
Even with ASEAN’s efforts, however, the tensions continued between China and the
Philippines into the late 1990s. In March of 1997, China sent several warships to survey the
Philippine occupied Kankiam Cay and Loaita Island in the Spratly Islands (Boston Global Forum
2015). The Philippines would act in April of 1997 by ordering a Chinese speedboat and two
fishing vessels away from the Scarborough Shoal, after which Philippine fisherman removed
Chinese markers and raised the flag of the Philippines (Boston Global Forum 2015). Later, China
would begin to warn the Philippines to avoid flying too low over disputed shoals that held a
Chinese presence in the South China Sea, that an accidental confrontation might be avoided
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(Gomez 1998), though the Philippines ended up publishing pictures from these reconnaissance
missions over Mischief Reef (Son 1999).
Despite several founds of dialogue between both of their governments, the accord
reached in these meetings did not stop China from constructing new structures on the features
they occupied in the South China Sea, no did it prevent them from stationing additional military
vessels there (Son 1999). The 1990s would end with tensions continually stirred up from the
Philippines continuing to arrest fishermen around Scarborough Shoal in 1998, and a Chinese
fishing boat sinking after a collision with a Philippine warship in 1999 (Boston Global Forum
2015). China would continue its pattern in this period of promising to never use force in their
shared disputes then going ahead in building up its presence in waters uncomfortably close to its
fellow disputant (Son 1999). Negotiations would continue the entire time this was going on.
In the early 200s, a new Sino-Filipino agreement was hailed by the sides as importance
progress towards the settlement of the territorial disputes peacefully (Sui 2000). China would
take steps to assure their counterparts in the Philippines that it was not a threat, and that what
was needed now was for both sides to build up their mutual trust and confidences (Sui 2000). In
the disputed waters themselves, however, continued practices of fishing stirred up incidents
between the two sides. In 2000, the Philippine navy fired several warning shots at Chinese
vessels to drive them away from the Scarborough Shoal, and later opened fire on Chinese
fishermen, killing one and arresting seven (Boston Global Forum 2015). Incidents like this with
Chinese fishermen would occur prominently until 2002.
Given the tensions and threats of the previous years, especially around fishing boats,
efforts were taken to decrease the likelihood of outright conflict in 2002 by ASEAN and China
who signed a landmark accord governing their interactions in the South China Sea called the
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2002 Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Penh 2002). This spirit of
cooperation would continue between China and the Philippines when both agreed to jointly study
oil deposits in the South China Sea where their claims overlapped, as well as agreed to a threeyear research project (Agence France Presse 2004). This goodwill would be further buttressed by
strategic cooperation between the two states and their efforts to consistently maintain contact in
consultation on shared issues (Xinhau General News Service 2007).
Unfortunately, shooting incidents would break out again in 2011, when a Chinese frigate
fired shots at fishing boats flying the Philippines flags when they refused to leave the vicinity of
the Jackson atoll. In the same time period China issued a statement that it denied any plans to
resort to force in the regional territorial disputes involved the South China Sea and Spratly
Islands (de la Cruz, Rosales, Manalo, and Mallari 2011). In fact, it reaffirmed commitment to a
peaceful resolution of these same disputes, to which the Philippines responded with calls for a
declaration guaranteeing an open seas policy and a general demilitarization of the region with
garrisons withdrawn (de la Cruz, Rosales, Manalo, and Mallari 2011). When this was not fully
carried out, the Philippines removed wooden markers on three reefs and banks in the disputed
area, and then formally protested intrusions by the Chinese navy into internationally recognized
Philippine waters (de la Cruz, Rosales, Manalo, and Mallari 2011).
A number of similar incidents occurred the next year as well. A Philippine naval ship by
the name of Gregorio del Pilar engaged in a standoff with Chinese surveillance vessels off the
Scarborough Shoal, while not long after the Chinese pressed a Philippine archeological ship to
leave the area based on their violating sovereignty (Dolven, Lawrence, Lum and O’Rourke
2016). In May of 2012, the Chinese government protested Philippine actions in the Scarborough
Shoal and, to illustrate their displeasure, they issued a travel warning against the Philippines to
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their citizens and imposed trade barriers against pineapples and bananas originating in their
fellow claimant’s territory (Dolven, Lawrence, Lum and O’Rourke 2016). Late that same month
a fishing ban went into effect on both countries for the Scarborough Shoal, though China would
later return and remain around the shoal after erecting a barrier at its’ entrance. Likely in part a
reaction to these events, Philippine President Aguino presented Administrative Order No. 29 in
September of 2012 (Dolven, Lawrence, Lum and O’Rourke 2016), which asserted that the
maritime areas to the west of the Philippine archipelago would henceforth be known as the West
Philippine Sea, to which they possessed sovereign jurisdiction over the EEZ to the distance of
200 nautical miles. A few weeks later China acted to increase the number of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) that monitored the disputed features also claimed by the Philippines. These
actions and others like them have only served to increase the tensions yet again between both
disputants.
It was around this period of interactions that the Philippines came to the determination
that the dispute would likely continue into the future in this manner and that negotiations would
likely not lead to an equitable outcome for both sides. As a result, in 2013 the Philippines took a
legal step against China’s claims by formally notifying that it would be seeking international
arbitration against China with the accusation that its activities in the South China Sea disputed
areas were illegal and invalid (Gomez 2013). China would ultimately respond to the Philippines
intent to carry through with these proceedings with a rejection of participating in it (Heydarian
2014). China based this response on the claim that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the
case, as it was beyond the scope of the United Nations Declaration on the Law of the Sea
Convention and that the Philippines had previously promised to only use negotiations to settle
the issue (Heydarian 2014).
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Events came to a head in January of 2014 when China imposed a requirement of a fishing
permit in the South China Sea, despite the objections of the Philippines and other states. As a
result, the Philippines invoked the compulsory settlement of disputes clause under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, where they submitted a case regarding their
competing claims with China over the South China Sea to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in
The Hague. By 2015 the Philippines v. China was a pending arbitration case centered on the
legality of China’s “Nine-Dash line” in the South China Sea according to UNCLOS (Dolven,
Lawrence, Lum and O’Rourke 2016). Eventually the tribunal ruled that it had the power to hear
the case and agreed to examine seven of the fifteen submissions by the Philippines, among which
were questions regarding the legal status of features like Scarborough Shoal and Mischief Reef
(Wiegand and Beuck 2018). The claims initially set aside by the tribunal were those that mostly
accused China of simply acting unlawfully. Though it falls outside the time period examined, the
tribunal would conclude rulings in favor of the Philippines, among which were the invalid nature
of China’s nine-dash line and that the Philippines had the right to expand its EEZ and access to
the continental shelf in its bordering sea.

Discussion
In the forty-four years of the China-Philippines disputes presented in Table 7, there were
fifteen years where only peaceful interactions occurred, zero years where only violent
interactions occurred, and eight years where both types of interactions occurred. Again, much
like as in the other cases, the convergence or divergence pattern of these settlement interactions
on voting in the UNGA does not collaborate the theory directly. For peaceful interactions, there
was a rough split of seven divergences and eight convergences in the UNGA voting. For both
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interactions occurring in a year, there was a split of two divergence and six convergence,
something that seems to indicate a slight bit more weight given to peaceful interactions over
violent ones. That being said, when average convergence of UNGA voting is examined for the
different interactions, the pattern again lines up more with the theory. The average UNGA voting
convergence was closer during peaceful interactions (mean = 0.3736) as compared to years
where violent and peaceful interactions (mean = 0.3912) occurred.
The lack of a large meaningful difference between peaceful attempts and mixed attempts
on divergent UNGA voting might be due to China’s approach towards other disputes,
specifically those in the South China Sea. With these other disputes, China escalated to the use of
force as opportunities presented themselves in the contested areas, again likely due to the belief
that their opponents would be unwilling to fight a war or would back off from a confrontation
due to lack of support from other actors. Also, in 2013 Philippines stated they were taking China
to Arbitration over their conflicting claims in the South China Sea. Though not begun before the
end of this studies bounded timeline (2015) the fact that this arbitration attempt initiation was
announced in 2013 might explain in part why the following two years voting similarity in the
UNGA jumped from 0.01 voting difference to 0.33 and 0.24 voting difference. These scores
would make sense given China’s previously stated desire to avoid outside involvement over its
territorial disputes.
Examining several years with high changes in convergence or divergence contributes
additional context demonstrating the variety of UNGA resolutions that the disputing dyad
respectively agree or disagree on, indicating again that it is not just the case of a few types of
resolutions being influenced. In 1992, following a year in which China and the Philippines had a
peaceful interaction over disputed territory, the states voted the same on a range of resolutions,
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including some dealing with the prohibition of nuclear weapons, colonial independence, selfdetermination, the law of the sea, and human rights in Iraq (see these sources for examples: UN
General Assembly 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1992d, 1992f). Another year seeing high convergence
in voting was 2005, which also followed a peaceful interaction over disputed territory in the
previous year. China and the Philippines voted the same regarding a range of issues including
nuclear issues, the International Court of Justice, globalization, human rights, Palestine issues,
the law of the sea, and national sovereignty (see these sources for examples: UN General
Assembly 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2005e, 2005f, 2005g, 2005h). Much like in the previous
cases, when all these findings taken together, and explanations offered for the few years that
don’t fully align, support has been found for peaceful settlement interactions having values
indicative of convergence (H1), compared to interactions where violent attempts occur, which
lead to more divergent voting (H2). Moreover, like in the other cases examined, the range of
issues in which they had similarities in voting was wide. That being said, it must again be
reiterated that no conclusions can be reached regarding specific kinds of peaceful attempts
having different impacts on voting alignment in this case, as negotiations were the only type of
peaceful attempts pursued.

Overall China Voting Similarity with Disputants and the United States
Having gone through each case one at a time, I now present the averages across all the
cases to determine general support for the theory in terms of China’s interactions with these five
fellow disputants. In terms of the average voting convergence in the UNGA, peaceful
interactions (mean = 0.6917) across the seventy-seven dyad years was closer than both mixed
interactions in twenty-six dyad years (mean = 0.8173) and violent interactions in twenty-four
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dyad years (mean = 1.3917). In general, it can be said that this allows for the null hypothesis to
be rejected as the pattern of these values show that peaceful settlement attempts saw higher
UNGA voting convergence (H1) compared to those that were violent (H2).
This being the case, it is now time to examine Chinese settlement interactions as they
relate to UNGA voting convergence and divergence with the US. Table 8 presents the number of
peaceful and violent attempts in a given year from 1971 to 2015 involving China and one of the
five disputants covered in the case studies. While not completely covering all territorial disputes,
China was engaged with over this time period, the expectation is that having engaged with the
five cases of this chapter that comprise states at different levels of power, different regime types,
and different disputes, the interaction with US voting in the UNGA in terms of convergence or
divergence will be sufficiently robust to make some conclusions relevant to the theory.
As is clear in this table, there are a range of possibilities for a given year in terms of
interactions, going from as low as one peaceful and zero violent, up to four peaceful and two
violent interactions in a given year. Generally speaking, the average UNGA voting divergence
increases as more violent interactions occur alongside peaceful ones, which holds true across the
majority of the dyad years. Voting convergence is lower for one peaceful interaction and no
violent interactions (mean = 3.4308) than one peaceful interaction and three violent interactions
(mean = 3.8255). For years with two peaceful attempts, voting convergence was closer when
only one violent interaction occurred (mean = 2.8260) than if two violent (mean = 3.0341) or
three violent interactions (mean = 3.0397) occurred. For years that saw three peaceful attempts,
convergence is closer when zero violent interactions (mean = 3.4126) occurred as compared to
when one violent interaction (mean = 3.4787) occurred. Lastly, for years in which four peaceful
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attempts occurred, when zero violent interactions also occurred convergence was closer (mean =
3.4421) than when one violent interaction (mean = 4.1780) occurred.
Only three combinations of peaceful and violent interactions varied from this general
pattern: years that saw one peaceful and one violent interaction; years that saw three peaceful
and three violent interactions; and years that saw four peaceful and two violent interactions. The
average for years in which one peaceful and one violent interaction occurred might be explained
by China’s consistent efforts of engagement in the 1970s to improve relations with the US and
Japan, as it feared a powerful Soviet Union across its disputed borders to its north, and the Soviet
sphere of influence freshly expanding into Vietnam and South Asia to its west. A similar
argument might be made for the year 1979 that saw three peaceful and three violent interactions.
In this year, the overall convergence compared to other years that saw three peaceful attempts
might be due to the brief border war that broke out between Vietnam and China. Part of the
results of this war, which occurred during the height of the Cold War, would be a wedge driven
between China and Vietnam, and by extension Vietnam’s backer the Soviet Union, which
decreased the possibility of communist consolidations expanding beyond those portions of South
Asia. In addition, it was this same period in time that China was making concentrated efforts to
grow closer to the US, as the Soviet Union was seen as the greater, and closer, danger. Lastly,
the average convergence of years that saw four peaceful and two violent interactions might be a
bit lower than four peaceful and one violent interactions due to the events that occurred in 1998
and 1999 in China’s dispute dyads. In these years, the land border treaty with Vietnam was
signed, decreasing the possibility of a new border conflict from breaking out, China settled its
eastern border dispute with Russia, and it also entered into negotiations with India to define a
clear Line of Actual control boundary to mitigate the possibility of more conflict over their
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disputes as well. As all these actions fall in favor what international law, and the US-led
international system, call for in managing territorial disputes, it stands to reason this would lead
to higher UNGA voting convergence in these years then otherwise, thereby throwing off the
pattern to some small degree. With all these findings taken together, and explanations offered for
the few years that don’t fully align, support has been found for peaceful settlement interactions
having values indicative of convergence (H3a) as compared to violent attempts being higher, and
in the direction of more divergent voting (H4). Unfortunately, the middle two of these latter
hypotheses cannot be assessed in regards to China (H3b and H3c) as for each of the dyads in the
time period examined only negotiations are presented as having occurred between the disputants
as peaceful interactions. While arbitration does eventually occur between China and the
Philippines, the start of the case falls outside the bounds of time of these case studies. However,
it should be noted that selecting different Chinese disputes would not have changed this
situation, as none of the disputant dyads that share China over this time period are coded in the
dataset utilized as seeing anything other than negotiations as peaceful attempts.

Conclusion
In this chapter I examined five case studies on territorial disputes involving China over
the years 1971 to 2015 in order to assess additional support for my theory. Initial examinations
of the case studies provided mixed results in terms of support for my hypotheses. Peaceful
attempts and violent attempts were assessed as either leading to convergent or divergent voting
as compared to the previous dyad year, but without fail each resulted in mixed patterns of results.
Particularly frustrating in this first examination was the China-India case wherein there were
thirty purely peaceful attempts in the forty-four years under examination. Of these peaceful
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attempts, fourteen lead to divergent voting and sixteen led to convergent voting. Russia,
Vietnam, and the Philippines had similar distributions, with all but Vietnam having just slightly
more convergent results than divergent ones. Upon conducting a closer examination of the
scores, a good number of dyad years that saw divergent scores associated with peaceful attempts,
and convergent scores associated with violent ones, were actually very small shifts in voting
alignment. After averaging out shared UNGA voting scores in each dyad by number of peaceful
attempts (mean = 0.6917), number of violent attempts (mean = 1.3917), and number of mixed
attempts (mean = 0.8173) in each year, more conclusive support was found for the first set of
hypotheses. Given previous discussions of China’s perspectives on international law and their
wary stance of its use in settling territorial disputes, it is clear that they appreciate efforts exerted
in negotiations according to the more convergent voting alignment in the UNGA. According to
these results the null hypothesis can be rejected (H0), as UNGA voting alignment values signal
support for peaceful settlement attempts having more convergent values (H1) than violent
settlement attempts (H2). In addition, when at least one peaceful and one violent attempt
occurred in a year, UNGA voting alignment possessed a mean between that of purely peaceful
attempts and purely violent attempts. Unfortunately, case selection, while effective in giving a
range of different kinds of states in terms of power and regime type, nonetheless was ineffective
in leading to cases that had different kinds of settlement attempts. All peaceful settlement
attempts that occurred between the five case studies were negotiations, though when additional
cases involving China were examined, none with the time bounds (1971-2015) saw an attempt at
arbitration or adjudication according to the dataset utilized. That being said, the pattern of results
for settlement attempts involving China and resulting voting alignment in the UNGA with the
US did fall in line with support for peaceful settlements having values indicative of convergence
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(H3a) as compared to violent attempts being higher, and in the direction of more divergent
voting (H4). Future work would do well to examine other case studies that do see these kinds of
attempts.
In the next and final chapter, I present an overall discussion of the findings of the
chapters of this dissertation project, as well as what conclusions we might derive from the
support of the hypotheses examined. I finish with a brief discussion of next steps in further fine
tuning the analyses as well as several directions to further examine and test the theory presented
here.
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Chapter 5: Findings and Conclusion
Summary
To what degree do settlement attempt methods influence disputant foreign policy
preferences, as indicated by voting preferences in the UNGA? To what degree does the
information actively conveyed by the settlement attempt method utilized by states in managing
their ongoing territorial and maritime disputes signal contentment with the US-led international
system? How is this reflected in general UNGA voting relative to the voting of particular
disputants? In this dissertation, I sought to address these questions by proposing a theory of
territorial dispute management influencing voting patterns in the UNGA, in which attempts made
by states to settle their territorial and maritime disputes signals information on their preferences
on international law in dispute settlement and perspectives regarding the US-led international
system as helmed by the United Nations and the United Nations General Assembly. My theory
emphasized how these attempts, whether violent or peaceful, provide insight into a state’s
perspective on international law and the international system that it structures, which in turn is
manifested in the voting patterns of the UNGA. The logic underlying these hypotheses can be
summarized in several points.
Firstly, given the degree that the UN and international community at-large have acted to
inhibit actions of forceful acquisition of territory, disputed or otherwise, one might expect the
awareness of the behavior of states in interacting over their disputes peaceably, such as through
negotiations, or violently, such as through border violations, will inform and influence voting in
the UNGA, and even convey on how a state feels about the role of international law in territorial
conflict management in the US-led international system. Keeping in mind that violent attempts
are clearly confrontational, non-cooperation and demonstrate contempt for international law
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enshrined in the UNGA, we might expect this to be reflected in voting on UNGA resolutions,
especially those related to international law. The opposite can be said regarding peaceful
attempts, which demonstrate conciliatory collaboration and respect for the role of international
law in attempting to settle disputes. Both these expectations were found to be the case, both
generally in the regressions and specifically in the case studies.
Secondly, it has been determined that signaling occurs when one actor is made aware of
information relevant to another actor’s decisions in the international system (Morrow 1999).
Early research into this phenomenon led to findings indicating that many outcomes of foreign
policy decision making were dependent to some degree on the interactions between multiple
activities taken by states (Gartzke, Carcello, Gannon, and Zhang 2017). Regarding interactions
over territorial disputes, since we might see these as zero-sum interactions, issues of incomplete
information and commitment arise (Fearon 1995), with the result that attempts at settlement
themselves might serve as a good source of information indicative of state preferences for the
distribution of the territory under dispute as well as information on their commitment and
perspective on the settlement process itself. In terms of the UNGA, these interactions might
further serve as sources of insight into contentment or discontentment with international law and
the US-led international system as a whole. In this project, signaling might be sent regarding
discontent with international law and the US-led international order in the form of violent
interactions over disputed territory, or to instead demonstrate contentment for the same in the
case of peaceful interactions. To assess the impacts of interactions over territorial disputes have
on UNGA voting, dynamic ideal points are used as a quantified representation of the position of
states in regards to their UNGA voting. As ideal points are generated from all votes taken in the
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UNGA and generated in terms of their distance from a central point of US UNGA voting, it
serves as an effective means towards glimpsing state preferences.
In terms of the relationship of territorial dispute interactions have to UNGA voting, based
on the theory I expected violent interactions would convey information that the state is
aggressive, untrustworthy, and lack respects for the role of international law and the US-led
international system. As a result, UNGA voting of a disputant might be expected to diverge from
their counterparts when violent interactions occur. On the other hand, if a state were to pursue
peaceful interactions over their shared territorial dispute, information will be conveyed that the
state is a good citizen of the US-led international system that has respect for the role of
international law and the potential to be a more trustworthy partner. In this second situation,
UNGA voting of a disputant might be expected to converge with its counterpart.
To test this theory, I generated two sets of hypotheses, one which applied directly to the
disputing dyad itself, and one beyond that to other states in the UNGA, to the US, and to China,
the last of which stands out as the greatest potential challenger to the US-led international
system. In the first set of hypotheses, I theorized that peaceful dispute interactions would be
significantly related to convergence between the disputants in UNGA voting (H1), and that
violent interactions would be related to divergence between the disputants in terms of UNGA
voting (H2). In the second set of hypotheses, I theorized that peaceful dispute interactions would
be significantly related to UNGA voting convergence between the disputants and the US (H3a),
that the strength of this convergence would increase as peaceful interactions became more
binding (H3B; H3C), while violent interactions would be significantly related to UNGA voting
divergence between the disputants and the US (H4).
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I utilized a multi-method design with combined quantitative analyses of all territorial
dispute settlement interactions (both violent and peaceful) from the founding of the United
Nations in 1946 up until 2015 with specific case studies of disputes involving China and several
bordering states, specifically Russia, India, Vietnam, Japan, and the Philippines. The findings in
my first quantitative analysis indicate support for the hypotheses that peaceful interactions led to
convergent voting in the UNGA (H1), whereas violent interactions led to more divergence (H2).
Further, as peaceful interactions go from non-binding to more legal and binding, the strength of
this convergence increases.
The individual case studies involving China, examined over the years of 1971 to 2015,
demonstrated similar results supporting these first hypotheses. In addition, for the general
support to the hypotheses, the cases themselves had a number of interesting findings. In the
China-Russia case study, the relatively close spread of voting convergences and divergences
might be due in part to the unique conflictual nature of the dyad, especially up until 1991, when
both states saw several border clashes and China saw Russia as enemy number one until the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Examining this case study found support for both peaceful
interactions being linked to UNGA voting convergence (H1) and violent interactions being
linked to UNGA voting divergence (H2). In the China-India case study, the overall lower
divergence in UNGA across the territorial dispute interactions, especially compared to the other
cases, might be due in part to the consistent, long-term engagement in negotiations that China
and India engaged in, as well as the looming threat of Pakistan to India and of the Soviet Union
to China for several decades into the case study. Much like the first case involving China and
Russia, support was found for both peaceful interactions being linked to UNGA voting
convergence (H1) and violent interactions being linked to UNGA voting divergence (H2). In the
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China-Vietnam case study, the reason UNGA voting divergence was nearly three times higher in
violent interactions as compared to peaceful ones might be due to the scale of these violent
interactions, especially considering the border war that was fought in the 1970s and the
continuing land border fighting up until the end of the 1980s. Much like in the first two cases, for
the China and Vietnam case support was found for both peaceful interactions being linked to
UNGA voting convergence (H1) and violent interactions being linked to UNGA voting
divergence (H2). Next, in terms of the China-Japan case study, though there were no peaceful
interactions with which to compare violent interactions, the UNGA voting divergence in years of
violent interactions was higher than when no violent interactions occurred, and further was of a
similar level of divergence to both Russia and Vietnam, leading to support for hypothesis (H2).
On violent interactions contributing to voting divergence in the UNGA. Lastly, in terms of the
China-Philippines case study, the lack of a large meaningful difference between peaceful
interactions and mixed interactions could be due to the frequent back and forth China engaged in
regarding the South China Sea, as well as their efforts to seize multiple disputed features over the
duration examined. With being in line with all the cases mentioned previously, this last case
indicated more support for both peaceful interactions being linked to UNGA voting convergence
(H1) and violent interactions being linked to UNGA voting divergence (H2). Further, after
averaging out all the mean UNGA voting ideal points, peaceful interactions were seen to lead to
voting convergence roughly twice as small as violent interactions, and mixed interactions lay in
the middle closer to peaceful interactions in terms of their relationship on UNGA voting. This
concluded my tests of support for H1 and H2.
In regards to the second set of hypotheses, I first utilized a second set of quantitative
analyses. Much like for the first set, the results of these models were also largely in line in
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support of my second set of hypotheses. Regarding support for settlement interactions as
compared to UNGA voting by the US, peaceful interactions were found to have more convergent
UNGA voting for the disputants (H3a), which increased from nonbinding (H3b) to more legal
binding interactions (H3c), while violent interactions were found to lead to more divergent
voting alignment (H4). In a second model, I examined these same settlement interactions as they
applied to alignment with UNGA voting by China. Fortunately, in terms of support for my
theory that states that might have issue with the role of international law in territorial dispute
settlement, China’s UNGA voting was found to increase in divergence as states engaged in
arbitration attempts on territorial disputes. When this is examined with the case studies, where
China consistently presented clear preferences for negotiations over all other peaceful methods,
the one instance of arbitration that is started by the Philippines to which China reacts badly sees
voting divergence rise thirty-three times as high in the next year, and stays at twenty-four times
as high in the year after that, at which point the time period under examination ends. The
quantitative analysis and the reaction to the Philippines in the case study is a point in favor of
China experiencing some discontent with the role of international law in territorial conflict
management in the US-led international system. Regarding the last examination of the case
studies combined as compared to US UNGA voting, the findings were generally consistent with
the previous analyses of the third chapter. The average UNGA voting divergence increased more
so for those years that had violent interactions, and the divergence generally increased above this
as more violent interactions occurred. The years in which this relationship was not the case could
be explained to some degree the specific events that occurred between China and its fellow
disputes. The one major drawback for using case studies on five of China’s territorial disputes is
that no instances of peaceful interactions beyond negotiations occurred. Unfortunately, all
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territorial dispute dyads in the data utilized for the case studies lacked these latter kinds of
peaceful settlement attempts, and it was judged that using China as the preeminent challenger to
the international legal structure of the US-led international system had extra merit over other
potential cases.
Having outlined my theory, my hypotheses, and presented the findings in support of them
taken from the analyses and case studies I conducted, I now move to conclude this dissertation.
In the final sections of this chapter, I present a reflection on the scholarly contributions of this
dissertation, proceed into certain relevancies of the project to policymakers, and finish with a
brief reflection on next steps in future research building open the theory introduced and
examined over the course of these five chapters.

Scholarly Contributions
The main scholarly contributions of this project are twofold. In regards to an expansion in
thinking about how signaling might have additional impacts on interactions between states
beyond the direct ones, this project goes a step further to suggest that states might be signaling to
multiple audiences when interacting over territorial disputes. According to Fearon (1997),
signaling to multiple audiences is possible, and given the importance and sensitivity of territory
to states it is likely that signaling occurs to states beyond the dyadic partner of a dispute.
Conceptualizing signaling in this manner regarding territorial disputes opens the door to greater
inquiry into how peaceful and violent actions impact the development of international law and
the functioning over international organizations in the international system.
Second, a further branching out of how interactions over territorial disputes not only
impact peace and conflict, but how they might also impact foreign policies of states in the
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international system as they apply to international organizations and international law.
Specifically, this project contributes the second point through the examination of territorial
dispute management interactions for their relationship to voting patterns in the UNGA, both
between the disputants in the dyad and between the disputants and the US as the titular leader of
the international system following the end of World War II. This is an important addition to the
existing literature as it seeks to move beyond the primary focus being on territorial disputes in
their relationship to direct conflict and peace to determine their impact on other interactions
between states, such as in international organizations. By utilizing voting patterns in the UNGA,
I make additional contributions to the literature on factors that influence voting in the
international organization. In making the connection between these two realms of interstate
relations, my work increases the relevance of territorial disputes to understanding the
relationships between states and opens up additional avenues of examination for the interactions
of international organizations.
My examination of within-dyad disputes for their impacts on other states behavior
outside the dyad is also somewhat novel. By examining these behaviors for interactions beyond
the dyad, in this case related to voting patterns by the US and China, I treat states as being aware
of what peaceful and violent interactions over territorial disputes mean for how the behavior of
disputants might bleed over into perceptions and other actions in the international system, with
the expectation states react accordingly, which in this case was shifting their voting patterns in
the UNGA. By considering signaling in this way, as not necessarily being direct but still able to
convey information, I open up to the concept to further explorations in its usefulness in
explaining interactions between states. Further by using both statistical tests and case studies, I
lay out some initial support for these theorized interactions.
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Lastly, by specifically examining the voting patterns of China and the US as being
influenced by an awareness of how others are interacting over territorial disputes throughout the
international system, I open up other avenues for the examination of what factors impact the
behaviors of states that are great powers. Given the worries of many that a war between China
and the US would be worse than World War II due to the military technologies of today, any
potential additional insight into their interactions, as well as how they might disagree over such
things as fundamental roles of international law, is well worth pursuing. To my knowledge this
dissertation is the first work to attempt to bridge the gap between interactions over territorial
disputes and interactions with other states outside the disputing dyad in an international
organization like the UNGA.

Policy Relevance
To some degree this dissertation presents some relevance to policymakers as well. While
many are already aware of the direct impacts the interactions over territorial disputes can have on
states, especially when they are violent, what is less well known is how these interactions can
impact state relationships in other forums like the UNGA. Hopefully in demonstrating how these
disputes are linked to other phenomena it will guide policymakers concerned with other goals
and priorities that touch upon the UNGA and its purview to continue pursuing peaceful
settlement attempts over any outstanding territorial disputes until all are settled. Of further
relevance is the demonstration that territorial dispute settlement is a dynamic, complicated
process with progress being made one year and backsliding the next, which can impact the issues
and states in the international system beyond just the states involved directly. That there might be
ups and downs in the interactions which will be reflected in other state to state interactions
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outside those directly related to the management of the territorial dispute. Lastly, when it comes
to voting behavior in the UNGA, being aware of how territorial dispute interactions impact state
behavior in the international organization will lead to policymakers looking closer at voting to
determine if other factors than the content of the resolutions themselves are in play. In the case of
China, fluctuations in voting behavior could signal its changing perspectives on the role and
usefulness of international law to the international system. Already it has presented strong
stances on the respect of sovereignty and the internal jurisdiction of states being sacrosanct with
few exceptions. In the future China may begin making a greater pivot towards issues like human
rights abuses as being outside the role of the UNGA, and instead the stability of the international
system as a whole should be paramount. Paying attention to how China votes in the UNGA, and
how these votes align with other states that have more proactive stances on international law
applications, might garner greater insight into if this might be occurring. Conversely, paying
attention to the voting patterns of the US regarding states that either uphold international law in
their interactions over territorial dispute or violate them in seeking to violently seize them could
give insight as to the changing place, and different emphasizes of international law towards the
functioning of the international system.

Future Research
Having opened up new avenues of considering how interactions over territorial dispute
influence interstate relations, and how UNGA voting in turn might be influenced by things other
than grants and foreign aid, the next steps in research are threefold. The first step to be taken is to
further clarify the relationship between territorial dispute interactions and voting in the UNGA.
Studies aiming to do so would examine other case studies beyond China, both to assess peaceful
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interactions beyond negotiations, but also with an eye towards collecting anecdotal or official
government documents more explicitly linking actions taken over territorial disputes and UNGA
votes. One particular set of cases of would be Israel and its fellow disputants in the Middle East.
Like the China case studies, Israel would provide a longer time horizon to study in the UNGA,
and moreover work has already been conducted to categorize votes related to Israel, its territory,
and the Palestinians. If further support for this theory is find in studies like the one suggested, a
logical next step would be to break down UNGA voting into what kinds of topics were voted on.
The big link for part of this study was between perspectives on international law to territorial
dispute settlement attempts and UNGA voting in general, but perhaps this relationship is
particularly strong for specific kinds of votes, such as those dealing with human rights issues, or
weak for others, such as purely economic issues. In addition, future work would also be well
served to search for other factors that influence UNGA voting, perhaps even going so far as to
determine the strength of relationships of multiple influencers as compared to each other.
Gaining a more nuanced perspective of what factors influence how the UNGA functions,
especially when compared to general voting patterns over time, will help provide insight into the
directions that the UNGA is evolving, the changing roles of international law, and how the
UNGA continues to maintain its relevance and importance to the international system into the
future.
In conclusion, this dissertation demonstrates the linkages between interactions over
territorial disputes and voting behavior in the UNGA. The shape of these interactions in terms of
violent or peaceful, and the degree the latter are non-binding or binding, all modify the impacts
on UNGA voting. My emphasis on the nuances of settlement interactions to the relationship of
UNGA voting, and my examination of dispute case studies involving China to further clarify
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these relationships, all contribute to advancement in scholarly research on the impacts of
territorial disputes directly between the disputants and on other states in the UNGA. Further,
these findings present some relevance to policymakers, such as increasing awareness as to the
potential impacts territorial dispute interactions can have beyond the direct dispute itself, which
may need to be taken into account depending on the specific dispute to encourage peaceful
settlement. Lastly, this dissertation has the potential to shape future examinations of both
territorial disputes and UNGA voting behavior for other factor of interest, which may shape and
influence how they occur. It is likely that other variables of interest remain to be examined as
well in more fully understanding this relationship, which opens up additional lines of inquiry into
the future.
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Table 1: Regression Testing Interactions between Settlement Attempts and UNGA Voting on a
Global Sample of Territorial Disputes, 1946-2015.
IVs
MID Onset
Negotiations
Arbitration
Adjudication
CONTROLS
CINC Ratio
Strategic Rivalry
Rivalry
Enduring Rivalry
Trade
Homeland (C)
Homeland (T)
Population Salience
Resource Salience
Strategic Salience
Identity (C)
Identity (T)
Historical (C)
Historical (T)
Offshore
Entirety Claimed
Polyarchy
Liberal Dem.
Deliberative Dem.
Participatory Dem.
Egalitarian Dem.
Peace Years
Peace Years2
Peace Years3
_cons
N
Prob > F
R-Squared
Adj. R-Squared

Coefficient
0.080**
-0.114***
0.038
-0.129**

S.E.
0.027
0.023
0.753
0.053

5.928***
0.103***
-0.114**
-0.065
2.37e-06***
0
-0.470***
0.081**
0.030
0.158***
0.392***
-0.274***
0.013
0.059
-0.164***
0.092
1.286***
-0.840***
0.802***
-1.255***
0
-0.003
-0.000
6.70e-07
0.646
3,336
0.0000
0.2780
0.2723
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

0.285
0.023
0.043
0.040
4.07e-07
Omitted
0.053
0.026
0.023
0.023
0.053
0.052
0.021
0.059
0.030
0.075
0.164
0.208
0.203
0.263
Omitted
0.003
0.000
5.02e-07
0.103
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Figure 1.1 Predicted Probabilities of MID Onset on UNGA Voting Alignment in the Global
Sample of Territorial Disputes, 1946-2015.
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Figure 1.2 Predicted Probabilities of Negotiations on UNGA Voting Alignment in the Global
Sample of Territorial Disputes, 1946-2015.

201

Figure 1.3 Predicted Probabilities of Arbitration on UNGA Voting Alignment in the Global
Sample of Territorial Disputes, 1946-2015.
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Figure 1.4 Predicted Probabilities of Adjudication on UNGA Voting Alignment in the Global
Sample of Territorial Disputes, 1946-2015.
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Table 2: Regression Testing Interactions between Settlement Attempts and Percent Agreement
UNGA Voting with US and China, 1971-2015.

IVs
MID Onset
Negotiations
Arbitration
Adjudication
CONTROLS
CINC Ratio
Strategic Rivalry
Rivalry
Enduring Rivalry
Trade
Homeland (C)
Homeland (T)
Population Salience
Resource Salience
Strategic Salience
Identity (C)
Identity (T)
Historical (C)
Historical (T)
Offshore
Entirety Claimed
Polyarchy
Liberal Dem.
Deliberative Dem.
Participatory Dem.
Egalitarian Dem.
Peace Years
Peace Years2
Peace Years3
_cons
N
Prob > F
R-Squared
Adj. R-Squared

Percent Agree
US
Coefficient
0.016**
-0.020***
-0.002
-0.028**

S.E.
0.005
0.004
0.014
0.010

Percent Agree
China
Coefficient
0.011
0.004
0.093***
-0.009

1.154***
0.054
1.164***
0.022***
0.004
0.020***
-0.039***
0.008
-0.040***
0.020**
0.008
0.010
1.69e-06***
7.64e-08
8.41e-7***
0
Omitted
0
-0.090***
0.010
-0.108***
0.009
0.005
0.001
0.017***
0.004
-0.010*
0.010*
0.004
0.034***
0.070***
0.010
0.020
-0.028**
0.010
-0.013
0.012**
0.004
0.001
-0.004
0.011
-0.031
-0.015**
0.006
-0.037***
-0.027
0.014
0.001
0.261***
0.307
0.124***
-0.006
0.039
-0.106*
-0.057
0.038
0.203***
-0.214***
0.049
-0.107*
0
Omitted
0
-0.001
0.001
0.002**
0.000*
0.000
-0.000*
-2.03e-07*
9.37e-08
0.000
0.099
0.019
0.165***
3,353
2,331
0.000
0.000
0.381
0.355
0.376
0.348
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
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S.E.
0.006
0.005
0.018
0.010
0.065
0.005
0.008
0.008
7.26e-8
Omitted
0.012
0.006
0.005
0.005
0.014
0.014
0.005
0.019
0.006
0.014
0.032
0.042
0.043
0.051
Omitted
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.027

Figure 2.1 Predicted Probabilities of MID Onset and Percent UNGA Voting Agreement with US
and China, 1971-2015.
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Figure 2.2 Predicted Probabilities of Negotiations and Percent UNGA Voting Agreement with
US and China, 1971-2015.
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Figure 2.3 Predicted Probabilities of Arbitration and Percent UNGA Voting Agreement with US
and China, 1971-2015.
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Figure 2.4 Predicted Probabilities of Adjudication and Percent UNGA Voting Agreement with
US and China, 1971-2015.
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Table 3: China-Russia Territorial Dispute Interactions and UNGA Voting, 1971-2009
Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Peaceful
Attempt
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
-

Violent
Attempt
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
-

Ideal Point
China
-1.005798
-0.748928
-0.632851
-0.876150
-0.304762
-1.039168
-0.808055
-0.269900
-0.068625
-0.043389
-0.049958
0.161219
0.166471
0.152464
0.159504
0.148145
0.162682
-0.05538
-0.100480
-0.163954
-0.298786
-0.695594
-1.351557
-1.596892
-1.520172
-1.320387
-1.176031
-0.425443
-0.627692
-0.734635
-0.574465
-0.514684
-0.893533
-0.837560
-0.737064
-0.865834
-0.624256
-0.638445
-0.620556
-0.848149
-0.705319
-0.825919

209

Ideal Point
Russia
-2.472733
-2.094426
-2.181508
-2.089906
-2.362317
-2.004792
-2.413198
-2.361727
-2.238038
-2.074371
-1.980956
-1.907985
-1.834074
-1.320554
-1.417421
-0.877877
-0.951497
-0.766197
-0.643784
-0.160954
0.676315
1.095015
1.312539
1.110595
1.211173
0.764989
0.569508
0.511173
0.418559
0.216840
0.202670
0.287654
0.273193
0.135905
0.099269
-0.182683
-0.06459
-0.191419
-0.036537
0.050026
-0.142746
0.139001

Ideal Point
Difference
1.466934
1.345498
1.548656
1.213755
2.057554
0.965623
1.605143
2.091826
2.169412
2.030982
1.930997
2.069205
2.000546
1.473008
1.576925
1.026022
1.11418
0.710812
0.543303
0.002999
0.975101
1.79061
2.664096
2.707487
2.641345
2.085376
1.74554
0.936616
1.046252
0.951476
0.777135
0.802338
1.166727
0.973466
0.836334
0.683151
0.559664
0.447026
0.584018
0.898175
0.562573
0.964921

Change
Direction
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge

Table 3 continued
Year
Peaceful
Attempt
2013
2014
2015
-

Violent
Attempt
-

Ideal Point
China
-0.488547
-0.786504
-0.224946

210

Ideal Point
Russia
0.021566
0.094876
0.218520

Ideal Point
Difference
0.510114
0.881380
0.443466

Change
Direction
Converge
Diverge
Converge

Table 4: China-India Territorial Dispute Interactions and UNGA Voting, 1971-2015
Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Peaceful
Attempt
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Violent
Attempt
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0

Ideal Point
China
-1.005798
-0.748928
-0.632851
-0.876150
-0.304762
-1.039168
-0.808055
-0.269900
-0.068625
-0.043389
-0.049958
0.161219
0.166471
0.152464
0.159504
0.148145
0.162682
-0.055384
-0.100480
-0.163954
-0.29878
-0.695594
-1.351557
-1.596892
-1.520172
-1.32038
-1.17603
-0.425443
-0.627692
-0.734635
-0.574465
-0.514684
-0.893533
-0.837560
-0.737064
-0.865834
-0.624256
-0.638445
-0.620556
-0.848249
-0.705319
-0.825919
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Ideal Point
India
-0.840080
-0.443996
-0.354511
-0.865518
-0.273817
-0.438988
-0.299237
-0.0742285
-0.253979
-0.476265
-0.417178
-0.601465
-0.360416
-0.401528
-0.514108
-0.763564
-0.702626
-0.563255
-0.796083
-0.843021
-0.696547
-0.725823
-1.148786
-1.341136
-1.618566
-1.648031
-1.109218
-0.678423
-0.610495
-0.603020
-0.627477
-0.129937
-0.125967
-0.403894
-0.224291
-0.550319
-0.464132
-0.656581
-0.475199
-0.529852
-0.510895
-0.623534

Ideal
Difference
0.1657174
0.3049326
0.2783397
0.010632
0.030945
0.600180
0.508818
0.195615
0.185353
0.432876
0.367219
0.762684
0.526887
0.553992
0.673612
0.91171
0.865308
0.507870
0.695602
0.679066
0.397761
0.032286
0.202771
0.255756
0.098394
0.327644
0.066813
0.252980
0.017197
0.131614
0.053011
0.384746
0.767566
0.433666
0.512772
0.315515
0.160124
0.018136
0.145356
0.318297
0.194424
0.202385

Change
Direction
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge

Table 4 continued
Year
Peaceful
Attempt
2013
1
2014
1
2015
1

Violent
Attempt
0
0
0

Ideal Point
China
-0.488547
-0.786504
-0.224946

212

Ideal Point
India
-0.583346
-0.800663
-0.135174

Ideal
Difference
0.094798
0.014159
0.089772

Change
Direction
Converge
Converge
Diverge

Table 5: China-Vietnam Territorial Dispute Interactions and UNGA Voting, 1971-2015
Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Peaceful
Attempt
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Violent
Attempt
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Ideal Point
China
-0.808055
-0.269900
-0.068625
-0.043389
-0.049958
0.161219
0.166471
0.152464
0.159504
0.148145
0.162682
-0.55384
-0.100480
-0.163954
-0.298786
-0.695594
-1.351557
-1.596892
-1.520172
-1.320387
-1.176031
-0.425443
-0.627692
-0.734635
-0.574465
-0.514684
-0.893533
-0.837560
-0.737064
-0.865834
-0.624256
-0.638445
-0.620556
-0.848149
-0.705319
-0.825919

213

Ideal Point
Vietnam
-1.114945
-0.958503
-1.232734
-1.494475
-1.749747
-1.634229
-1.592337
-1.448861
-1.588699
-1.508391
-1.231522
-1.244139
-0.741020
-0.898298
-1.044067
-1.304068
-1.564829
-1.648241
-1.554147
-1.464186
-1.565615
-1.332127
-1.428839
-1.287646
-1.420417
-1.446776
-1.49806
-1.462409
-1.394336
-1.432585
-1.231114
-1.291166
-1.262436
-1.300602
-1.175198
-1.121792

Ideal
Difference
0.306889
0.688602
1.164109
1.451085
1.699788
1.795448
1.758808
1.601326
1.748203
1.656536
1.394204
1.188755
0.640539
0.734344
0.745281
0.608472
0.213272
0.051348
0.033975
0.143799
0.389584
0.906684
0.801145
0.553010
0.845951
0.932091
0.604527
0.624848
0.657271
0.56675
0.606857
0.652720
0.64188
0.452452
0.469878
0.295872

Change
Direction
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Converge

Table 5 continued
Year
Peaceful
Attempt
2013
0
2014
0
2015
0

Violent
Attempt
0
0
0

Ideal Point
China
-0.488547
-0.786504
-0.224946

214

Ideal Point
Vietnam
-1.09201
-1.069775
-1.057054

Ideal
Difference
0.603461
0.283271
0.832107

Change
Direction
Diverge
Converge
Diverge

Table 6: China-Japan Territorial Dispute Interactions and UNGA Voting, 1971-2015
Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Peaceful
Attempt
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Violent
Attempt
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0

Ideal Point
China
-1.005798
-0.748928
-0.632851
-0.876150
-0.304762
-1.039168
-0.808055
-0.269900
-0.068625
-0.043389
-0.049958
0.161219
0.166471
0.152464
0.159504
0.148145
0.162682
-0.055384
-0.100480
-0.163954
-0.298786
-0.695594
-1.351557
-1.596892
-1.520172
-1.320387
-1.176031
-0.425443
-0.627692
-0.734635
-0.574465
-0.514684
-0.893533
-0.837560
-0.737064
-0.865834
-0.624256
-0.638445
-0.620556
-0.848149
-0.705319
-0.825919

215

Ideal Point
Japan
0.832418
1.281603
1.172948
0.942564
0.939354
1.218138
1.130449
1.049927
1.174535
1.228904
1.272063
1.251746
1.292274
1.372912
1.344655
1.324362
1.316847
1.383989
1.469349
1.465591
1.279036
1.013757
1.207474
1.228352
0.991576
1.068965
0.865223
0.788789
0.753941
0.749388
0.796971
0.794361
0.776992
0.796298
0.745431
0.897749
0.634273
0.562665
0.634472
0.669961
0.713827
0.665612

Ideal
Difference
1.838216
2.030532
1.805799
1.818715
1.244117
2.257306
1.938505
1.319828
1.24316
1.272294
1.322021
1.090527
1.125803
1.220448
1.185151
1.176217
1.154165
1.439374
1.56983
1.629545
1.577822
1.709351
2.559031
2.825244
2.511748
2.389351
2.041255
1.214233
1.381634
1.484024
1.371438
1.309046
1.670525
1.633859
1.482496
1.763584
1.258531
1.201111
1.255029
1.518111
1.419147
1.491532

Change
Direction
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge

Table 6 continued
Year
Peaceful
Attempt
2013
0
2014
0
2015
0

Violent
Attempt
0
0
0

Ideal Point
China
-0.488546
-0.786504
-0.224946

216

Ideal Point
Japan
0.772771
0.958784
0.743213

Ideal
Difference
1.261319
1.745289
0.968160

Change
Direction
Converge
Diverge
Converge

Table 7: China-Philippines Territorial Dispute Interactions and UNGA Voting, 1971-2015
Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Peaceful
Attempt
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

Violent
Attempt
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Ideal Point
China
-1.005798
-0.748928
-0.632851
-0.876150
-0.304762
-1.039168
-0.808055
-0.269900
-0.068625
-0.043389
-0.049958
0.161219
0.166471
0.152464
0.159504
0.148145
0.162682
-0.055384
-0.100480
-0.163954
-0.298786
-0.695594
-1.351557
-1.596892
-1.520172
-1.320387
-1.176031
-0.425443
-0.627692
-0.734635
-0.574465
-0.514684
-0.893533
-0.837560
-0.737064
-0.865834
-0.624256
-0.638445
-0.620556
-0.848149
-0.705319
-0.825919

217

Ideal Point
Philippines
0.395435
0.445758
0.073193
0.210993
0.199811
-0.178519
0.076316
0.050305
0.001289
-0.010042
-0.180625
0.170754
0.239412
-0.011363
-0.033545
-0.164143
-0.213428
-0.049720
-0.126265
-0.621123
-0.737661
-0.441215
-0.668901
-0.476171
-0.538597
-0.624419
-0.850460
-0.856713
-0.811444
-0.483924
-0.396834
-0.431338
-0.506995
-0.435540
-0.448114
-0.463534
-0.43799
-0.488148
-0.480300
-0.481820
-0.331382
-0.423483

Ideal
Difference
1.401234
1.194687
0.706044
1.087144
0.504573
0.860648
0.884372
0.320206
0.069915
0.033347
0.130666
0.009534
0.072941
0.163827
0.193049
0.312288
0.376110
0.005663
0.025785
0.457169
0.438875
0.254379
0.682655
1.120721
0.981574
0.695966
0.325570
0.431270
0.183751
0.250711
0.177631
0.083345
0.386537
0.402020
0.288950
0.402300
0.186261
0.150297
0.140255
0.366328
0.373937
0.402436

Change
Direction
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge

Table 7 continued
Year
Peaceful
Attempt
2013
1
2014
1
2015
1

Violent
Attempt
0
0
0

Ideal Point
China
-0.488546
-0.786504
-0.224946

218

Ideal Point
Philippines
-0.477756
-0.457934
-0.466816

Ideal
Difference
0.010791
0.328570
0.241869

Change
Direction
Converge
Diverge
Converge

Table 8: China-US Total Territorial Dispute Interactions and UNGA Voting, 1971-2015
Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Peaceful
Attempt(s)
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
3
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
3
2
1
3
1
1
2
3
2
2
2
2

Violent
Attempt(s)
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
2
1
0
0
0
0
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
3
3
1
1
0
2
0
2
1
0
0

Ideal Point
China
-1.005798
-0.748928
-0.632851
-0.876150
-0.304762
-1.039168
-0.808055
-0.269900
-0.068625
-0.043389
-0.049958
0.161219
0.166471
0.152464
0.159504
0.148145
0.162682
-0.055384
-0.100480
-0.163954
-0.298786
-0.695594
-1.351557
-1.596892
-1.520172
-1.320387
-1.176031
-0.425443
-0.627692
-0.734635
-0.574465
-0.514684
-0.893533
-0.837560
-0.737064
-0.865834
-0.624256
-0.638445
-0.620556
-0.848149
-0.705319
-0.825919

219

Ideal Point
US
1.714252
2.109892
2.150352
2.048959
2.396126
2.691913
2.292782
2.270893
2.332264
2.416651
2.732683
2.610053
2.623879
2.798987
2.825391
2.957062
3.026928
3.026567
3.100612
3.049283
2.930121
2.959768
2.925993
2.957176
3.155592
3.130425
3.001963
2.862664
2.713628
2.689113
2.682369
2.755723
2.931988
2.865051
2.936058
2.836643
2.771993
2.774131
2.589479
2.550539
2.530669
2.632266

Ideal
Difference
2.72005
2.85882
2.783203
2.925109
2.700888
3.731081
3.100837
2.540793
2.400889
2.46004
2.782641
2.448834
2.457408
2.646523
2.665887
2.808917
2.864246
3.081951
3.201092
3.213237
3.228907
3.655362
4.27755
4.554068
4.675764
4.450812
4.177994
3.288107
3.34132
3.423748
3.256834
3.270407
3.825521
3.702611
3.673122
3.702477
3.396249
3.412576
3.210035
3.398688
3.235988
3.458185

Change
Direction
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Diverge
Converge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge
Converge
Diverge

Table 8 continued
Year
Peaceful
Attempt(s)
2013
2
2014
2
2015
2

Violent
Attempt(s)
0
0
0

Ideal Point
China
-0.488546
-0.786504
-0.224946

220

Ideal Point
US
2.729899
2.718152
2.613841

Ideal
Difference
3.218445
3.504656
2.838787

Change
Direction
Converge
Diverge
Converge
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